

AR DEFERSE COMME

IN THE

CUBER CRISIS

OCTOBER-DECEMBER 1862

FOREWORD

This study has been written by many holds. Its authors are historians of the Headquarters. Air Befense Command and ABC's air divisions. Specifically, the contributors are as influence Chapter I was prepared by Mr. Richard F. Somiles Chapter II by Mr. Denys Volant Chapter iff by Mr. Gensells of Grover C. Jarrett: Chapter IV by Mr. John ag Dennison: Chapter by Wilss Rath Dampler. Co.pter VI by Mr. James McRussell; Chapter VII by Mr. James McRussell; Chapter VII by Mr. James McRussell; Chapter VIII by Technical organization. Benjarin T. Siler.

No attempt has been made by the Lathers to assess the Cuban experience. The chapters were written too soon after the event to hake thispossible, even if an historian's assessment were desirable. Also, no organizational formation stylistic standards were imposed on the additions. Consequently, there are inconsistencies and much the presentations. Collectively, the authors wish to acknowledge the cooperation of the dedicated officers and airmed of the Air Bofense Command, who displayed unusual understanding and putterno with them as they got underfoot in a heetic stiort to preserve the memory of a significant experience in air despise operations.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER ONE: THE BACKGROUND: "SOUTHERN TIP".			1
CHARTER TWO: THE OCTOBER CRISIS	,		20
CHAFTER THREE: THE 25TH AIR DIVISION (SAGE)			30
Proporations			34
Fighter Interceptor Operations			44
" - served Conditions at Paint Field			4.5
57th Fighter Group			32
Sisth FIS Returned to McChard AFB.		. ,	5.0
Dolonious fion of Corps: Capatility			21.41
Support for Siskiyou Dispersal Sord, 84th FIS at Kingsley Field AMS Participation in Cuban Cfisis			5.5
90rd &4.5 FTS at Fineslev Field			5.7
ANG Participation in Cuban Officia			58
F-102 Lost on Flight from Paine Field.			59
Termination of Dispersal			59
Surveillance and Defection			60
Interference at Klamath Air Force Station.	•		6.1
Maintenance of Eadar Equipment			69
Surface-to-Air Missiles	•		59
Ministlement topote	•		-₩n
Miscellaneous Aspects. Manning in the Combet Center Direction Centers	•		71)
Examing in the Combit Center Direction Centers Interceptor Force Survival Survival of Essential Facilities Sub Contact Quebec 23. Exercises and Evaluations Cancelled. SAC Runs Amainst FBS Sites Continued Exercises Sites Continued			70
interceptor force burviva:	,		
Survival of Essential facilities	•		70
Sun Contact Quebec 23.	1		***
Exercises and Evaluations Cancelled.	*		# 1 P
SAC RUAS ATRINSI FBS Sites Continued			-
Reflections on the Cuban Crisis Participation.	,		1.
			~ .
CHAPTER FOUR: THE 26TH AIR DIVISION (SAGE)		* - 1	,
			** /:
Alext,			15-
Command and Control,	ı		59
Alext Control			88
Texas Towars			
Missiles			96
Problems and Lessons			21.1
Conclusion			100

CHAPTER FIVE: THE 28TH AIR DIVISION (SAGE). (b/) Dispersal Ordered (b/) The Dispersal Situation.			. 112
			113
Dispared Ordanod	•	•	111
The Dispersal Situation Status of the Program. Air Lift Problems. Security Problems. Sabotage Alert Special Problems at Siskiyou Williams AFB	•	*	117
Min Diamana 1 Olamana 1	•	•	120
The Dispersal Situation	٠	1	120
Status of the Program	•	•	. 120
Air Lift Problems	٠	•	. 121
Security Problems	-		124
Sabotage Alert			. 125
Special Problems at Siskiyou			. 136
Williams AFB			. 128
Rotation			. 130
A SAC Dispersal Problem		,	. 132
Waintaining Bispersa' Capability	Ċ		. 135
AFWER Americans			133
Crosses Monotone	•	•	175
DOMESTICA STRUCTURE CONTRACTOR CO	٠	•	
ing to the see arms squarron	•	•	120
nickey souse.	•		. 133
Fly Speck L. France Control of the Annual Control of the Control o	-	٠	. 141
Fly Speck II	٠	٠	. jai
Effects of the Alert			1.1.1
Dramatica and the second secon			. 145
Special Problems at Siskiyou Williams AFB Rotation A SAC Dispersal Problem. Maintaining Dispersal Capability AEWAC Operations Station Manning TOY to the 966 AEWAC Squadron Mickey Wouse Fly Speck I Fly Speck I Effects of the Alert		,	. 149
Comments on Contingency Operations			. 150
Follow Up Action on Dispersal			. 150
Summary.			. 161
CHAPTER SIN: THE SOTH AIR DIVISION (SAGE)			163
Charles and the second	•	,	
CONAD/NORAD and the RCAF			104
CONNEY NORTH THE THE NUMBER OF THE PARTY OF	• .	*	2 4 C 12
Deployment	*	•	100
ist righter wing Deployment,	•	•	, <u>1(4</u>
327th Fighter Group Deployment	4	٠	. 179
1st Fighter Wing Deployment. 327th Fighter Group Deployment. Dispersal	4		100
SUID-Air Division Dispersal Figh			
Dispersal October 22, 1960		*	. 397
Facilities at the Dispersal Cases,			20
of the second transform the second of the se			**
Navigation Aids		-	209
	Ċ		. 216
Burnanet an Dispares	1	•	223.5
CARL CONTRACTOR OF THE CONTRAC	*		ستان مساستان مساستان مرادی
The Allendary of the Committee of the Co	•	١.	v #4%. 3191¢
THE OTHER DESIGNATE COMMAND OF WARRENESS AND A STATE OF THE PROPERTY OF THE PR		٠.	. 610
Remain funda, Director 2	٠	*	419
Communications Social ty Personnel on Dispersal The Stretegic Air Command Dispersal BONARC Under DEFOON 3	١.	2 .	2 4 4 E

Air National Guard and the Cuban									
The Ground Environment									024
Whither SAC?									200
Alert Status, Training and Transp	50 mi								349
mint provide the transfer									
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE SEND AIR DIVISION	((\$	5AO	F' }			,			21
CONAD Task Force 32									24.3
Time Cround Environment,									240
The Key West CCC									
Detachment 1, CONAD Task Force 32	,	•	-						200
The Fighter-Interceptor Parce									
Chacopt of Pightor Operations									
Arroraft dhistorance and Araument		•	•	•				•	د شد د سرد
FAA Activities.	•	-		•			•		ايتيا
weather support	-	•		•	•			•	
Army Air Detense Attillery									
"Failing Loaves"									
La-Level Surveillance				-					11200
Sammary and Conclusions	٠	•						,	Cu.
CHEPTTH RIGHT: THE TURD AIR DIVISION	(*	Eà	PO	88	j				1
Legistics									Since
Sirorait Martenance									
Return to horselev									1.1

CHAPTER ONE

THE BACKGROUND -- "SOUTHERN TIP"

The reaction in the United States was generally invorable when Fidel Castro came down out of the Cubun sountains in late 1958 and ousted the dictator Batista in January 1959. Events of the next two years, however, offered adequate proof that Castro's Cuba was no friend of the United States. There was increasing evidence that Cuba, despite its location, had been drawn behind the Iron Curtain. On January 1961 the Eisenhower administration, as one of its last official acts, broke diplomatic relations with Cuba.

The emergence of a Communist state of the Florida context, plus intolligence concerning the lengthening of the pour rapways and the building of thespile pads, and it

prugent to look to the defenses of south Florida. There will no likelihood of a major offensive strike from Co. ... but Castro was believed capable of nutsance raids against Miana. where many of his opposents and taken rejugo, and other cities of south Florida: CONAL (the U. S., element of NORAL) decided to take but insurance for south Florids in the form of a "Contingency Plan for Augmenting the Air Berenses of Southern Florida, " dated 5 January 1961. This plan recommended use of radars at key bort and the Miami-Homescens Alm area in Florida and the Shaw AFB and Myrtle Beach areas in South Carolina for early warning and the control of interceptors deployed at Key West and Homestead . The Key West interceptors were to be Navy nirerall. Those at Househead were to be k-102A sircraft from ABC's Tyndall AFD. As the initial plan was written in January 1961. ADC was a participare only to the extent of providing a contingent of alert interceptors for Homestead and the communications limitation needed to weld the various cleavats into an operating wir defense system.

^{1.} NOTORN EX CANADA, CONAD Operation Plan 1-01, "Contingency Plan for Applicating the Air Defenses of Southern Florida, " Light 1961 Don 90 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jan 1861].

Oddly enough the only permanently haved dir torco interceptor Strength in the area, the 76th FIS at Sechy los in the process of moving to the northeast at the time 2. Shorter art for strongthering the defenses at Classic developed. In order to position the diminishing intercourse force as meanly astrade probable enemy income, a course, as possible, 1849, in the sunger of 1969, had abneutral tre transfer of the 76th FIS tran McPar to Western AFR to Massachusetts. The 26th had disposed of most of P-801 aircraft by the end of 1960 and aircrews and supposed carsonnel had begun to move north. f-102A intercentors for the re-equipped squadros began to arrive at bullower in Pubeunry 1961 and by end-April the 76th was jully east pood. Unfortunately, the 76th, when seeded to block to this is Macatebranets

On 7 April 1961, the JCS, through CONAD, ordered a two-week test of the Contingency plan for south Floridi (blobhamed SCUTHERN TIP), beginning 12 April. Typicall caphoyed Six F-102, aircraft to Homestead, where two

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-27,000

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^{2.} Memo for Rec., "76 FIS Capability to Support F/TF-102 Attornatt," n.d., ca. 31 Jan 1861 | Doc 352 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1961; Msg 26MDC 2-3, "25 AD to ADC, 10 Feb 1961 [Doc 354 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1961]; Minutes, Program Dentrol Committee, ADC, 25 Apr 1961 [Doc 356 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1961].

1 September interceptors were maintained in flyc-minute-alert status at all times All elements of SOUTHERN TIP were on hand on 12 April except the radar picket ship, USS Projector, which encountered rough seas and arrived on station 36 nours late. The Navy, in fact, did more than was asked of it by voluntarily providing a second picket ship, the USS Searcher, and three WV-2 airborne early-warning and control aircrais (Navy version of APC s RC/121D AEWEC craft) shortly after the exercise got underway. This makeshift air detense system was in being when the abortive invasion of Caba by anti-Castro forces occurred on 17 April; The two-week suitability test of the south Floring defenses did not end on 26 april as originally scheduled. The following day the JCS directed that SOUTHERN TIP con-*Lage indefinitely. phases were as follows: A SERVER ADOOP-P 7411 ADC NO USAR & Apr. 1961 | Doc 388

in Hist of ADC. Jan-Jun-1961 | Mag 22000-240, 32 AD to ADC. 19 April961 | Dec 11 in 22 AD Study, "The Air Defense Buildin Southern Florica, January-Devember 19611, hereafter cited as #32 AD Study and the second second

The BCS agreed to implementation of Phase II on 29 May 1951; but added that action on Phases III and IV would have to apart further political and military developments.

The lengthening of SOUTHERN TIP into a commitment of indefinite duration brought changes in the basic plan match increased ADC's stake in the operation. The temporary interceptor detachment from Tyndall was to be replaced by a more-or-less permanent contingent of the 450ga Fl from Seymour-Johnson AFB in North Carolina. The tempor retact radar at Richmond Naval Air Station (Florida) was to be replaced with ADC equipment. The three Navy 6V-2 AEW-C aircraft were to be replaced with an AEWAC detachment provided by ABC.

After these devisions had been made by the JCS and CONAD, the story of SOUTHERN TIP, so far as ADC was concerned, what an account of ADC's attempts to furnish the men and

^{4.} Hist of NOPAD, Jan-Jun 1961, pp. 84-85; Ltr. CONAD to JCS, "Air Defense in the Southern Florida Area," 27 Apr 1961 [Dec 13 in 32 AD Study]; Msg COOPAN 163, CEPAGE to JCS, 15 May 1961 [Doc 100 in Rist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1961].

^{5.} Msg AFOOP 78604, USAF to ADC, 6 Jun 1861 [B. 55 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1861]; Msg AFOAC-EG 1186, AD7 66 USAF, 8 Jun 1861 [Doc 36 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1861]. NOTORN EX CARADA, Msg. A NOP-E 1257, ADC to SSAF, 15 Jun 1861 [Doc 37 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1861]; Msg ADOOP-E 1354, ACC to USAF, 26 Jun 1861 [Doc 105 in Histoff ADC, Jan-Jun 1861]; Msg ADOOP-EI 1358, ADC to 26 AD, 35 Jun 1861 [Doc 106 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1861].

. . .

equipment required. Provision of a portion of the interceptor force (the Navy also had interceptors based at Rey
Most) was possibly the simplest of the required notion of a
consemplish. While the TOrd Air Division at Typonal felt it
could ill-afford the absence of six F-102A airc.off from
test activities and obtained ADC permission, in aid-May,
to reduce the number based at Homestead to three, the notion
of ADC interceptors increased to four in July when the not
tachment from the 482nd FIS arrived in Florida. Because it
was necessary to begin repairs to the Homestead runnings in
July, the F-102A interceptors from the 482nd was again
for international Airport until Homestead was again
available.

Approximately 50 officers and mon were required to support the four F-102A's maintained at Kinni. This proof was on temperary duty status until Detachment 1 of the 382nd

E. NSg 730DC X188E, 73 AD to MOADS, 18 MLy 1961 [Doc 366 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1961]; NSg ADIRP-E 1077. ADC to USAF, 23 May 1961 [Doc 361 in Hist of ABC, Jan-Jun 1961]; NSg ADOPC 1109, ADC to 73 AD, 26 May 1961 [Doc 362 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1961]; NSg ADOP-N1 1179, ADC to 73 AD, 6 Jun 1961 [Doc 363 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1961]; NSg AFOOF-BU 76498, USAF, to ALC, 8 Jun 1961 [Doc 364 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1961]; NSg ADOP-PARIL 13, ADC to FAA, 9 Jun 1961 [Doc 365 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1961]; NSg ADOP-N1 1324, ADC to 26 AD 24 Jun 1961 [Doc 369 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1961].

FIS was established on a permanent basis at Homestond in Kovember 1961. The four aircraft (two of them on live-minute-alert status at all times) moved from M on to Homeston in January 1962.

With respect to the MEW&C detachment, however, the difficulties were much greater. While the Navy and materially increased the effectiveness of the initial SOUTHERS TIP system by gratuitously providing WY-2 aircraft for ALLAC use it as the desire of the 32nd CCNAD Region and CONAD that ADC furnish the long-haul AEW&C capability. The Navy cooperatively offered to loan ADC six operational WY-2 aircraft if this gesture would help maintain rudar surveillance over the Florida Straits.

The immediate question, then, was the manner in which this requirement was to be met. ADC, on 15 June 1851. sau four possible methods. One plan (Plan A) involved stuging RC-12 aircraft From Otis AFB (Massachuselts) and using Key Wes as a turn-around base. The Navy WV-2 around the control of the cont

^{7.} Msg ADMDC 1969, ADC to SAC, 15 Sep 1961 [hit]: 10 ADOCF EI 2078, ADC to SAC, 27 Sep 1961 [HRF]: Msg ADISH ED 14 ADC to 26 AD, 25 Oct 1961 [HRF]: FCS: LAF-VI4, ADC 2 Feb 150 [HRF].

^{8.} NOFORN, Msg 326 310, 32 084D 8gn to COLL 8 May 1861 [Doc 99 in first of ADC Jan-Tun 1961]; Msg AFOOP 75704; USAF to ADC 6 Jun 1961 [Doc 35 in Hist of ABC Jun 1961].

would not be utilized under this plan, which would mean the abandonment of one and one-third AEWaC stations off the East Coast. Plan B called for manning of the WV-2 arcraft with ADT crews and basing the operation at Key West. This would involve the loss of one and one-half surveillance stations on either the East of West Coasts until additional arrection of either the East of West Coasts until additional arrection of all be trained. Plan C would simply assign the significant arrection car situation of canded. Plan D required no Albact arrection and but involved secting the low-level surveillance requirement shrough installation of gap-filler radars at Naples. West Palm Beach and Carathen Island. ADC interest the limits plan as furnishing the required capability without rethering AEWAC inverse in arcis ADC feet were also critical.

Actually, none of the tour plans are a up by the word placed in effect. Instead, pending JCS decision on the trace positions, ADC was asked to man one ADNAC start. A full the Florida Straits on an "on will" basis. No AENAC pirelate were to be scattened to Florida, but within 12 hours of materication by CONAD, the AENAC Wing at Otis was to supply sufficiencyalized t, based at Emplif, to cover the Florida Stimits 12 hours.

^{9.} SOFOLN EX CANADA, Mag ADODPAT 1257 ADO to COST, 10 DUE (561 (100 37 to 222) of ADOT Squeduk 1961).

^{110.} Buz abode-E 1444, Abo to BAP, 25 mm t 1 pp e

The JCS, however, thought a defense effort of bounds what greater scope via required in south Florida. Not only did the JCS approve the establishment of three gap fillers to support the radar station at Richmond, but also the probability and deployment of an AEW&C unit to Florida. The JCJ decision was made known to ADC on 29 August 1961.

This crystallization of SOUTHERN TIP policy required, as a first step, determination of adequate locations for the AEW&C unit and the three gap filler radars. The earlier plans for utilization of MacDill as the base for AEW&C were scrapped for two reasons. At first, MacDill had to be removed from consideration because it was one of the base, chosen for inactivation by the Department of Defense, such this action was cancelled, MacDill became unavailable because it was chosen as the headquarters for the new U. S. Strike Command, an organization composed of the Strategic

[[]Cont'd] 105 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jul 1961]; Esg ADCOP-EI 1359, ADC to 26 AD, 28 Jun 1961 (foo 105 in Hist of ADC Jan-Jun 1961); Msg 26LPRO 323-C, 26 AD to 551 AFBAC hg, 30 Jun 1961 [Doc 107 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1961]; Ksg 26 LPR 335-S, 26 CONAD Rgn to ADC, 7 Jul 1961 [Doc 108 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1961]; Msg ADOOP 1493, ADC to USAF, 18 Jul 1961 [Doc 109 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1961]; S51 AEW&C %g Ope Flan 8-61, 28 Aug(1961 [Doc 20 in 32 AD Study].

^{11.} Mag AFOCP-DE-WC 97862, USAF to ADC, 28 Aug 1961 [HRF]; AFC Floc Sys Div, Weekly Act Rept, 8-11 to 1961 [aRF].

Army Corps and the Tactical Air Command. McCoy was therefore chosen as an alternate location, despite the objections of SAC, host command of McCoy. A group of five RC-121D aircraft (two from the Solist AEW&C Wink at Otis and three from the SS2nd AEW&C Wink at Otis and three from the SS2nd AEW&C Wink at McClellan) began operations from McCoy in November 1961 as Detachment 1, 551st Wing. The six WV-2 AEW&C aircraft offered by the Navy had grown to eight by the autumn of 1961 and were undergoing conversion to AIC configuration by the end of the year. These aircraft (to be known as RC-121J) were to replace the RC-121D aircraft at McCoy in the spring of 1962. These former Navy aircraft were to be operated by a new organization, the P66th AEW&C Squadron, under the administrative control of the SS1st AEW&C Wing at Otis.

Acti n to determine sites for the three SOUTHERN TIP gap fillers was taken 14 September 1961. By 12 October, sites for these untended radar had been established at Naples, Lorg Key and Jupiter, all in south Florida. Construction contracts were awarded in mid-December, and near the end of January 1962.

^{12.} Msg AFOOP-BU 71755, USAF to ADC, 19 Oct 1961 [URF]: 3g AFOOP-DE-WC 73111, USAF to ADC, 25 Oct 1961 [HRF]; Msg DPLC 3073, SAC to USAF, 24 Det 1961 [HRF]: Msg AFCUC 76996, USAF to SAC, 3 Nov. 1961 [HRF]: Msg ADMLP 2501, ADC to 25 AD, 14 Nov 1961 [HRF]: Unit Programmed Action Directive 61-24, ADC, 7 Dec 1961 [HRF]: RCS: 1AF+V14, ADC, 29 Nov 1961 [HRF].

it appeared that construction at all three sites would be finished in early March. It these beneficial occupancy dates ore realized, it was antic, pated that the radar equipment could be installed by the end of May 1962.

During the early stages of SOUTHERN TIP, height-firsting capability for the radar station at Richmond was provided by a mobile MPS-14 height finder provided by TAC. It make II SOUTHERN TIP operations required the replacement bit the TAC equipment with two FPS-8 height finders to be operated by ADC crews. The original planning for Phase II anticipated operational readiness of the FPS-8 sets by the error 1961. By late June 1961, however, an operational date of 1 September 1961 had been established.

Hindsight later proved the 1 September date to be impossibly optimistic, although the full extent of the slippade which was to be experienced did not become apparent for several months. In late July it was expected that the necessary construction would be completed by 18 August and

^{13.} Msg ADOAC-LR 1932, ADC to 32 AD, 14 Sep 1961 [HRF]: Msg ADIRP-R 2249, ADC to USAF, 12 Oct 1961 [HRF]: ADC baily Staff Digost N. 116, 25 Oct 1961 [HRF]: ADC. Program Mgmt Div, Weekly Act Rept, 3-9 Nov 1961 [HRF]: AE]. Else Sys Div, Weekly Act Rept, 18-25 Jan 1962 [HRF]:

^{14.} Msg ROZIC: 724. GEEIA to USAF, 28 Jun 1961 [HRF]: Msg AFMME-EE 81146. USAF to GZEIA, 23 Jun 1961 [HF]: Msg ROZICG 727, GEEIA to Eastern GEEIA Rgn 30 Jun 19 [HRF].

that an operational date of 20 September could be met. the latter date approached it was revealed that the radar tower extensions had been received in incomplete form. The construction contractor, to complicate satters, had left the site. operational date of 15 December was suggested. An estimate of the situation in November predicted a January 1962 operational By that time it had been discovered that 235 parts were mitsing from the radar towers provided for Richmond and that a placement parts were exceedingly difficult to obtain. In because ber the Ground Electronic Equipment Installation Agency (GEL.A. sufficients; that a sporational date of 28 February 1902 saget of Reanwhile, the mobile TAC MPS-14 height finder continued in place, citiosuph an ADC ore: had assumed restons that the for its operation and a intenance because TAC could no lumber spare the ammpower.

Although the JCS had approved only Phise II (extended contingency operations) of the four-phase CONAD plan for the difference of South Florida, the SOUTHERN TIP system was gaining a look of permanency by the end of 1961, insofar is ADC involvement wis concerned. A detachment of F-102A interceptors was

^{15.} ADC, ADOAC-E. Weekl, Act Rept, 21-2. Jul. 22-28 Sep. 3-9 Nov and 22-28 Dec 1601 [NGF]: Mag ROZI-3505b, Eastern GEBIA Ren to 35 AD, 20 Nov 1961 [Dec 29 in 22 AD Study]: 32 AD Study pp. 65-66.

permanently established at Pomestead. A squadron of AEW&C attribute was to be permanently in place at McCoy in early 1968. Height-finder radars on solid foundations of steel and concrete were going into Richmond. Three gap-filler radars were being readied to augment the low-level detection apability of the main radar site at Richmond. The time was near when south Florida would be afforded a degree of protection similar to that offered the eastern, northern and western approaches to the Grited States.

The four F-102A interceptors at Homestead were a token force that ADC (and CONAD) was anxious to supplement. One plan, broached in February 1982, called for the transfer of a squadron of F-104 aircraft from the Air National Suard to ADC for use in Florida. USAF showed interest in this proposal, although not all USAF staff offices agreed with ADC as to the manner in which the ANG F-104 sirerift should be used. There was one school of thought which held that the F-164s should be retained by the ANG and that the Homestead alert should be maintained by rotation of ANG aircraft and trews. ADC strongly disapproved of this suggestion. countering with the recommendation that all: ANG F-104 be transferred to ADC. When that harmened; ADC: proposed to save the 71st F S from Selfridge to Homestead and re-equip

it with F-104 aircraft. The remainder of the ANG F-104's were to be used to replace the F-102A interceptors of the 331st FIS at Webb.

USAF finally adopted the ADC position in early sugger and forwarded the ADC proposal to the Department of Defence. Despite repeated inquiries on the part of ADC, the DOD dulaved its decision month after month until mid-October, which a negative decision was rendered. Probably because the situation in Cuba would not permit delay, DOD decided to shirt a squadron of Navy interceptors from Sar Diego to Key west. rather than authorize the re-equipment of the 71st FIS f Loving a transfer from Selfridge to Homestand. The Navy unit was ready to move almost immediately. Re-equipment of the 71st PIS with F-104's obtained from the ANG would have required at least several weeks. On the other hand, Dob approval of the USAF/ADC/CONAD proposal in July would have resulted in combat-ready F-104 aircraft being available in South Florida when the Cuban crisis developed in October.

^{16.} Msg ADCCS 617, ADC to USAF, 2 Mar 1962 [HPF]: Msg APDOP 72866, USAF to SAC, 23 Mar 1962 [HRF]; Msg ADCCR 1072, ADC to USAF, 19 Apr 1962 [HRF].

^{17.} SECRE: NOFORN, MSg ADMDC 1946, ADC to AFIC, 20 Jul 1962 [HRF]; MSg ADDDC 2111, ADC to USAF, & Aug 1962 [HR]; MSg ADOOP-W1 2240, ADC to 32 AD, 23 Aug 1962 [HRF]; MSg ADOOP-W1 2405, ADC to USAF, 12 Sep 1962 [HRF]; MSg 82788, USAF to SAC, 14 Sep 1962 [HRF]; SECRFT-NOTORN, MSG ADOOP-W1 2800, ADC to 28 32, 28 and 36 AID DIVS, 19 Oct 1962 [HRF].

At any rate, when the Cuban crisis broke, ADC had four F-102A interceptors in the Southern Tip area. While ADC began making arrangements to furnish an FPS-6 height finder for the FAA radar at Miami in 1961, consideration of the use of a second SOUTHERN TIP radar at Key West did not begin until early 1962. The Navy already had FPS-37 and FPS-6 radars in operation at Key West and it was possible to link both the Miami and Key West radars with Montgomery Air before Sector (MOADS) at Gunter AFB, Alabama, and thereby improve radar surveillance in the direction of Cuba. Some thought was given to replacement of the Navy's FPS-37 with an ADC FPS-20 radar, but an evaluation of the FPS-37 in Har 1962 revealed that it could offer performance that was almost equal to that of the FPS-20. It was therefore decided to retain the F 3-37. Meanwhile, a third radar station was added to the SOUTHERN TIP network with the addition of AFSCowned FPS-66 (an improved FPS-20) at Patrick AFE, the support base for Cape Canaveral. To differentiate the SOUTHERN TIP radar network from the regular ADC network, these three Stations were given special code names -- Z-208 (Rey west); Z-219 (Richmond NAS) and Z-213 (Patrizer,

^{18.} Msg ADOAC-EE 868, ADC to USAF, 30 Mar 1962 (HRF): Msg ADOAC-E 1461, ADC to USAF, 24 May 1962 (HRF): Msg ADOAC-EG 1460, ADC to USAF, 29 May 1962 [HRF]; Msg ADOAC-AP 1472,

The radar installation at Key West was the one which presented the most problems. Because the Navy FPS-37 scarch radar and FPS-6 height finder were not supported by the equipment required for heavy and sustained air defense operations, both the Navy and ADC agreed that it would be necessary to build a Ground Cor rolled Intercept (GCI) building at a new location at Key West and provide another FPS-37 (to be supplied by the Navy) and another FPS-6 (supplied by ADC). This building was still in the design stages in early September 1962. Meanwhile, operations with the existing FPS-37 were scopardized in late September when mechanical failure became "him by probable." It was also discovered, upon closer examination, that the antenna of the FPS-37 was corroded. In this situation, ADC recommended tha TAC provide a mobil. search radar either until the rold FPS-27 could be repaired or the new PPS-37 (to be erected in conjunction with the GCI building) was available. The TAC mobile radar was in blace 15 at Key West by 10 October.

[[]Cont'd] ADC to USAF 31 MLy 1962 [H.C]: MSg ADOAC-ER 1661, ADC to USAF, 6 Jul 1962 [HRF]: ADC, ADOAC, Weekly Act Rept, 1 Jun, 15 Jun, 29 Jun 1962 [HRF].

^{19.} Msg 320DC 7974, 32 AD to CONAD, 30 Jul 1962 [HRF]: Msg ADOAC-ER 2091, ADC to USAF, 7 Aug 1962 [HRF]: Hsg 32CAC-E 9018, 32 AD to MOADS, 4 Sep 1962 [HRF]: Msg ADOAC-ER 2338 ADC to 02 AD, 7 Sep 1962 [HRF]: Msg ADOAC-ER 2417, ADC to USAF, 11 Sep 1962 [HRF]: Secret-Noronn EX CANADA, Msg ADOAC-ER 2555,

Construction of the three special SOUTHE IN TIP gap filler radars (Naples, Long Key and Jupiter, Florida) began in late December 1961 and early January 1962. All three gup fillers were designed to provide surveillance information for the prime radar at Miami. Although it was planned that the gap fillers would be operational by 2 July 1962, various delays made it impossible to meet this date. All three, however, were considered 95 per cent operational by 1 October. While the gap fillers were being equipped and tested, CONAD decided that the gap filler at Long Key would also have to provide information to the prime radar site at Key host, although the necessary communications and read-out equipment were not in place when the Cuban crisis erupted. While the gan fillers were under construction the Navy provided a radar picket ship off South Florida to personm part of the function of the gap fillers It was ADC's understanding,

[[]Cont'd] ADC to USAF, 25 Sep 1962 [HRF]; Msg ADOAC-ER 2625 ADC to 32 AD, 1 Oct 1962 [HRF]; Msg ADOAC-ER 2623, ADC to USAF, 11 Sep 1962 [HRF]; Msg ADOAC-ER 2623, ADC to USAF, 18 Oct 1962 [HRF]; Msg ADOAC-ER 2622, ADC to 2781, ADC to USAF, 18 Oct 1962 [HRF]; Msg ADOAC-ER 2622, ADC to 32 AD, 1 Oct 1962 [HRF]; Msg ADOAC-ER 2602, ADC to Eastera GEEIA, 4 Oct 1962 [HRF]; Msg ADOAC-ER 2768, ADC to CLAF, 10 Oct 1962 [HRF]; Msg ADOAC-ER 2774, ADC to USAF, 17 Oct 1962 [HRF]; Msg ADOAC-CO 2775, ADC to 32 AD, 17 Oct 1962 [HRF]; Msg ADOAC-CO 2782, ADC to 5936 Comm Sec Dop Gp, 18 Oct 1962 [HRF]; Msg ADOAC-CE 2793, ADC to USAF, 19 Oct 1962 [HRF]; Msg ADOAC-ER 2793, ADC to USAF, 19 Oct 1962 [HRF]; Msg ADOAC-ER 2811, ADC to SE Div, Navy Bureal of Docks, 19 Oct 1962 [HRF];

in 1991, that the picket ship would be withdrawn when the gap fillers were operational. In mid-October 1962, however, CONAD reached the conclusion that it would be wise to retain the picket ship in Florida waters sadefinitely. The Joint 20 Chiefs of Staff agreed.

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There was no marked increase in ADC's airborne carly warning capability in the SOUTHERN TIP area during the first nine months of 1902. There were five RC-121D aircraft based at McCoy at the end of 1961. Six were available in October. In 1961 it was planned that the WV-2 aircraft furnished by the Navy (the number was variously given as six, seven and eight, but was eventually established at seven) would be modified to the configuration required by ADC and would replace the RC-121D aircraft based at McCoy. Early in 1962, however, it was decided that the Navy planes would be modified to Airborne Long Range Input (ALRI) configuration and that the RC-121D aircraft currently based at

^{20.} ADC, ADOAC, Weelly Alt Rept, 19 Jan, 23 Feb, 2 Nur, 4 May, 25 Jun and 6 Jul 1952 [HRF]; Msg ADOAC-CE 905, ADC to 32 AD - Apr 1962 [HCF]; SECRET-NOFORN EX CARADA, Msg ADOAC-CE 1739, ADC to 32 AD, 27 Jun 1962 [HRF]; Msg ADOAC-ER 2369, ADC to 37 AD, 7 Sep 1962 [HRF]; Msg ADOA-CE 2484, ADC to USAF, IL Sep 1962 [HRF]; Msg ADOCP-EI 2605, ADC to CONAD, 28 Sep 1962 [HFF]; SECRET-NOFORN EX CANADA, Msg ADOAC-CE 2746, ADC to USAF, 15 Oct 1962 [HRF].

McCoy would remain there. Thus, the AEW&C capability established at McCoy in 1961 was essentially unchanged when \$21\$ the October crisis came.

^{21.} CCS: 1AF-V14, ADC, 31 Jan and 3 Oct 1962 [HRF]; ADC, ADOAC, Weekly Act Rept, 25 May 1962 [HRF].

CHAPTER TWO

THE OCTOBER CRISIS

On 17 October 1962, certain key persons in the office of the Deputy Chici of Staif for Operations, ADC Headquarters, were asked to attend an impromptu conference with their counterparts in Headquarters Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD). When they arrived they were informed that the Joint Chiefs of Staif bad just directed General John K. Gerhart, CINCONAD, to increase the fighter-interceptor force in the southeast. For the Air Defense Command, involvement in the Cuban Crisis had begun, for, as the USAF component of CONAD, ADC commanded the resources needed by CINCONAD to fulfill the orders of the Joint Chiefs.

^{1.} htr, ARC to 85 ADC "Springing on Participation of ABC in present Contingency Operations," 15 Nov 1962 [HRF].

The torces under CINCONAD's operational control in Florida on 17 October were not inconsiderable, considering that the extent of the threat from Cuba was not yet fully known. At Homestead AFB, near Miami, four F-102's belonging to Detachment 1 of the 482nd Fighter-Interceptor Squagron were on alert. At Key West Naval Air Station there were stationed eight F4D aircraft of the Bavy's WAL-S Squadron based at North Island, California. The eight-plane detacmment at Key West was under the operational control of CINCONAD. Also at Key West unde. CONAD operational control were 12 to 14 P4B fighters of the VF-41 soundron provided on 9 October 1982 by CINCLANT. At McCoy AFB hear Orlando were based six RC-. 21D At borne Early Warning and Control (AERGC) historatt of the 968th AERGC Squadron of ADC. It was the mission of this unit to man one off-shore station on a full-time basis for surveillance of the Florida Straits. Patrolling the surface of the Straits was a radar picket ship of the U. S. Navy.

^{2.} These aircraft were provided to CINCONAD by DOD in lies of a CONAD-,DC request for F-104's. The planes of VF-41 were to replace those of VFAb-3 in due time.

^{3.} Pre-Cuban Crisis states of forces in Florida under CINCONAD was obtlined from Meso, "Proposed Remarkes by General Gernart to Commanders Continence 19 November 1985)." (HRS.).

As a result of the JCS order to augment his forces in Florida, General Gerhart ordered Lieutenant General Robe, t M. Lee, Commander of the Air, Defense Command, to "Insure the availability" of 18 comb: t-ready F-102A aircraft, airgroup, amintenance personnel, equipment, supplies and convetional armament from the 482nd Fighter-Interceptor Squadros at Seymour-Johnson AFB, North Carolina. These direrait were to be "available" at Homestead AFB from 1300Z 20 October 1955 until release by CINCONAD. The 18 F-102's thus ordered of CINCOLAD included the four planes already at Homestead. In addition to the F-192's CINCONAD directed General Lee to make available at Patrick AFB 12 F-100's from the 46th Fig. (er-Interceptor squadron at Langley AFB, Virginia, also not later than 15007, 20 October 1983. The balance of the 45th FIS and to be prepared to deploy on 12-hour advance actice.

In addition to the 30 interceptors from the 482nd and 48th FIS's, ADC was to support the Florida operations with its Tyndail-assigned F-191's, F-102's and F-196's as directed by CIPCONAD. The Tyndail forces were not inconsiderable. They included 17 F-101's, five F-102's, 18 F-106's and four TF-102's --- a total of 44 aircraft aread and ready to fight.

^{4.} These orders from CINCONAD wave included in CONSE Operation Plan 1-62, 18 October 1962 [RRF].

^{5.} Memo to 4756th Air Def Mg commander from 4756 Air Def Gp commander, "Activities History, 18-27 Oct 1962;" 30 oct 1962 [MRF].

ADC was also to augment the Navy's VFAW-3 distancement at Key West with additional aircrews, equipment and argument as 6 required for maximum readiness. Thus, on 1d October ADC was committed to make available a total of 7m interceptors from its regular resources to the Florida operation and to support thus indefinitely.

In addition to the one full-time offshore station immined by the five RC-121D's stationed at McCoy, ALC was directed by CONAD Operation Plan 1-62 to provide sufficient AEVAC aircraft to main two wore stations during daylight 7 hours. To ADC, this called for a total of 12 RC-121D's to be staged from McCoy AFB. Consequently, ADC ordered the 26th Air Division to assure a total of seven planes at McCoy and the 26th Air Division to provide the balance. Deployment was to be immediate, with all aircraft in place by 13002, 20 October.

The two fighter-interceptor squadrons earnhyked for Florida lost no time in deploying. Both contingents took sif on 18 October from Langley and Seymour-Johnson, "turned-

^{6.} CORAD Operation Plan 1-62 [HRF].

^{7.} Ibid.

S. Meg ADODU 62-282A, ADC to AFLO, 19 Oct 1982 (HRF).

aroun. at Tyndall, and arrived at Patrick and Homestead on the reliewing day. No nuclear weapons were carried, CINCOMAD having stipulated that conventional armament would be deployed with the aircraft.

On the eye of the crisis, the air defense radar act in Florida comprised seven heavy radar and six gap fills is. Of these, however, only three were located where their some verifiance capabilities extended to the skies between Coba and the sainland. These were Z-209 at Ker West NAS, Z-210 at Rierannd NAS and Z-211 at Patrick AFB. Z-200 employed an FPS-37 search radar which was not well-regarded by the 12 special at Division, and an FPS-6 height finder. Z-210 was a "goist use" station, using an FAS-owned ARSF-1 scatch radar. No neight-finder was operational at Z-210 though two FPS-6's were being installed at the time the crisic erected. Z-211 used an FPS-66 (modified FPS-20) search radar and an

^{9.} Historical Monograph, "Contingency Operations of the 73rd Air Division (Weapons), 15 Oct=31 Dec 1982," p. 16 [RPF].

^{10.} The heavy radars were TM-198 at Tyndall, M-11: at Jacksonville, TM-200 at Cross City, M-129 at RacDill, Z-Ull at Entrick, Z-210 at Richmond NAS, and Z-209 at Key West. The gap fillers were TM-1684 and B near lyndall, TM-2004 near Cross City, M-1144 near Jacksonville, and M-1294 and B near MacDill.

^{11.} A TAC-owned mobile search radar (NPS-11) was in place on 10 Cot at Key Heat as a back-up for the Navy YPS-27 which was being repaired.

FPS-6 height finder. Z-209 was operated by the 671st ACLW Squadron and also served as a NORAD Control Center (NCC) when manual procedures were used in the sector. Z-210 was aperated by the 644th ACLW Squadron. Z-211 was operated by Detachment 1 of the 679th ACLW Squadron. The detachment became the 615th Radar Squadron on 1 November 1962.

The augmented interceptor force, the additional RC-1210's and the radar picket ship it southern Florida were bound to tax existing communications facilities to the utmost. Consequently, or 18 October, even before the first continuent of interceptors arrived at their new bases, ADC asked for two duplex on-line teletype circuits between Also, ADC asked MOADS and Homestead a i NOADS and Patrick. for immediate implementation of a high-frequency singlesideband radio ne. between Mey West, Homestea". Tyndail and Patrick, as well as a separate single-sideband circuit between Key West and MCADS. Circuits to support &EW&C and picket operations from Key West were also demanded. 1.3 the event the cable between Key West and the mainland wis severed no end of confusion was bound to et ue. Consequently,

^{12.} Mag aboac-to 2782, AuC to 6936 Comma Sec Dep Gp, 18 Oct 1982 [HR:].

^{13.} Msg ADOAC-CL 9781, ADC to CSAF, 18 Oct 1962 [HRF]: Msg 320AC, 32 AD to ADC, 18 Oct 1962 [RRF].

to safeguard against this, ADC asked USAF for a tropospheric scatter communication system to provide emergency back-up 14 between Key West and Homestead.

Even as early as the CONAD-ADC conference on 17 October, it was obvious that additional interceptors to those stipulated in CONAD 1-62 might be needed in southern Florada. As insurance against unpreparedness, ADC, on 19 October, warned the 32nd Air Division to alert its 331st FIS at Webb AFB, Texas to the fact that it might be called upon to deploy 12 F-102's on three hours notice.

The alert warning was given none too soon. On 20 october, a phone call from the JCS to CONAD directed the latter
to "re-examine its air defense plans for the Southeast United
15
States." This resulted in two major actions.

and on 21 October, on instructions from CINCONAD, AEC directed two additional units to deploy fight e-interceptor forces to

A Stable

^{14.} Mag ADOOP-W 2801, ALC to 32 AD; 19 Oct 1962 [BRF].

^{15.} Hsg COOP-P TS 1922, CINCONAD to JCS, 21 Oct 1902

the southeast. The First Fighter Wing at Selfridge AFB, Michigan, was to deploy 12 F-106's to Patrick, with resources "sufficient to Support 18 sorties per day for an indefinite 17 period." The 331st, already-alerted two days earlier, was to deploy 18 F-102's, with resources capable of supporting 26 sorties per day for an indefinite period. The 4756th Air Defense Wing at Tyndall, already aware of trouble brewing to the southeast, was to place six F-102's, eight F-106's and eight F-101's on five-minute alert within one 19 hour's notice.

Also on 21 October, the 32nd CONAD Region, in whose territory the crisis was taking shape, moved to establish advance control posts in Florida. CONAD Task Force 32, with headquarters at Key West, was created under the command of Colonel Theo R. Diltz, Deputy for Operations of MOADS. Detachment 1 of Task Force 32 was set up at Homestead under 20 the command of Colonel Paul H. Konney. The creation of the

^{17.} Msg ADCCR 62-272, ADC to AFLC, 21 Oct 1962 [HAP]. Msg ADCCR 62-274, ADC to 30 AD, 21 Oct 1962 [HRF].

^{18.} Msg ADCCR 62-272, ADC to AFIC, 21 Oct 1962 [HRF]; The /1 FIS from Selfridge AFE, arrived at Pattick on 21 Oct 196. The 331 was in place at Homestead in the pre-dawn of 22 Jot.

^{19. &}lt;u>ibia</u>.

^{20.} Hist Wone of 32 AD and 32 CONAD Ren in Cuban Crisis, Oct-Dec 1962, p. 17 [HRF].

advance post at Key West was not a spur-of-the-moment decision.

As early as March 1962, it

46 5 / 21

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Thus, when President John F. Kennedy addressed an anxious American people on Monday, 22 October, and broke the news of the Russian missile build-up, he was supported in his resolve to quarantine Cuba against a fur her Russian build-up by an impressive show of air defense forces contributed by the USAF Air Defense Command and controlled by CINCONAD.

One hun red and four interceptors owned by ADC were based in Florida, operationally ready with conventional armament. These included 42 F-106's, 41 F-102's, 17 F-101's and 4 TF-102's. In addition, 12 RC-121's were based at McCoy and engaged in patrolling the waters between the adiaband and Cuba. Only four days previously the total of ADC's interceptor consistent in Florida was four F-103's at Homestead and 44 asserted interceptors at Tyndall, The result of

²¹ C. 1 T. R. Diltz, "Narrative Report of Task Force 32 Operations, 19 Oct to 1 Dec 1962," [Doc 13 in Historical Bonograph on the Cuban Crusis, 32 Air Div] [HRF].

the ADC build up was a net gain of 56 operationally ready interceptors and seven RC-121's.

And yet, the extroardinary reinforcements in Florida were no cause of complacency to air defense officials. The gravest defect of air defense -- the ability to see and to fight at low altitudes -- remained largely unrectified. This caused ADC to dispatch a worried message to the 26th Air Division on the day of the President's speech asking for immediate action to evaluate the capability of AEWAC aircraft to detect and track small, low-level targets such as T-34's and U-3A/B's and to control interceptors against Of course, the low altitude deliciency was not news to ADC, NORAD or ARADCOM. Three gap-filler radars had been sited and FPS-18 radars were being installed when the crisis broke, in an effort to partially alleviate the deficiency. The radars were "on-the-air" when the President addressed the nation.

^{22.} Msg ADDOP 2813, ADC to 28 AD, 22 Oct 1952 [Md]; For a full account of this project, dubbed Mickey Mouse, see Historical Monogram of the 28th Air Division, "Operations During the Cuban Crisis, October - Jecember 1962," p. 23 and documents appended thereto.

b1"

"Minicom" was also

implemented the same day. Sabotage plans were reviewed; command posts were put on 24-hour operation; personnel were ordered back to duty and the slack was taken up throughout the command.

At 1200 hours local on the day of the President's speech, another, and in many ways the most extraordinary action of the Cuban crisis so far as ADC was concerned, occured. At that time the order was given to implement Annex O of ADC Operation Flan 20-62,

flight in the history of the command.

23 Mag AFCOP-CP-EA, ADC 62-292 USAF to ADC, 22 Oct

24 "MCRC-C1, COVAD 62-554, CINCONAD to Chur Alaskan CONAD Rgm; 22 Cet 1962 (ARF); The dispersed aircrait included 05 F-10IRIS, 64 F-106Als, and 31 F-102Ats; The dispersal of ADC interceptors and the adventures that befell them is best told by their own gir division historians in the chapters that follow. From the ADC head-quarters standpoint, the effort was deemed an extraordinary success.

As to Florida, the 331st FIS remained at Homesters only about a week before it was replaced by the 325th FIS from Truax. The charge was made because CONAD had decided that more capacity to deal with low-level targets was needed in South Florida. The F-102A armed with 2.75-inch rocket, was chosen as the preferred weapon for this job. The 325th FIS was therefore picked for movement to Florida since it was the only F-102A squadron which had not yet been mouthed to carry the GAR-11 nuclear missile as primary armament. The 482nd FIS remained at Homestead, but took action to fit its interceptors with 2.75-inch rockets. The 325th FIS was made or 37 Getober.

To further enhance low-level combat capability in the area, ADC also furnished several two-seat trainer versions

^{25.} MBS COOP-N 457 CONAD to ADC, 26 Oct 1962 [Dog 32 in "Chronology"]; "Chronology," 30 and 32 Air Elvs, 27 Crt 1962; Operations Log, ADC Command Post Operations Log, 26 Oct 1932.

of the F-102A (TF-102A) for that purpose. Those aircraft could not be armed with nuclear weapons, but could be filted with 2.75-inch rockets. Three of these aircraft began standing "strip alert" at MacDill AFB on 30 October. The each began performing a Similar function at McCoy AiB and Patrick on 4 November. The next day, 11 TF-102A aircraft were being put to this use, four each at McCoy and Patrick and three at MacDill. ADC continued to offer this low-level protection to these three key Florida bases for the remainder of the crisis period.

The latter two squadrons had F-104 aircraft and it was proposed 57 that each squadron maintain four F-104 p on elect at Key West.

27. SECRET-NOTORN, Mag COOP-P TS 1902, CONAD to JOS.

^{28:} Meg COOP-X 497, CONAD to ALC, 26 Oct 1962 [Doc 32 in "Chronology"]; Meg ADODC X-88, ADC to 32 AD, 27 Oct 1962 [Doc 42 in "Chronology"]; Meg ADODC X-88, ADC to 32 AD, 3 N V 1962 [HRY].

That portion of the revised plan which dealt with the ANG was not placed into effect at once, as were the other portions. Bather, the pertinent operations plan (312-14-16) of the Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic (CINCLANT) was revised to call for use of ANG interceptors. Implementation of the CINCLANT plan was held in abeyance. Also, a phased procedure for federalization of the ANG was adopted. Phase I squadrons included not only those at Jacksonville, New Orleans and Houston mentioned in the revised CONAD plan, but also the 198th FIS in Puerto Rice. The F-104 squadrons in South Carolina and Tennessee were briefly earmarked for TAC use in Phase II, but by the end of October were back under ADC jurisdiction.

These orders were not to be given effect, however, until
the implementation directive was received or until subordinate
commanders (of air divisions or sectors) determined that a
confi med state of national emergency or was existed.

^{28.} Msg ADODC 2900, ADC to 26, 28, 30 and 32 Air Divs. 26 Oct 1962 [HRF]; Msc ADODC 2937, ADC to 267 28, 30 and 32 Air Divs, 30 Oct 1962 [HRF]; ADC SO C-113 thru C-124, 29 Oct 1962 [HRF].

During the first month of the Cuban crisis four squadrons were maintained in southern Florida although it did not prove possible to provide the full complement of 60 aircraft at all times during the entire period. And the trend as regards aircraft on hand was steadily downward as the effect of extensive flying on machines and the men who maintained them began to tell. During the first week an average of 49 aircraft were on hand. In the first week of November the average dropped to 45, then to 39 the following much. During the last 12 days of the crisis period that ended 23 November, the average number of ADC interceptors 29 available was 35. The day-to-day situation is given in the following table.

DEPLOYMENT OF ADC INTERCEPTORS IN FLORIDA 22 October 23 November 1962

Date and	I Time (EST)	Patrick AFS (F-106A)	Homestead AFB (Y-102A)	Total
22 Oct 23 Oct 24 Oct 25 Oct 26 Oct 27 Oct	0328 0600 1200 1200 1800 0600	24 16 23 23 17 21	30 30 36 29 24 30	60 46 59 52 41 51 36
28 Oct 30 Cct 31 Oct 1 Nov 2 Nov 3 Nov	1860 1200 1205 1200 1200 1200	21 20 22 19 19 20	· 27 23 26 26 24	47 45 45 45 44

^{29.} ADC Status Reports, 22 Oct-23 Nov 1962 [HRF].

Date and	Time (EST)	Patrick AFB (F-106A)	Homestend AFB (F-102A)	Total
4 Nov	1200	17	26	43
5 Nov	1200	17	26	43
6 Nov	1200	16	26	42
7 Nov	1200	20	1.5	ఫిక
6 NUV	1200	16	20	3ಕ
9 800	1200	19	21	40
10 Nov	1200	10	19	6 x 31 -2 x 2
12 Nov	1200	Ĩŧ	15	33
13 Nov	1200	18	is	3.5
14 Nov	1206	18	15	JÚ
15 Nov	1200	15	15	J.,
16 h.v	1200	17	24	41
		17	25	37
17 Nov	1200		13	
is hov	1200	1.7		5.0
19 kov	1200	18	17	
20 Nov	1200	17	17	5-1
21 Nov	1200	20	2^	20.00
20 Nov	1200	22	16	ũ s
25 Nov	1200	22	5	2.7

CHAPTER THREE

THE 25TH AIR DIVISION (SACE)

B.

Grover C. Jamrett

PREPARATIONS

By the time the President began his provised in a set 2300% on the 22nd, most of the assigned alto CONAD k gion 25th Air Division personnel had made arranged its to be hear rule or television receivers. They distend with interest as the President fold the nation that the United States was not going to stand by and let the missile site construction continue, what a "quorantine" was to be imposed against certain as crials that were being shipped into Country Romain and that serials that were being shipped into Country Romain and that serials that were being shipped into Country Romain.

Although all of this action — the actual build up of Soviet forces in Cuca and the Presidential decision about what was to be done to counter the build-up — was taking place approximately 3,000 miles from the 25th CONAD Region/25th Air Division (SAGE) area of responsibility, it had an immediate effect on the Region/Division units. Also, the Presidential message explained the reason for certain actions the Region/Division was ordered to take earlier in the day.

The Region/Division introduction to the Cuban Crisis accurally came at 1735Z (6930 PST) when Commander-in-Chief CONAD ordered all primary armament placed in a state of increased readiness throughout the command. Upon receipt of that directive,

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battle staffs at Region and Sector headquarters were fully manned within 15 minutes after being notified of CINCONAD's order. The Region/Division herdquarters then made ready for the steps that were to follow.

^{1.} Extract from 25 Air Div Chie: Controller Log

Also unusual was the telephone call from Commanderin-Chief CONAD at 19182—which directed the dispersal of
Division units to designated dispersal bases with primary
weapons in place. The Director of Operations for the RegionDivision felt that CONAD had made a mistake in directing
dispersement with primary weapons because, up to this time.
such flights were allowed only ender higher conditions of
readiness. Therefore, when the conference call between
Commander-in-Chief CONAD and his Region commanders was completed, the Region/Division called back to the Combat Center
at Colorado Springs and asked for a clarification of the
directive. Again, the Division was told to disperse with

This dispersal arrangement weant that 12 F-106 interceptors, six from Spokare International Airport and six from

primary armament, which it did.

^{2.} Extract from 25 Air Div Chief Controller Log, 22 Oct 1992.

^{3.} Dispersal directed under provisions of ADCR Gps Plan 20-62, Annex D

^{4.} It must be remembered that at the line of this action the Division did not know what preparations were being made as a result of talks at Government level. It wasn't until after the Presidential speech that the real reason for directing listers, of primary weapons under DEFGON 5.

McChord Air Force Base, would be deployed to Paine Field armed with MB-1 rockets, and, at 1023Z, the 325th Fighter Wing at McChord and the 84th Righter Group at Spokane were directed to carry out the dispersal plan. The first aircraft from McChord Air Force Base arrived at Paine Field at 2105Z. Spokane's first aircraft reached Paine at approximately 2116Z. By 2121Z,

and the state of t

Then, at 2300Z, about the time the Presidential address began,

5. Extract from 25 Air Div Chief Controller Log, 22 Oct 1962, and from 318 FIS Falot's Form 178 (it tundy,

6. Extra from 25 Air Div Chief Controller Log

lbid.

While the interceptors were en route to their dispersal base, preparations were being made at McChord to deploy spare parts, tools and technicians for the maintenance of the interceptors. A convoy of tractors and trailers, buses and trucks left the base at approximately 2130Z and, although they passed through the heart of the Boeing Airplane Company complex where traffic could have been a major problem, the convoy arrived at Paine Field at about 0100Z on October 23 with no undue delay or public alarm. It had military or civil police escort during the entire trip.

A hurried conference was called at Spekane at 0600Z on October 24 to work out details for supplying and reinforcing the 84th Fighter Group personnel force already dispersed to Paine Field. By 1900Z, eight commercial vehicles were en route with the necessary tools, parts and equipment.

This group reached Poinc at approximately 1700Z.

Region/Division was placed on DEFCON 3, Spokens Air Defense

When the

^{3.} Interview with 325 trans Sq Mtr Pool Dispatcher and members of the convoy.

^{9.} Into parplied by off los of Info, get Fir Co.

Sector was in a Mode .. configuration due to maintenance being accomplished in the Great Falls air Defense Sector area. This condition had existed since 16152. October 16. To tring the Region/Division back to its full potential, the Spokene Sector was directed to return to a Mode I configuration and by 23262, the return had been completed.

Also, of this time, the radar facility at Mt. Hebo Air Force Station, Oregon was inoperative due to damages suffered in a severe windstorm on October 11-12, 1962. High altitude coverage was being provided by the overlap of adjacent radar stations but, at the beginning of the Crisis, localititude coverage was seriously degraded. Coverage of the low altitude function was being provided by USAF airborne early warning aircraft and U. S. Savy 11 picket vessels of the seaward element.

At radar squadrons where operations were in a normal state, personnel were placed on a three-shift schedule to provide for full force around-the-clock manning, and all pre-ventive maintenance and equipment resting was cancelled.

With its surveillance and detection units and fighter interceptor squadrons operating under the increased readiness

^{10. 25} Air L.v Chief Controlle: Log., 22 Cct 1962.

^{11.} USAF Accident/Incident Rpt, 18 Oct 1962; and interview with 25 CONAD Rgn/25 (in Div C47 Backle Staff Orficer, 26 Oct 1985).

posture, the 25th CONAD Region/25th Air Division SAGE system was ready for whatever emergency might follow as a result of the Presidential order that placed the 'quarantine' against certain materials being shipped into Cuba.

FIGHTER INTERCEPTOR OPERATIONS

Because they were dispersed from their home stations, the 318th and 498th Fighter Interceptor Squadrons were the first 25th CONAD Region/25th Al. Division units to feel the effects of the increased readiness posture brought on by the international situation evolving or hof the Russian acts in Cuba.

To give the interceptor squadrons that capability, it was decired that each of the dispersed 9-106's

This decision required that additional weapons, people and equipment should be placed at Paine Field as soon as possible. Also the Region/Div...ion

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Therefore, in a message to the two air defense sectors having operational control over the dispersed squadrons, the 25th CONAD Region said that weapons deployment would be accomplished by tactical ferry flights from McChord Air Force Base and Spokane International Airport, and wherever possible in conjunction with the 13 rotation of aircraft from dispersal to home station.

This was in accord with ADC instructions.

At this point weather conditions entered the picture. Weather in the Pacific Northwest had been bad for several days prior to the implementation of the increased readiness posture and remained bad during most of the first week of operations. Because tactical ferry flights in conjunction with the rotation of aircraft would have been dependent upon the whims of weather, regular ferry flights were established and took off whenever weather conditions permitted. By October 25, the necessary stockpile of primary seapons was completed.

¹² Mag 25000P-0 626-6 to CONAD Sorr Seattle, CONAD Sorr Spokene 24 Dot 1962, 1965-1965

Also, the Region message pointed out that during the tactical ferry period, the MB-1 would be configured with the igniter safety pins installed and the ejection rack cartridged removed, that all tactical ferry flights of primary weapons would be conducted during daylight hours only. Further compliance with established safety measures required that these flights be conducted over water wherever possible, and, where not possible, over sparsely settled areas

Although the Region message pointed out that the bomb rack ejection cartridges would be removed during tactical ferry flights, the 318th Fighter Interne for Squadron was of the opinion that this was wrong. The Squadron Communical felt that the cartridges, should have been installed, that the pilot should not have been prevented from exercising the prerogative of jettisthing the weapon if necessary for 15 over all safety.

The Squadron Commander al., felt that the stockpiling of the prinary weapons should have been accomplished with cargo aircraft, and this opinion was expressed verbally to bettle Air Defense Sector. The Squadron Commander based

 $^{14.\ \}mbox{MSg}$ 25COOP-O 626-Q to CONAD Sett Seattle, CONAD Set Spokane, 24 Oct 1962.

^{15.} Interview, 318 Fis andr and 25 Air biv bir of Info, 3 Feb 1963.

his opinion on several factors: the cargo aircraft could carry more weapons, had an additional safety factor with two engines, and could have adjusted its fuel load to allow for immediate landing instead of remaining in flight until the fuel load was burned off.

The Division had good reason for establishing the tactical ferry schedule, however. It was not physically equipped to carry armed weapons aboard cargo aircraft. Stockpiling with cargo airlift would have swant that the Division would have had to disassemble the weapon, crate the separate items and can the warhead, and then wait for strategic airlift. Since past experience has shown that there would be a three to five day wait for strategic air-17 lift, the tactical ferry schedule was established.

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However, upon inquiry, Headquarters, Air Defense Command granted author to for the Division to set up a relatenance and inspection system at Paine Field. This yetem was established carly in the crisis period and none of the

^{16. 181}d.

^{17.} Interview, Ch of Armaneut, 5 Feb 1963

weapons were returned to their home stations until the Cuban situation was settled.

With the inspection system estal lished and operation. it was found that even small components could create probleas which could hamper operations, as did the shortage of ARD 446 bomb ejection cartridges. The basic technical order states that these curtridges could be used ten times on solid pin or one year from the date of initial insertion for springloaded pins. However, Headquarters Air Defense Command had imposed a more stringent provision which allowed the cartridges to be used only once. With the added requirement for primary weapons usage during the Cuban Crisis, A: Defense Command's provision created a shortage of cartridges and 25th Air Division had to ask for authority to increase the usage time. On October 23, 1962, the Division told the 325 n Fight : Wang, the 84th Fighter Group and the 408th Figurer Group that the provisions of Paragraph 5-10 of Air Desense Command Manual TM136-1 which pertained to the use of ARD 440 cartridges was waived, and that provisions of This gave the Region/ the technical order were implemented. Division more latitude in the use of its primary wearons and a greater capability.

^{18.} Msg 25HME-DE 109358 to 325 ltr Mg, 84 Ftr Gp and 465 Ftr Gp, 23 Oct 1962.

The dispersal also brought with it another minor problem for the 84th Fighter Gro_p. With its forces split, part at Paine Field and part at Spokane International Airport, the Group found itself with a shortage of MF-9 trailers, which are used by nuclear equipped units to transfer and load primary weapons. On October 24, the Division told the Group that they had authority "to assume control of Air National Guard MF-9 trailers that are being used for training purposes." The Group also was given authority to effect "local repair of crossmembers on out-of-commission MF-9 trailers until such time as new crossmembers are received, at which time they will be replaced." Portland International Airport also offered to assist the 84th Fighter Group with a loan of some of its trailers.

After these early problems were worked out and a sufficient supply of primary weapons was available for the F-106's dispersed to Paine Field, there will was a need for more primary weapons for the F-102's at Portland International filiport, Portland, Oregon. Secause the 337th Fighter Group's 450th Fighter Interceptor Squadron had not been more field to handle the GAR-11 its primary weapons remained the GAR-10 and GAR-2a and these were in short supply. On October 30,

^{19.} May 25MME-DE 108367 to 84 Ftr Gp, 24 Oct 1960

1962, the Region/Division asked Middletown Air Materiel 20
Area for additional GAR-DD's and GAR-2A's to be stored at Kingsley Field, Klamath Falls, Oregon for the 460th Fighter Interceptor Squadron, but no assistance was received.

Middletown Air Materiel Area said additional weapons were not available for assignment and that Portland International Airport would have to be supplied through a redistribution of weapons already possessed by the Region/Division. This was of no help since the internal distribution of F-102 weapons already was as fair as it could be. The 377th Fighter Group went through the Cuban Crisis with a limited number of primary weapons, but it had a sufficient number of secondary weapons = 2.75 FFAR rockets.

Although some of these problems now appear to have been minor in nature, it was necessary that they be solved before the Region/Division could consider itself to have its full capability.

of 12 additional interceptor aircraft at Saine Field and the tactical ferry aircraft used to bring in primary weapons.

^{20.} MSg 25MME-DE 869-G to MAAMA: 408 Fmr Gp and 307 Ftr Gp, 23 Oct 1962

^{21.} Inserview with SCOIG Armament and Municions Sect 25 air Div.

space was at a premium. Hangar space for the dispersed aircraft was not available. And, security forces had to be augmented from other bases to provide guards for the areas brought into use as parking ramps.

But, there were other than physical aspects to the dispersul at Paine Field. In a report to the 25th Air Division on November 14, 1962, the Spokane Air Delense Sector pointed out that the "quality and number of personnel deployed and doing two shifts at Geiger has watered down our over all maintenance capability." The necessity for having black boxes, test equipment and ground power support equipment at the dispersal base also reduced the over all maintenance capability at Spokane International Airport.

The 84th Fighter Group-Commander, in a report to Spokane Air Defense Sector, said that because of the reduced maintenance capability the 498th Fighter Interceptor Squared, sortic success rate was reduced. In that type of dispersel there is much ferrying of unit equipped aircraft balts, never could have attained a successful mission.

^{22.} Esg SPOOP-625-240 to 25 Air Div, 14 Nov 1962.

^{20.} Hes 81000R 178 | Re-quoted in SPGOP-628-240

For the 498th Fighter Interceptor Squadron, there was an increase of 9.2 per cent in unscheduled maintenance and a decrease of 17.9 per cent in "OK" flights, and no aircraft were recovered within one hour. Further, the operational ready rate dropped nine per cent tollowing the deployment of the squadron.

The Sponne Air D lense Sector also said that an A-malysis of the ratio of missed intercepts to attempted fator-cepts for similar period before and after October 22 showed that 195 attempts were made during the 20 days before the 60 missed intercepts, for all reisons. After October 22 130 intercepts were attempted and 55 missed. This showed the squadron with a 75 per cent success rate before the Cuban Crisis and a 58 per cent success rate after having been deployed for a period of 20 days.

Significant was the fact that prior to October 22

66 per cent of the missed intercepts were due to Airporne
Electronic Failure or Fire Control System malfunction. This
jumped to 75 per cent during the days following the implementation of the increased reachess posture.

^{24.} Mag SPOOP-625-240 to 25 Air Div, 15 Nov 1962.

^{25.} lbid.

Ground aborts also increased considerably following the increased readiness status and the deployment of the Equation. Prior to October 22 there had been no ground aborts; however, in the following 20 days 15 were logged.

The Sector Commander added that continued operation from such a deployed configuration "will most surely continue to decrease the total compat capability of the effective frames Group."

While the 498th Fighter Interceptor Squadron rule its problems at Painc Field, the 318th Fighter Interceptor Squadron fared somewhat better. There was no appreciable change in its success rate or in the number of ground aborts experienced. In fact, the squadron's success rule for Sciencer 1962 was only two per cent lower than for September. In December, the rate had climbed to climb per cent above the September figure, but, in neither case, did the squadron feel the fluctuations were caused by the deployment to Painc Field. Also, it should be remembered that the 318th Fighter Interceptor Squadron was returned to its home base in less than two weeks after it was

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^{26. &}lt;u>loid</u>.

^{27.} Itic.

deployed. Most likely, then, the December increase was due 25 to increased training and maintenance efforts.

57th Fighter Group, 409th Squadron Alera Commit. ... The S7th Figster Group, under normal conditions, would have had 24 F-102 arregait available for alege which mitteents, but when the Cubba Crisis Struck, four of the Re-Delta Daggers assisted were away from their home station for thepection and repair as necessary. The .. on Gategor 27. 1962. Headquarters. Air Defense Command directed the 20th Air Division to provide two TF+102's from the STin Fighter Group and two from the 337th Fighter Group to the t requirements in the south ast area. Air Beichse Command Tactical Evaluation Tead members flew in on October 29 and picked up the two 57th lighter Group aircraft. (Only one TF-102 was picked up from the 337th Fighter Group). Since this left the 57th Fighter Group with only 18 arccraft, its alert status was changed from 24 to 18 afformit on October 31, 1962.

^{728.} Interview with 518 FIS Ope Officer

^{29.} Msg ADODC-X-88, to 25, 26 & 32 Air bays & CINCHIELD. 27 Set 1952.

^{30.} Interview with 25 Air Div Fir Linep Diller.

^{...} Was 25000 677-0 to 57 Fir 6g, 64 Fig. 31 Ger Helb.

Two days later, on , weather 1962, the Royal Cannara. Air Force Air Defence Command requested that the 25th NORAD Region $^{\rm MS} 50\%$

to allow the unit to meet minimum essential training $$82^\circ$. The Region, in turn, asked CINCNORAD for approval, which was granted. The 409 Squadron alert committeest was reduced at 22002 on November 2.

Stein Fighter Interceptor Squadron Resurred to McChord AFB. Shortly after the increased readiness ports. Lot under way, the 25th Air Division asked CINCNORAD for authority to return the six 325th Fighter Wing F-100 acrecial to their home station. The Region felt that since McChord Air Force Base was no longer carried as a Category 1 base and that the number of all field dispersed to Pain. Field was causing overcrowded conditions, the 31cm might just as well be resurred to its home base as soon as possible.

[[]Cont'c] 25 NORAD Rgs Bastle Staff Journal entry by Ops Officer: Neg NCRC-C-124, 31 Oct 1962

^{32.} Msg 25NOPS 719-G to CINCHORAD, 2.No. 1962.

^{33.} Neg 25NOPS 723-0 to 409 Sq. Comon B.C., 2 Nov 1962.

⁻²⁴ . Aga Dep to: Opa in presentation to officers following close of Cuban Crisis.

CINCNORAD agreed and the Region told Seattle Sector that the 318th Fighter Interceptor Squadron would be returned to 35 WeChord.

The stockpile of primary and secondary wellpons for the SISth was left at Paine Field, nowever, to maintain the third sorties per aircraft capability it any future dispersal smooting be required during the increased alort. These weapons were returned to McChord on November 24; the Spokane weapons are returned to their home station on November 23.

Deterioration of Combat Capability. With the interceptor units committed to a rigid increased alert program, training requirements had to be overlooked in many cases. Since interceptor pilot training starts to suffer within a soort period of time during prolonged periods of reasing the Division was greatly concerned about the suspected of terrioration of its combat capability. On October 30 times concern was expressed to Readquarters, Air Determe Committee when the Division reported that ender the conditions of the alert status normal training act vities were not possion.

^{35.} Msg 25CRC 688-G $^{\circ}$ Code NORAD Seth Seattle, 31 Get 1962.

^{36.} Pbic.

^{37.} Est 845050-825-0243: Hsg FYMLE-45 0228.

^{38.} MSR 20000 678-0 to USAF ADO, 30 Oct 1962: Gill

On November 1, the Division became more specific about its concern over loss of combat crew proficie.cy.

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Most affected by this condition were the F-100 units, with the F-101 and F-102 units affected to a lesser degree.

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This status change permitted the use of more aircraft for training and relaxed the squadron priot elect commitment. From this point until the end of the increase readiness no crash actions were required, and it was seen that the Division would be able to maintain at least a minimum training program for its aircrews.

[[]Cost'a] Byn Dep for Ops during presentation to officer following close of Cuban Crisis.

^{39.} Msg 250DC 697-C to ADC, 1 Nov 1962.

^{40.} Extract from 25 NORAD Rgm Chief Controllers Log. 3 Not 196%.

^{41.} Agn Dep for Ope during prescritation , willness tailoring close on Caban Crists.

when training records were compiled at the end of the crisis period, they showed that Region/Division interceptor units and flown a total of 1,634 training sortles between October 22 and November 26. At first glance, that would appear to have been adequate. However, when the over all total was broken out by individual unit, the situation was found to be very unhealthy. For instance, the 496th finite interceptor Squadron flew an average of orly four training sortles a day, and that was not considered enough to maintain prior productions. The 46th Fighter Interceptor Squadron, at the other end of the scale, flew an average of 18 soution a day -- perhaps we to the number of aircraft possessed during the period.

Support for Police

Tactical algoraft from 26th AD Division also were operatory from the 25th Air Division area. On October 25, Zeth Air Division asked Headquarters Air Defense Command to happy ment to Satisfy navigational aid requirement. $-46 \, \mu_{\odot}$

where a part of that Division's fighter interceptors were dispersed. Since $n \in \mathbb{R}^2$ was in the 2^n th Division area, the Division told Portland Air Defense

^{42.} Myn Dep for Ops during presentation to officers roiloung glose of Cuban Crabit.

Sector that such action would be completed only after all other higher priority requirements were satisfied. Also, the S-stor was told that immediate consideration was to be given to the possibility of developing suitable scramole and recovery procedures to serve $(G_{5/2})$

b3rd, 84th Figurer Interceptor Squadrons at Kingsley Field. In addition to the 28th Air Division interceptor-dispersed to "b/" 12 F-101's from the 83rd and 84th Fighter Interceptor Squadrons were dispersed from their home stations and arrived at 2100Z on Gerober 32. 1982. They were parked on the approach end of Rusway 56. In an area temporarily reserved by the Kingsley Field Airport Manager for military use. Sleeping quarters, scrange procedures and vehicles were set up at the BOQ, where 28th Air Division aircrews were billered.

^{43.} Mag 2500P-0 J 0072 to POADS, 31 Oct 1962.

Air National Guard Participation in Cuban Crisis. The Washington and Oregon Air National Guard fighter squadrons at Spokane International Airport and Portland International Airport also participated in the increased readiness on the same basis as did the regular United States A: Force Interceptor squadrons. It was an Air National Guard F-89J pilot iron Portland International Airport who increased the pulse rate of the system during the evening hours on November 1. While flying off the mouth of the Columbia diver he spatied an aircraft which was seen to drop flares and circle over The F-89J pilot moved in to investigate but the unidentified aircraft apparently began evasive action. This was reported to Portland Air Defense Sector and the at: craft was declared an "unknown" at 0454Z. After Federal Aviation Agency and Portland International Airport were unable to identify the track, Portland Sector contacted the Haval Air Station at Whidbey Island (Seattle). The Navy auvised that a Mavy rescue squadron had SA-16 type aircraft practicing night illumination in the general vicinity of th position of the unidentified track. This seemed to solve the mystery of the flare-dropping aircraft and the

^{44.} Extract from the 25 RORAD Byn hottle Statt Journal.

Region/Division settled back to what had become a sormal state of being during the increased rendiness period.

E-102 Lost on Finalt from Paine Field. Following the excitement created by the Navy SA-16, a note of Sachess clept into the Region Division affairs on November 10 when an F-102 on a tactical flight from Paine Field was reported overdue. Search was immediately begun and several unconfirmed reports of flares, parachute and life raft signtings were received. Each was enecked out by both air and ground parties but no sightings were confirmed. All organized search for the missing aircraft was discontinued on November 18 hecause of bad weather conditions and the lack of further leads. The pilot was being carried as missing.

Termination of Dispersal. Also, on November 18, the 25th NORAD Region told the Spokane and Seattle Sectors to terminate the dispersal of aircraft at Paine Field as soon 40 as practical. All primary armanent was to be returned to its home station by factical ferry flights under configuration and restrictions imposed at the beginning of the

^{45.} Msg RCC Vancouver to 25 Mir Div. 10 Nov 1982: Msg CCOD Thir.een to CGAS Port Angeles, CGC Klausath and CG-95328-10 Nov 1962: Msg 570BS 11-4604, 11 Nov 1962: Msg 570BPO-PRA 11-4604, 12 Nov 1962: Msg 570BPO-PRA 11-4683, 18 Nov 1962:

^{46. #}sg 25NORC 696-G to Seattle, Egokane & Portland TORAD Sears, 15 Nov 1962.

dispersal period. st the home station, (6)

SUBTREE LANCE AND DETECTION

At the time the 25th CONAD Region/25th Air Division went into the increased alert posture on October 32, 1902, the radar facilities at Mr. Hebo Air Force Station Greath still we a unusable. The 689th Badar Squadron's AN/FPS-24 AR/MPS-11, and AN/FPS-6 had been dispaged juring a severe windstorm on October 11-12. Only an AN/FPS-68 was left operational. However, during the early days of the Cuban Orisis the S89th Radar Squadron was not standing idly by.

When the seriousness of the international altuation because known, the Squadron Counander and the Communications and Discironics difficer accelerated their efforts to bring the station pack into the surveillance network. Sugy has no intention of being caught up in a serious situation with an inoperative radar station.

First, they exchanged neight firme: locations, sevens the PAS-68 into the PPS-6 tower! where it was a ready schooling

^{47.} May Raysond R. Robinson, 50 878489.

^{48,} Est Hay Y. Cooley:

to go at some future date. To get the FFL-eB equipment into its new location meant that all of the damaged FPS-6 wear had to be removed and a great amount of electionic wiring re-routed. By doing this work themselves, nembers of the Squadron had the height finder back in operation on October 25, three days after the beginning of the increased readiness. Had they waited for approval through normal channels, it was doubtful that the equipment would have the ready at any time during the crisis.

This departure from approved methods did not mean that the Squadron acted without guidance. Headquarters. Air Decense Command provided an expedited approval for the move, sitting that the Squadron's actions were enorthodomble that the exigences involved probably were sufficient to warrest deviation from standard procedures.

A search radar was sorely needed, too, if the station was going to be in the air defense business at all during the alert period. So, getting a replacement for the MPS-11 moved almost as fast as the relocation of the FPS-8B. A few days after the storm, the Squadron began looking for a new buble and sound one at Rome Air Material Area heliquartels.

^{49.} Inverview with 385 Sq Cado. 10 Sen 1865

^{50.} May ADDATHAN 30110 to GERTA, 23 Got 1802.

A new antenna -- the old one had been ripped from its tower and slammed onto the ground at the base of the 198-26 tower -- was located at Winslow Air Force Station, 'Arizona and ilotin to 8t. Hoso, but not until some complications were cleared up. Restrictions imposed on flying and the need for cargo aircraft for support of the southeast area made it almost impossible to get airlift for the antenna. Finally, we aircraft was allowed to take off and the needed piece of equipment arrived at Mt. Hebo at about 0600Z on October 24. Om hour and 40 minutes after arrival, the antenna was on top a the 30-foot tower and the bubble was being inflated.

"It was so foggy that night that you could hardly nee the ground from the top of the tower," the Squadron Commander said. "The only way we could adequately signal the cruse operator was with a flashlight."

Also, he added that the entire operation would have been impossible without the teamwork of every man ut it. Held Air Force Station. "Manual lator was something everyone shared, regardless of his rank or position," the Communication

The search capability of Mt. Hybo Air Force Station and finally restored at 1840Z on October 28, eliminating a multi-nate kind emilited in the 25th SORAU Region 25th Air bit from serverlinger and oct outsin hetworks since the application.

of the alert. High altitude overlap coverage had been provided by adjacent radar stations during the time Mt. Hebo was inoperative, but low altitude coverage was somewhat decraded. Some low altitude coverage was provided by USAF airborne early warning aircraft, but this was on a random-wanned basis and there were long periods of time when the airborne early warning stations off the Portland Air Defense Sentor were not manned at all. Also, some information affecting the area was received from U.S. Navy placet whips on patrol off the coast as part of the seaward 51 elebent.

In November, in response to the urgent need for an operational FPS-24 at Mt. Hebb Air Force Station, Headquarters. United States Air Force told Electronic System Divisio: that repairs would not be delayed pending a fir.1 assessment close and liability, and that every offort should be made to return the electronic components to operation as juickly as possible and to expedite plans to rebuild the following. However, in view of the Mt. Hebb area weather situation during the winter months, Electronic System Division did not plan to start new radome installation work.

^{51.} Intervew with 25 NR C&E Battle 1 all Officer, 26 Oct 1962.

^{52.} Ho ADO Daily Start Digest No. 181, 21 Nev 1962

S52,000 for a 75-day work period and 15-day test period. Line Electronic System Division planned to award the repair countries as soon as money was available for the job.

At the end of December 1962, the FPS-24 still various roady for use and probably would not be ready for neveral months. Until it was returned to operation, the outdated MPS-11 was going to be the only search equipment as inimite should another increased readiness be ordered.

Interference at Klamath Air Force Station. While the facilities at Mt. Hebo were still down and the Region, Division was concerned over the lack of low altitude coverage in that area, Klamath Air Force Station reported that electronic interference was being experienced on both sources of height finder radars.

Although the interference was light and represented an annoyance more than a degradation of Klamath's extreme and largest finder capacitizies, the situation did calme in factor. Staff some concern.

The first report came at 02352 on October 25, when the Battle Staff was advised of the problem. An amplifying

⁵³ mg ADC Daily Staff Digest No. 181, 21 Nov 1962.

^{54.} Extract from 25 NR Battle Staff Journa: 100

report was made at 0308Z, when the 777th Radar Squadrer reported that the interference was coming from a bearing of 210 degrees. A few minutes later, Headquarters, Portland Air Defense Sector added to the suspense by reporting a radar pickup on a surface vessel bearing 220 degrees at a distance of approximately 56 nautical miles from Klamath 55 Air Force Station.

At this point, the Region advised Headquarters, hestern Soa Frontier of the problem and asked that (he harmance vessel be investigated. Headquarters, 28th NORAL headquarters) also was notified of the interference report, since the larget was moving in that direction.

Both the track and the in preference faded at NVJ.... at which time the 25th NORAD Region/25th Air Division still did not have positive identification of the interference source. But, like the Air National Guard-Navy Sa-16 includent off the mouth of the Columbia River, the incident gave the Division pulse rate reason to fluctuate a little

^{55.} Extract from the 25 AR Battle Staff Journal, 25 Oct 1982.

^{56.} Ibid.

^{57.} Ibid.

Existenance of Radar Equipment. With the problem at U. Nebo at least partially solved and the electronic interference no longer present, the primary problem faced by the Region/Division was the maintenance of its radar equipment which, for the most part, presented no real problem. In Last, the only serious problem foreseen as a result of mach a prolonged period of increased reading a way that its Reeping single channel equipment in continuous operation.

When the crisis began, the Division wanted its equipment ready for any emergency, so on October 23 field units were told to conduct only those tests necessary to assure that all equipment was operating effectively. Even so, requests to remove equipment from active air detensations continued to come from the field.

Then, on October 30, after a week of dual channel operation, the Division saw that a program of maintenance monitoring was essential to insure maximum availability of equipment and that some period of single channel operation would be necessary to alice for repairs to degrading equipment. To insure recovery at the earliest possible time

^{58.} Byn Dep for Ops during prosentation to Div officers following close of Juban Orisis.

^{56.} Usg 25MME-MC 109351 to 5MADS, SPADS & POADS 23 Dot 1964

after going into a single channel situation, the air defense sectors were instructed to keep close control of 60 units in that configuration.

By November 6, maintenance policies moved from DSth Air Division level to Command level, with Headquarters. Hir belease Command setting up procedures to be used by all divisions during the remainder of the increased readingss period. Headquarters, Air Defense Command said that numerous interpretations of operations regulations pertaining to equipment status had arise; and that to prevent further system degradation certain guidance had to be fullowed, particularly that of operational improvement versus operational degradation while improvements were being accous-In other words, was the period of degradation worsh the improvements made during the time the equipment was inoperative? In general, where recovery time was one hour or less, it was felt that repairs should not be deferred. Upon receipt of the Air Defense Command policy, the Division amended its earlier policy to conform with the Command pro-63 redures.

^{60.} Msg 2JOAC-E 109478 to SEADS, SPAJS & POKES, 22 Oct 1962.

^{81.} ADCP 35-12.

^{82,} gag ADOOF-E1 Star to all are block & now that.

^{55.} usg 250AC-2 169310 to 82A05. APADS or DADA Thom:1982.

After the international situation became less serious, further amendments to maintenance policies were made to allow for periodic tests and preventive maintenance routines which required removal of a function from operation or standard status when dual channel recovery was 30 minutes or less, or, in the case of single channel functions, the adjacent facilities were operational in that function under recovery time was 50 minutes or less.

when the period of increased readiness was cancelled, all caintenance procedures were returned to normal, Anti-with the return to normal, the Divisian noted with interest that it had weathered the increased readiness with fewer unscheduled outages than usually experienced during normal 65 conditions.

SUMFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES

Units of USARADOOM's 7th Region, headquartered at Machiora Air Force Base, Mashington, also were alerted an topy states at 17352 on October 22.

^{54.} Msg 250AC-E 119910 to SEADS, SP.DS.& POADS, 28 Nov 1860

⁶⁵ . Ryn Dep for Ops in presentation to officers sollowing close of Cub \times Criets

and were brought up $(2.5)^{20}$ and brought down with other units of the 20th

CONAD Region.

At the time the alert was called, the 7th Region 66 alestic site at Vashon Island—had been turned over to contractor and support personnel for a 60-day period for installation of an improved radar system kit. With the international situation requiring a high state of military preparedness, installation of the kit was expedited and the site returned to active use on November 9, 20 days ahead of schedule. Return of the site gave the 7th Region 67 full air defense of paulity.

In addition to the active U. S. Army units affected by the increased readiness. ${}^{(1)}\mathcal{D}/{}^{(3)}$

All National Guard

units assigned an on-site mission stood ready for federalization. They accelerated their training programs and imposed certain availability restrictions on their personnel so that any call-up could be completed in minimum time. Although the of these units was actually indoralized

^{88.} Entrery B, 4th ks1 Bn, 4th Arty.

^{87.} Asst Chief of Stoff, G-3, 7th Rgn.

during the alert period, 7th Region was prepared to implement any orders for the call-up of National Guard on-site 68 mission units.

Operational readiness of the NIKE-equipped units was maintained at a very high state considering the prolonged period of time involved and the high operational rate required. This was confirmed by statistics published during the first two weeks of the increased readiness period which showed the 25th NGRAD Region-controlled 7th Region and the highest over all readiness rate in the country.

While the Region was maintaining its high readiness rate, it also was experiencing periods of non-operation; but, these were of short duration and had little effect on the unit's combat capability. Over a longer period of time however, the maintenance of such a high state of about would have had its effect on operations, primarily because 69 of the lack of live exercises.

MISC" LANEOUS ASPECTS

Operations at the beginning of the Cuban Crisis uppeared 2 little unusual to 38th CONAD Region/25th Air Division.

^{88.} Ibid.

^{65.} Asst Ch of Staff, G-3. 7th Agr.

particularly when

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There had been

routine intelligence on the increasing seriousness of the Cuban baildup, but there had been nothing to indicate that the increase in the veapons alert status was a result of that, or any other, world situation. So, when the Region. Division was instructed to move its interceptors to dispersed bases with primary armament aboard, it requested clarification of the directive. After being told that the dispersal would be carried out as originally instructed, and with the thusual status remaining on the board, the Region/ 70 Division acted in a positive manner.

the interceptors thered and dispersed, the Region Division began arranging for 24-hour a day combat center manning without the use of Canadian present. This was recessary of the beganning of the increased residues period because it actions were taken unilaterally by CONAD, the Canadian government not naving begun their participation. Therefore, the Royal Canadian Air Force members of the Region were not

^{70,} ligh Dop for 'ne dering presentation to officers of liesing place of Orban Crisis; also pp. 4 and 3 of this document.

chigible for duty in the Combat Center and Direction Centers.

with the Candaians eliminated, it became necessary for some CONAD Region/Air Division people to live in the centers and 71 almost a round-the-clock mass. The Region/Division open-acted under these conditions until Commander-in-Caref Management of 575 at 17312 on October 24.

Interceptor Force Servival. Only two of the hepter.

Division's five Air Force fighter interceptor equadrons and two Air National Guard fighter interceptor squadrons were dispersed during this time and they were operating from an established Air Force installation. At the same time, a 72 second dispersel base—was being prepared for further dispersal use. The field was closed to traffic at 21°52 on November 5, 1962 after Headquarters, Air Defense Command 73 gave the go-anead on meeted repairs, and re-opened at 74 1710Z on November 29, 1962.

^{71.} Rgs Dep for Ops during presentation to usingers following close of Caban Crisis.

^{72.} Walla Walla, Wash,

^{73.} Msg ADIFS 2925, 17 Oct 1962.

^{74.} Inter/lew with Mr. William A. Stander, 25 Air Div Civil Eng Office.

During the 24-day closure, a 150 foot wide overlay was spread over the existing 7,186 foot runway, which was found to be in good shape structurally but limited to him-cruft with a wheel-load of 25,000 pounds.

The short time required for the repair of the runway was directly attributable to the Cuban Crisis and the possible need for the base if further dispersals were required.

Survival of Essential Facilities. Planning for survival of essential facilities aist was directed as part of the Region/Division preparation for whatever might come as a result of the "quarantine" placed around Cuba. All 25th Air Division units were advised that command posts and other essential facilities were to be sandbagged where plactical to increase protection from fallout, all disaster control teams were to be updated, civilian employees and on-base dependents were re-briezed on emergency procedures, and close liaison was astablished with local civil defense 75 and public agencies.

Sub Contact Quebec 23. While these survival plans were being ordered, further realism was added to the situation when the 25th NORAD Region Battle Staff was advised

^{75.} Interview with 25 Air Di. Disaster Cont Officer, 26 Oct 1982.

at 02302 on October 25 that a good contact had been made with an unknown submarine off the Portland Air Defense. Sector. The contact, tabbed "Quebec 23," was taken under surveillance by the U.S.S. Watts, a U.S. Navy destroyer patrolling in the general vicinity of the reported signting. Twelve hours later the contact was still good and hold down tacties were being carried out. General surveillance was continued until after four destroyers reported they had had negative results with the contact. The search was terminated at 0728Z on October 25.

The end of "Quebec 23" was not the end of submarine sightings reported to 25th NORAD Region/25th Air Division, however. Headquarters, Portland Air Defense Sector forwards a massage to the combat center at 2052Z on October 26 statistical a civilian living on the coast had reported a possible submarine surfaced off the coast in the vicinity of 41 29.1 124 11%. Headquarters, Western Sea Frontier was advised of the report and asked to investigate. Final evaluation by the Navy was that the "sub" was either a probable fishing boat or rock formation off the coast.

^{76.} Extract from 25 NORAD Rgn Ch Controller Log, 26 Oct 1962.

^{77.} Ibia

Exercises and Evaluations Cancelled. While these reports lossened the routine of the long increased alert, they did not provide the live training the Region Division thought was necessary. From previous experience, the hegion Division knew that without sufficient live exercises combat center proficiency would begin to deteriorate. But, four days after the alert was implemented, all 25th NORAD Section and Sector exercises and evaluations, synthetic or live, and support thereto were cancelled until further notice. Also, support of adjacent division and sector exercises and evaluations were reacculted. This, in effect, eliminated any possibility for live exercises during the period.

SAC Runs Against RES Siles Continued. Although Region/Division exercises and evaluations were no longer clicved. Commander-in-Chief NORAD said there was no objection to the continuation of Strategic Air Command runs against Li racar somb scoring sites. Therefore, during the Cotober 22-November 27 alert, USARADCOR units in the a5th ACRAD Region

^{78.} Ms. 98 DOP-X 109438 to SENS, SPNS, PONS, 28 Oct 1962.

^{79.} Thid.

AG. Mag DSCRO I 9015 tu SEADS, SPADS & POADS. 25 Get 1962:

continued to provide overflying combers with results of their "bankb" drop.

Fracetime Flight Restrictions Lifted On October 27. Headquarters, Air Defense Command told all air divisions if it productime flying limitations had been lifted and that other restrictions previously imposed which were restricting operations could be lifted by local division commanders. On the surface this appeared to be a simple, straightforward directive that could easily be placed into effect throughout the 25th NOE'D Region/25th Air Division. On closer observation, however, it was soon apparent that numerous restrictions had been imposed from time to time and that the difficulty of researching these items and determining which was been removed was going to be a major project.

For example, there were restrictions on carrying F-106 drop tanks, the use of high altitude ilight suits above 50,000 fect tail number scheduling in accordance with AFF 86-1, PRIME requirements, data collection for both AFF 66-1 and PRIME, and many others still to be researched well 82 after the close of the period.

Rgn Dep for Ops during presentation to officers following close of Court Crasts.

^{\$2.} laim.

The Division realized that to react quickly in the future all such restrictions would have to be catalogued, even though determining which items were not required during 83 higher states of alert was going to be a big job. This was just one of the lessons learned during the Cuban Crisis.

Reflections on the Coban Crisis Participation. After the 28th NORAD Region/25th Air/Division Battle Staff went on reduced manning at 1600Z on November 21, there was an opportunity to look back over the entire period of increased readiness and pick out the areas that were in need 5: 84 further investigation. At the end of December 1982, the Segion/Division was asking:

Were we satisfied with the existing NORED regulation outlining readiness conditions and solutes of about?

What restrictions imposed during read(ness conditions could and should be lifted during increased readiness? For instance, should the requirements of AFN 66-1 be partially disregarded?

Was there a need for more supervisors to direct manageme. For resources during operations on a Re-hour a day bases?

^{83. .} Ibid.

^{84.} fbig.

²⁶ NORAS Red SSAS.

What training requirements should be maintained during period of extended higher alert status?

How long should communications and electronics is a continuous period of the maintained at a peaked condition without researd to preventive maintenance pulsaies?

Should cross training regulations be reviewed with the idea of training selected personnel in highly teconient areas so commanders at sectors can be advised on technical implications that arise periodically?

This was by no means a complete list of the questions Region/Division was asking itself at the end of the crisis. There was to be no let-up in the Region/Division efforts to overcome even the most minute deficiency uncovered during the partial. The end of the crisis was, in actuality, a point from which to begin to strengthen combat capability and to prepare for the real thing.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE 23TH AIR DIVISION (SAGE)

Dy

John W. Dennison

ALERT

The alert began at 1918Z when COCO chlor was implemented. All Battle Staif members of the Seth Nobelb Region were in place within the hour. Minicom was implemented at 2025Z. At 2000Z $-6.5^{+0.5}$

In these cody hours of fremmied activity.

CINCONAD directed the 26th Air Division, after " 2/2

6.015

Approximately

*50°

ut 12552 on 23 October.

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The deployed aircraft did not change their alert status with the new status but remained on the same alert posture. Not until 28 November was the 26th - 65/15

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Upon receipt of increased alort status, pattern State members took their positions and wir plans were read and Up to date intelligence summaries were furnished by the intelligence Stiff (hrough intelligence briefligs. Major General Beary Viccelia notified commanders that maximum.

^{1.} Log, Record of Events, 26AD/26NORAD Rar COLL 22 Oct 1962 to 27 Nov 1962 horositer referred to us Loc Log; May CORC C-1, CINCNORAD to 26 NORAD Rgh, et al. 22 Oct 1962; May NORG-3-31, CINCNORAD to 26 NORAD, et al. 23 30ct 1962.

^{2. #}sg 26NOOF-PL 11352, 26 NORAD to Boston NORAD: et al., CINCNORAD/COMAD declared DEFCON 3 BRAVO 63/16321, 3 NOV 1962.

^{2.} Interview with Maj Gen Vincolio, Cuch 26 Robin' COHAD/AD/(MAGE), 5 Dec 1962.

security measures would be initiated, increased effort would be made to maintain the highest incommission rate for all types of equipment, all flight leaders and commanders would be thoroughly familiar with current war plans and rules of engagement, and each commander would make the maximum use of personnel, equipment, and supplies.

As the direction of the flourishing crisis was unroom and could progress toward actual aircraft engagement
and major armed conflict, rules of what to do when controoting a nostile aircraft became of primary amportance.

A CONAD Supplement to NORAD Regulation 55-6 set forthe the
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tirst instructions. These instructions were modified by
CONAD Operation Plan 2-62 which gave a general synopsis
of the crisis, duties of participating commands, and the
rules for engagement.

Generally,

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^{4.} Msg 2600R 02-10546, 36 AD to MAADS, et al., Personal Vicelia to Sect Cadre ala Char 551 F1S, 23 oct 1952.

^{5.} COMAD Supp #1 to NORAD Reg 55-6, 9 Dec 1959, Sules for Engagement of Cuban/Sino-Soviet Tactical Apparatt, 22 Oct 1962.

^{6.} NOFORN, MSE COOP-P X-488, CINCONAD to 26 CONAD, et al., CONAD Ope Plan 2-62. So Oct 1962.

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. Nike-Ajax or non-

andlear Nike-Hercules missiles could be considered to: employment only when the safety of the surrounding areas troad falling components was assured. In the event that

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hajor General Viccellio, as 26th CONAD Region and Other responsibilities reserved specifically to him. These actions are listed on the charts titled: "NORAD Actions Reserved to Communder of 26th NORAD Region" and "CONAD Actions Reserved to Communder of 26th CONAD Region." If one of the reserved actions of

^{8.} Ltr, Ma; Gen H. Viccellio to 26NOOPS and 26NOCC, NORAD actions Reserved to Codr 26 NORAD agn; 30 Oct 1962; Ltr, Ma; Jen Viccellio to 26COPS and 26COCC, What actions Reserved to Codr 26 COMAD Mgs, 30 Oct 1962.

the CONAD or NORAD Commander took place during the absence of General Viccellio, all decisions related to these actions governed be accomplished under the following chain of command: Eager General J. T. Snodgrass, USA, Deputy Commander; Colonel G. R. Brokell, USAF, Vice Commander; Colonel W. P. Bace, USA, Deputy for Operations.

Position manning for the Continuous Battle Staff con-10 sissed of:

- The Commander, Deputy for Operations, or Director Compat Operations.
- 2. Fighter Officer, Interceptors or Fighter Officer, Elssiles.
 - 3. Air Defense Artillery Navy.
 - 4. Compat Reporting Center.
 - 5. Communications and Electronics.

is addition, one of the following officers, Major General Nice. To. Colonel Mace, Colone. Bickell, or Colonel M. E. 11. Thurmin, would always be on duty in the headquarters.

^{9.} Ltr, Maj Gen Viccelliu to 26NOOPS and 26NOOC, NORAD Actions Reserved to Cmdr 33 NORAD Rgn, 30 Oct 1962; Ltr, Maj Gen Viccellio to 26 COPS and 26COCC, CONAC Actions Reserved Cmir 26 CONAD Rgs, 30 Oct 1862.

^{10.} IOM, 28COPS to All Cofficers Cuncerned, 26 CC, Al. Ago, 26 AD. Continuous Battle Staff Manning, 26 CONAD Rgn, 28 Oct 1962; Esg 28NOPS 16-25-47, 58 NORAD Rgn to CINC 3.AJ, 61 al., 23 Oct 1962.

^{14.} **101**0

A command problem developed concerning control of U. S. Forces of the Bangor Sector. In September 1962. Bangor NORAD Sector was transferred from the 26th NORAD Region to the Northern NORAD Region. The Northern NORAD Region was located at St. Hubert, near Montreal, Quebcc, and was under the Command of Air Vice Marshal J. B. Harvey, Royal Canadian Fir Force. When the Cuban alert was instituted operations were limited to U.S. military Participation. Numerous countries offered assistance early in the crisis. but Canada delayed a policy approvacement until 29 October causing some consternation among Canadian military personnel on duty with U. S. military personnel. Therefore, COURD. rather than NORAD of which Tanada was a member, had the responsibility to conduct the air defense of the United States. Thus for CONAD or Continental Air Defense policies. Bangor Sector had to be reassigned. To correct the situation. CONAD directed that Bangor Sector would be placed under the

^{12.} Msg 26NOIN N62-7026, 26.0RmD to Bangor NORAD Sector, et al., NORAD Intellimence Item, 25 Oct 1962.

^{13.} Msg NNFO-164, 27 CNORAD to 26 NORAD, e. al., Canadian Personnel, 29 Oct 1962.



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Aircraft from Six 26th Air Division fighter interceptor squadrons were sent to dispersal bases. The 76th FIS at Westover AFB, Massachuset S, sent F-102's to

The SOOth FIS at McGuire AFL.

New Jersey, dispatched four F+106's to Olmstead AFB

Pennsylvania. F+101's from the 49th FIS at Griffiss AFB

New York, and the 75th FIS at Dow AFB, Maine, were dispersed

to #2/10

And to Atlantic City Airport, Atlantic City, New Jorsey, the Spin FIS at Dover AFB, Delaware, Sent Felicies, and the 95th FIS at Andrews AFB, Maryland, Sent Felice S.

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^{16.} COC Log: Msg CCRC-C-1, GINCHORAD to 26 NCHAD Rgn, et al., 22 Let 1962.

operational control of the 26th CONAD Region in matters

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pertaining to CONAD and the Cuban Crisis.

DISPERSAL AND DEPLOYMENT

Upon the receipt of the dispersal message, two or its of the 2dth Air Division (SAGE) prepared to deploy to import 15 in Florida. The 48th Fighter Interceptor Squadron (FTS) thom Langley AFB, Virginia, deployed its F-106's to Patrick AFB, Florida, and the 482nd Fighter Interceptor Squadron thom Seymour Johnson AFB, North Carolina, deployed its F-102's to Homestead AFB, Florida. During the crisis, the 4d2nd kept four F-102's operationally ready at Homestead. The 48th FIS had 12 F-106's ready at Patrick AFB.* Two F-101's from the 444th FIS at Charleston AFB, South Carolina, were rotated to Langley AFB to till alert commitments left by the departure of the 48th FIS.

^{14.} Msg NCRC-C-66 CINCONAD to Cher CONAD Sept Bonno 27.56t 1962: Msg 26000P-PR. C62-795t 25 20NAD to 20NAD 5.0. Bangor, et al. 50 Oct 1862: Msg COOP-2 N-517, CINCONAD to 26 CONAD Rafi, 6 E.M. 1962.

^{15.} Ms; CCRC-C-1, CINCNORAD to 26 NORAD Rgn <u>et al</u>... 22 Oct 1952.

The aircraft remained on glert status at the dispersari bases until 17 November when CONAD sent instructions for 17 then to redeploy their home bases. By 19 November the 18 dispersed directal had been returned.

The aircraft in Florida were not released at the said time as those aircraft at the dispersal bases. As one crisis continued to dissipate, further reductions were made to the military might posed near Cuba. President kennear infect the quarantine on 20 November. Eight only later, the F-102's of the 482nd FIS were returned from he steed the Florida, to Seymour Johnson AFB North Carolina. Then the Godden, the F-106'% of the abin FIS redeployed from the Godden, with the departure of the last F-106, Major Godden T. J. Godd, Commander of the 32nd CONAD Region and and one to an one.

^{17.} Mag NORC-C-154: CINCNORAD to 26 NORAD R... et al., 17 Law 1962.

^{18.} COC Log.

^{19.} Syracuse Pos. Standard, 21 Nov 1902.

^{20.} Interview with Maj.Gen Vibeellio, Cmdr 26NorAD Ab 5 Per 1962; COC Log: MSK 2600F4W 62-12083, 26 AD to WAADS, furce Bithdrawal South East U.S., 3 Nov 1962; N=g 2600P4WF 62-12315, 26 AD to WAADS and 48 FIS, withdrawal of Forces S.1 (SA. 5 De. 1962)

^{21.} Meg 2000P-WT 222 $^{\circ}$ 28 AD to WAADS, 48 FIS. How fix. For AEW2C Wg. Meg for Con Covinct from Que Gen ()1 fac ()2

pering the crisis, Nator General Gent stated that fighter interceptor atteract thew 8901 hours and that attended early warning and control aircraft flew 3754 hours without a major accident

These aircraft missions were performed from strunge aircraft missions were performed from strunge aircrafts upon short notice under conditions that were not $\frac{23}{2}$ always the most desirable. Early in the crisis, all plaint restrictions concerning the carrying of external fael think on lighter interceptor aircraft were waived.

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To increase large survivability

local commanders were instructed to keep aircraft located with nuclear weapons for an indefinite period and were

^{20.} Ibia.

^{23.} Ibid.

^{24.} Msg 2600P-WF 0591-C, 26 AD to BAADS, ot al., External Fuel Tanks, 30 Oct 1902.

^{25.} Msg 2600P-wi 0588-C 26 AD to EAADS, of the Whiter of Pencetimo Flying Limitations, 30 Oct 1802, The ADDOP-Wi X-72, ADC to 26 AD, c. 11., Walve of Pencettic Plying Limitations, 26 Cot 1902

permitted to waive the nigh explosive criteria for a period 26 of 72 hours during operational emergencies.

Region commanders were also authorized to approve rotational flights of tactical aircraft between home and disserall hases for the purpose of exchanging aircraft, crews. and weapons, and conducting essential training. Co tain limitations were imposed, however. CONAD reconsission would airc. aft on rotational flights carry suclear weapons on ... if the weapons needed to be returned to the home base for maintenance or mandatory inspections. Then the MB-1 would be terried with the igniter safety pin installed and the ejection rack cartridges remov d. The GAR-11 sould be ferriad as prescribed by Air Force Regulation 122-23, paragraph 15. dated 2 April 1962. Before one aircraft could be down-loaded and rotated, another operationally ready aircrait was to be in place at the base. All operationally ready aircraft as the dispersal bases were to be fully loaded with primary armament at all times except during the exchange of well-als. Pyimary armament would be down-loaded prior to all rotational Loading safety and technical directives were always The 26th Air Division amplified CONAD instructions

²⁶ Ms; ADMDC 2902. ADC to 26 AD Limitations to Force Survivability, 26 Oct 1902.

^{27.} Mag 26000P-0 862-7038. 26 CONAD to CONAD Setr

by authorizing sector commanders to rotate conventionally armed aircraft and aircrews every 72 hours. When it became necessary to transport primary weapons for maintenance or mandatory we mone inspection, the commander was to solliv the 20th Region Duty Deputy for Operations and receive bermission for each flight. Flights with primary scapoos were kept to an absolute minimum and conducted during the daylight hours. Flights followed sinings safe distance routing consistant with normal landing weights for the aircraft

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et al., 25 Oct 1962; Msg CCRC-C-28, CINCUNAD to 26 CONAD, et al., 24 Oct 1982

^{28.}

Ibic 29. cod

the 26th Air Division did not foresee any proble areas.

but did direct its subordinate units to coordinate their 20 (lush policy with collecated units. At the beginning of the crists, all planned exercises, tactical evaluations, and 51 simulated tests were either postponed or cancelled. But us the crists began to subside, exercises and tactical cycles 32 uations were rescheduled. Thus, AMCHE NOOSE*, AUTOMS 33 February 1963.

TEXAS TOWERS

During the Cuban Crisis, the Texas Towers were in operation but weather continued to be an obstacle.

^{30.} Msg 2600P-0585-C, 26 AD to BAADS, Fighter Floating at ADC/SAC Collocated Bases, 25 Oct 1962.

^{31.} Msg NOEV-E-134, CIKCNORAD to 26 AD, et al. NORAD Training Exercises, 25 Oct 1962; Msg NCRC-C-51, CINCNORAD to 28 NORAD, et al., 27 Oct 1962.

^{32.} Msg 26NOOP-OE 11-21-71, 26 NORAD to NORAD Sett Boston, et 11; Exercise Postponements, 21 Nov 1962: Msg 26NOOP-OE 17-21-69, 26 NORAD Rgn Exercise Schedule for Dec Jan, and Feb, 21 Nov 1962: Msg 26NOOP-OE 2-28-48, 26 NORAD Rgn to CG 1st Rgn ARADCOM, et al. 26 NORAD Rgn Exercise Schedule for Jan, Feb and Mar, 28 Dec 1962.

^{33.} Msg 26NOC7-OE 12-28-48. 26 NORAD Rgs to CC let Rgs AEADCOM, et cl., 26 NORAD Rgs Exercise Schedele is Res. Feb and Mar. $\overline{28}$ Dec 1962.

^{*} aPACaE MAGIC, to be held in Dec. was emprelled.

Deteriorating weather on 30 October caused concern when minimums were reached. In this regard lotal evacuation or Phase III of the Texas Towers was to be accomplished when the advancing storm and associated "wind wave" obtained a 51-knot speed at 35° 00" north latitude or within a 350 mile radius of either Texas Tower. At the towers, the safeti of the personnel took precedence over all other considerations. including the air defense mission during conditions of permal readiness. ADC had directed, however, that for alert periods in DEFCON 3* or higher, the Texas Towers as a to resain manned unless a tropical storm or a nurricane was 3.1 approaching. On 3 November, weather forecasts indicate. 50-knet winds at the Texas Towers. However, the towers continued operational except for 12 mis. tes on 4 November when Toxas Tower 2 was down due to loss in the air condilighing. Bad weather continued with helicopters being sent for tower evacuation on " November. Weather conditions necessitated the towers to be placed on evacuation along status amain on 9 hovember and 14 November. Then on 16 November, General Viccellio and General Greenfield ordered

^{*} ADC changed this to DEFCON 2 with Change 1, 17 Nov -562.

^{34.} ADC Ops Pins 19-62. Texas Tower Placuation Plan. 10 No. 1962; Ch I to ADC Dps Plan 19-62. Texas Tower Evacuation Plan 18 No. 1962, 17 No. 1962

the maining at both towers reduced to seven men because of high waves.* Thus, on 16 November, Texas Tower 3 and 2 because non-operational at 2105Z and 2115Z, respectively. As the storm lessened on la November, inspectors arrived to perform underwater structional inspections. Fifty-three men were returned to Texas Tower 3: but, when the inspectors found severe scouring and erosion around the tower's legs, and tower was re-evacuated on 20 November. Maining continued with seven men at both towers throughout the remainder of the Cuban Crisis while USAF evaluated future utilization 36 of the towers.

MISSILES

One basic operational advantage of the missile as a wearon system was that it is perpetually on alert. In its posture within the 26th Air Division, the BOMARC was operationally ready to strike a target 400 miles distant in 17 minutes. Thus, the Cuban Crisis changed very little the alert conditions of the missile. More system readiness

The usual complement of a tower was approx 80 pen.

^{35.} COC Log.

³¹ Msg aFOOP-DE-HC 806cm, On o. Staff (SAF to ADC), 7 Set 1869.

checks were performed (the number was increased from approximately three a day to 12), but this was accomplished without sacrificing alert posture. The ready force was retained above the 80 per cent minimum (200 plus missiles) through accolorated and round the clock maintenance and extended 37 man hours. Security forces around missile installations were also increased requiring additional personnel and missile hours.

The crisis did reclarify conditions that had existed routinely before and clarified procedural reporting as to missile alert status. In addition, it emphasized the old axion, "Train the way you fight, and fight the way you go train."

PROBLEMS AND LESSONS

The Cuban Crisis necessitated unplanned agroraft and personnel movements. Associated with these movements agra-

^{37.} Interview with Maj/Scamidt, 26 AD Hs1 Br. Ops. and Training, 8 Jan 1969.

^{38.} Interview with 2nd Lt McNully, Base Prov Marsha). Niagar Falls Aprt, 14 Nov 1962: Interview withil/C Gannon. Ch Sec/Law Enforce Div, 26 AD, 16 Nov 1962: Interview with S/Sgt Turner, Trov Sgt. 35.h Ms1 Sq. 14 Nov 1962.

^{39.} Interview with May Senmidt, 28 AD Mai Br, Ope. and Training, 8 Jan 1963.

possibly the most serious problems of the crisis. The lack of readily available airlift caused dealys in the arrival of support equipment and personnel at dispersal bases. How it been necessary for deploying aircraft to be employed immediately upon their arrival, the lag caused by the air
10 lift might have had a disasterous effect.

Abother problem was the shortage of security personnel Security personnel were not available at the dispersal basis and only a working minimum were present at the regular bases. Augmentation people had to be supplied from other sources then in some cases, airlifted to priority positions to all it, seven air police were deployed during the first three hours of the elect to 26th Air Division dispersal bases with the Chis lest complement arriving shortly before midgrant on 22 October. This action of gaining supplementary people had disadvaniages in that hany had inadequage security experience and needed training. No Air Entional Conturns Air Force Reserve people were used although the Air National Guard offered assistance. The extended period and intere of the alert further complicated the security problem and painted

⁴⁰ Lir, 26 AD to ADC, Object Lessons, 27 Dec 1962.

^{41.} Interview tith L/C Connon, Ch Sec/Law Entorce Div. 26 AD, 16 Not 1982.

up a need for more pre-planning to increase the number of security personnel and equipment and the organizing of a security force fly away kit during a period of emergency.

In an area of high Soviet targeting, force survivability continued to concern the 26th Air Division. Dispersal concepts, tested during the crisis, pointed out the
need for a greater degree of flexibility. If the intercepts,
force was to meet an air preathing threat followin: a missilla
attack, the 26th Air Division needed the capability to
operate from a greater number of airfields than currently
43
designated by ADC. Thus, the 26th in Division recommended
that the number of dispersal bases selected be increased to
improve force flexibility and survivability.

The Bangor CONAD command and control problem, discussed under Command and Control, was resolved with a change in assignment. Effective 1 December 1962, the Bangor CONAD Sector was transferred from Headquarters Continental Air Defense Command to the 26th CONAD Region. Effective the same data the 26th CONAD Region was assigned an area of responsibility consisting of that U.S. territory and

^{42.} Ibid.

^{43.} Liv. 26 AD to ADC. Orfect Lessons, 27 Luc 1932.

^{4-. &}lt;u>loic</u>.

adjacent U. S. territorial waters and international waters contained within the 26th NORAD Region and the Bangor CONAD 45

Other problems, such 28 supply support, long hours, and loss of flying time while on alert, were persont; but everall, the absence of problems, in what could have been a most serious situation, was one of the most notificable items of the crisis. The absence of major problems was attributed to previous training that made alert and dispersal assignments almost routine.

CONCLUSION.

The Cuban Crisis demonstrated that units of the 26th CONAD Region/26th Air Division (SAGE) could react quickly and effectively upon short notice to an emergency. Training and experience had sharpened the units so that dispersal and deproyment assignments were accomplished with a minimum of problems. Thus, the crisis confirmed the training and testing

^{41.} GC 39, CONAD, 30 Nov 1962.

^{46.} Interview with L/C diller, Exec Off, DCS/OPS, 26 AD, 19 Dec 1962; Interview with Capt Bell, Det C.O. 75 FIS. 14 How 1962; Interview with Maj Patrick, 2600P-RF, 19 Dec 1962.

procedures conducted within the Command validating earlier assumptions. The importance of planning was reiterated, especially if the basic plans were valid and flexible. In this regard,

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Next.


the crisis introduced an excellent motivating element for all personnel not found generally in a test, exercise, or training. Finally, the Cuban Crisis fulfilled an important facet for the 26th Air Division; it testified to the Command's high state of readiness and capability to perform the air 47 defense mission.

^{47.} Interview with Col Mace, 26NOPS/2600P, 9 Jan 1963.

FIGHTER INTERCEPTOR STATUS AT HOME BASE

<u> </u>			17 Get	1 New	8 Nov	21 801	<u>93 t</u>	<u>94 15.</u>
	F-101	Buse	Auth/Poss	Puss/6ft	Foss/OR	Poss/08	Poss Off	1525 011
	2F1S	Suifelk	£8/16	16 15	15/12	16/12	15 12	16
	60F15 70F1S 98F1S 444F1S	Otis Dow Dover Chirleston	18/17 19/17 19/16 15/15	17/16 13/9 9/4 13/13	16/10 13/9 14/11 14/12	18/13 16 15 17/14 15, 11	17 14 16, 16 17 14 13, 13	17, 14 16, 15 17, 16 16, 15
	F-102							
	76F.3 482FIS	¥esto er Seykbur÷ Jo∴adon	21/19 27/24	12/10 13/10	12/9 19 15	17/18 19/14	17 14 21 11	1948 24 19
	F-106							
	27FIS	Loring	23/21	16/4	16/4	\$17.15	21. 15	31 13
	95FIS 539FIS	Andreva MoGuire	20/17 21/18	13/12 13/12	11/6 21/12	17/11 16/11	17, 14 16/12	16. 12 14. 19
	F-100				1			
	118450	Bradley Fld	22,19	10, 15	19/15	19/12	16,11	19
<u> </u>	Y-19							
	134889 114889	Burlington Dox	25/1 24/29	27 - 23 28,194	27, 23 28, 24	27-22 28/15	25 2 25 2	21 25

15



		17 Oct	1 304	8 Nov	21 Nov	22 22	200
F-102	Base	Auth/Poss	Poss OR	Puss/OR	Poss for	<u> 1 se sui</u>	<u> 2 - 1,5 - 5 î.</u>
14GANG	PittsLarg	17.116	16 10	14/8	14/11	19, 10	2.8
F-104							
15TANG	McEst re	24, 24	24/16	24/1€	24/16	23, 7	2.3

Deployed correct status is deploted on 28th air Division appeart Deployed Status Chart and are not included in the figures represented un this court

SOURCE: Fighter Interceptor Status Chart, 26000.



26TH AIR DIVISION AIRCRAFT DEL LOYED STATUS

23 Gerakar Lagu 6 December 1962

				Poss	Cushat	Pass =	Sov Comence	Park	Surv Colland
Unit	Buse	Deployed To	AYC	4 OF	Loaded	100	Los.es	<u>= 68</u>	L uded
76718 98718	hestovic Dover		F=102 7-101	6 5	9	6	5	٥.	4
95 F 15	Andrews	6,	F-1 3	5		4	4	-1	1
48 1S	Gr111155		F-101	٤	ä	\$	c	۸	٥
757 (5	čk.»		F=101,	4		G.	4	4	- A
539F1S	McCaras	Ginatwac Langley	~106 /~160	4	4	4	**	4	9
27FIS 4 1 182FIS	toring inngley seymour-	Olastead Patrice	F-106 F-106	5 12 14	ž	6 12 3	Ü	: 2 : 2	6
444FIS	Johnson Charle:ton	pangley Audrews	9-101 9-101	_2		2	2	2	2
	Topal:		·	75	35	55	37	: 2	3.3

E tros: 26:, esp Sivenco, esporare Septe, ed Start- Coinc Sect.

Weapon Type

Manned — Interceptor


Surface-tc-Air combat ready fire units in a defense with more than 2 fire units (NIKE-LERCULES)

Surface : Air combat read fire units and defense with more than 2 fire units (NIME-ERCULES)

Surface-10-Arr combat ready fire units (SIKE-AJAK)

Unamoned Interceptors

E/ 1




S				21 Poss	Combat	Poss Comput	Post Compat
Usit	Bust	Deployed To	A.10	<u>. 08</u>	Loaded	A OR Louded	a OR Luaded
76F1S 98F1S	Westever Dover		F-102 F-101				
9SF15	Andress	5.1	F-166				
4981S	Joiffise		F-101				
75./ IS	Dow		F-101				
539FIS	McGalre	Olestoca Langley	F=100 F-100		1		
27F1S 45FIS 462FIS	Lor-AJ Ling key Segmont	Ol.Stead	1 = 166 7 = 1 7 = 1	1.5		12 Resepto, 14	Alway Market Service
444F1S	มีอีกมะอย่า ∘ก ว่า…มโอะเอก	Langley	F-101	15		_Beduployed	

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
) Lu



SEETH AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING AND CONTROL EQUADRES

Cumulative Station Manning Data 15 October to 4 December 1963

	STATION "BOO"	STATION "LCho"	<u>~</u>
Station Required	1152-00	1010-45	2362-83
Station Provided	1151+40	1016-30	2169 - 19
Per Cent Provided	99.97%	99.97%	99.57%
Bent Time	12+0"	5+35	2.7 - 22.5
Per Cent Bent Time	1.04%	0.5527	0.812
Station Brez!	+20	+15 ·	,25
Per Cent Station Break	0.032	0.03%	0.032
APS 45 10	1054-10	920-10	1974-26
Per Cent APS 45 10	91.5%	91.04%	91.29%
Track Foral	1961	2257	4218



	STATION "DOG"	STATION ECRO	TOTAL
AEWaC Intercepts	50	14	64
K.A.	48	12	60
s.1.	2	2	

Station DOG performed low altitude lodge between Florido and Colm in the vicinity of the Florid: Ears

Element ECHO performed low altitless radar jouverage between Floress and flore that vicinity of the Great Bosons Sank.

CURRENT EMERGENCY - CUBAN SITUATION

Revised Net Addition Obligations (in dollars)

22 Oct - 31 Dec 62

	Estimated	Actual
Civilian Pay	5.932	2.842
TDY	150,933	101,953
tansportation	6,916	1,725
Communications	13.058	2 965
Utilities	4,208	1.056
Equipment Rental	910	392
Real Property Maintenance	9.700	5.500
Contracted Services	6 949	5.168
	12.957	4.005
FOL & Fuels (Heating-Util.tics)	143.051	47.006
Supplies		ซี.ยอย์
Equipaent	6,480	
Modical Services	3,950	1,951
Subsisience	131,905	8.620
Tetal	257,949	199.776

The difference between the estimated and actual totals are not as great as the figure would indicate on first onservition. The estimated figure was a prediction up to 31 December, whereas the crisis ended early in December. Then at Hancock Field, Strategic Air Command reimbersed 805 000 worth of supplies to the 26th Air Division. In the area of TBY, expenses began to decline after the initial surge of movement had been reached. The only figure that was not representative was Subsistance. In this area. additional checks were being conducted to determine any there was such a great variance. For a more accurate Communist. super of Subsistance fotals from the Estimated and Actual columns (revised Estimated Total \$366.045 and revised actual Total \$162,156), then reduce the Estimated Total by one half (\$183,022) to comply with the shorter duration of the criminal with a result that the totals (\$183,022 Estimated to \$184,150 Actual) are aimost equal. [26ABF and interview with it (v) Richard Hamilton, Dir of Budget, 26 AD, 11 Jan 1963].

CHAPTER FIVE

THE 28TH AIR DIVISION (SAGE)

Ĺу

Ruth Wampler

In spite of the uneasy international situation, the normal readiness posture designated $(-- \oplus_{j})^{(i)}$

was still in effect.

15 1

(This latter

requirement had gone into effect in February 1962 as a part of the servival plan in the event of a nuclear missile attack)

3012

Training and maintenance activities were proceeding normally. The 28th Air Division command post (CP) was functioning as the System Maintenance Control Center on a 24-hour basis in accordance with current directives. Major General Conrad F. Necrason, division commander, and has Chief of Information, Lt Colonel Louis J. Churenville. Fire in Colorado Springs, attending a meeting of the Citizens' Committee at Headquarters Air Defense Commind.

That this peaceful status was soon to end was loveshadowed by a message from the Commander-in-Chief, Continental Air Defense Command (CINCONAD) warning that a change in the defense readiness condition was expected in the near future.

When the notice of increased readiness was received at 1033 PDT on 22 October, it was not a change in the DEFCON as might have been expected. O...

 ²⁸ Of li-11, Command Point Operation of System Maintenance Control (Sull) for Logistics, 27 Jul 1962.

⁶⁷

165 J 17

With the change in alert status and the notification that the President was to address the nation on a matter of uthe it urgency, Lieutenant General Robert H. Terrill, Apc. Vice Commander, directed General Necrason and his Chici of Information to return to the division headquarters.

1200 PDT, CINCONAD ordered dispersal in accordance with ADC Operations Plan 20-62.

^{4.} Thi

^{5.} AFR 122-23, Weapon System Safety Rules T.F-102A GAR-11, 2 Apr 1962; AFR 122-35, Weapon System Safety Rules F-101/Mg 1, 27 Jul 1961; AFR 122-36, Weapon System Sciety Rules F-106/Mg 1, 27 Jul 1961.

In the light of these conflicting instructions, the division was reluctant to disperse aircraft with nuclear weapons without further clarification. Since General Neurasso had not yet reached his headquarters, the Vice Commander. Colonel John W. Weltman, sought clarification from the 28th CONAD Region. Following discussion between the two commands. dispersal action was taken.

In all, 22 nuclear-armed aircraft were dispersed.

The 7Sth Fighter Wing at Hamilton AFB dispersed 12 F-1016 S

to MD / 71 Four of the 15th FIS F-1018/S

went to Williams AFB, Arizona, from their home base at DusingMonthan AFB. Six F-106's from the 456th FIS at Cartle AFB
dispersed to the MD / 72 Seven F-1028'S

from the 82.d FIS at Travis AFB dispersed to the MD / 75.

The F-101B's each curried that

MB-1 nuclear missiles and the F-106's each carried one.

The F-102A's were armed with GAR-II nuclear missilys. The off and recovery times were:

-15th FIS: First take off -- 1308 PDT Last take off -- 1311 PDT Last recovery -- 1331 PDT

S. 28 Air Div Command Post Summary, 22 Oct - S Nov 1982, Atch 2, 200 5, this chapter...

62nd FIS: First take off -- 1649 PDT Last take off -- 1663 PDT Last recovery -- 1849 PDT

78th Ftr Wg: First take off -- 1259 PDT Last take off -- 1310 PDT

Last take oil -- 1310 PDT Last recovery -- 1355 PDT

456th FIS: First take off -- 1312 PDT

Last cake oil -- (time not available)

Last recovery -- 1342 PDT

The reason for the concern felt during this initial dispersal is indicated in the following comment by the division's missile/nuclear safety officer:

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At the " \odot_1 " ordered, only two or three key people in the 28th Air Division neadquarters know the true situation. Other personnel were in profit pack the same position as that prevailing in the interceptor, branch

3/4

^{7.} Ltr, 28CAS-N, Summary of Missile/Nuclea: Safety Problems Stemming from Tactical Disposal Operations during Cuban Crisis, w/atch 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7, 4 Jan 1903, DGC 0, this chapter.

 ^{8.} Transcribed Informal Discussion on Contingence operations, 20(Nov 1962, 200 7, this chapter.

5111

The 26th Air Division command post (CP) had not been manned which there seemed to have a mesome uncertainty with regard to manning the CP because of the property the call did go out and the command post was manned by 1322 PDT. Thereafter the command post became the focal point for coordinating component staff actions and for gainering and reporting states of forces and certain logistical information to the 25th COMAD Region and to ABC/USAF. The smiet of the command post will also the 28th COMAD Region liaison officer in accordance with pertinent directives.

At 1600 PDP, the President informed the factor of the crists and the CONAD forces for the particular special danger of nuclear war.

^{9.} Command font Log, 25 Air Div Dep for Anteriol.

^{15. 28} OF 11-5 Fairgency Manning and Albert Procedures.

So many actions took place simultaneously or in such rus. decession, that it is not feasible in this managraph to discuss all of them in detail or in their exact time sequence. All command posts were manned on a continuous parts. Leaves were cancelled for an indefinite period. and personnel not on leave or TDY were guartly called all he to duty. Some rated officers who had been in mon-flying status vere made available to serve as crew members to their 13 mission support flight requir ments. Personnel resources were shifted from overhead type work to full essential 1.3 mission requirements. Certain types of incividual training were discontinued. Base security measures were increased.

[[]Cont'd] 30 Jul 1962, DOC 8, this chapter: 28 01 11-]a. Command Post Organization, Responsibilities, and Procedures: 9 Jul 1962, DOC 9, this chapter.

li. Ksg, 28 AD t All Beits. Military and Civilian Leave Policy, 1 Nov 1962, DOC 10, this chapter.

^{12. 28} AD Compand Post Log. 22 Oct=9 Nov 1962 $\pm 2000 \pm 11000$ this chapter.

^{1&#}x27;. Msg. ADO to All, Letura of FSC-3 and 4 Officers to FSC-1, 27 Oct 1862, DCC '42, this chapter Msg. LOC to Lil. Return of Flying Status Code a k 4 Officers to FSC 1, 29 Oct 1962, DCC 13, this chapter. γ

^{14.} $\pm sg$, 28 AD to A11 Units, Use of Overhead Personnel 25 Oct 1952. DOC 16 this chapter.

^{15.} Msg. ADC to Air Divs. TBY Training 25 Oct 1967. DOC 15, thus chapter.

^{18.} Mag. CINCOSAD to Bone Base Security, 25 Get 1900

Carlo Carlo

Mability plans and other contingency plane were reviewed to 17 insure their adequacy if implementation should be required. Radars down for depot level maintenance, or for other reasons were returned to the air as quickly as possible. 19 Aircraft maintenance was expedited. Exercises and tactial evaluations were cancelled. "Minimize" proceeders were implemented world-wide.

While all of the actions mentioned above, and may others, had an impact on the division, the major problems of division personnel were concerned with supporting disperson operations.

[[]Cont'd] DOC 16, this chapter; Msg. 28 AB to Sectors. JOS Instructions for Base Security, Só Oct 1982, DOC 17, this chap.

^{17.} See DOC 11, this chapter.

^{18.} See DOC 7, this chapter.

^{19.} Charts showing the operational ready status of aircraft are included as XXC 18, this chapter. These enaits show that for short periods of time, some squadrons reported 100% operational ready aircraft status. The goal, however, was to maintain an acceptable status at all times with a normal flow of work to maintenance sections.

^{20.} Msg, 28NR to Sectors, Regional Exercises, 30 Oct 1982, DOC 19, this chanter; Msg, 28NR to Sectors, NORAD Training Exercises, 20 Oct 1932,7000 26, this chapter.

^{21.} Mbg. CSAF, Minimize, 23 Oct 1962, DOC 31, this chapter.

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Status of the Program.

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No rearestate was the

quarried c

Obviously, before this capability routed be reached, dispersal bases would need facilities for at route and continuous of nuclear weapons, for aircraft which makes and operations, for nousing personnel, and for other purposes necessary to fighter operations. Since final selection and approval of dispersal bases was not yet firm at the time of the Cuban crisis, any kind of construction was still; the future.

Of the four bases used, only Kingsley was an accept ADC base capable of supporting operations with suclear apparent

^{-22.} Abbia V. App I through XVII, 20 AD Warring Nov. Such 2-61.

None of the remaining three bases and any storage facilities for nuclear weapons or an, capability of maintaining such weapons. Williams AFB was not manned to support 24-2007 operations as it was dependent upon civilian contract personnel who worked a 40-hour week. At the Fresho Municipal Air ort, the 144th Fighter Group (ANG) provided sufficient support and facilities for an interim Phase I capability. The base that lacked everything was the capability.

There was virtually nothing there for Air Force use except a runway and a converted dental van.

Air Lift Problems. One of the problems 'nat immediately affected the dispersal operations was the lack of support aircraft for airlift. Limit planning and been based upon the availability of C-123 aircraft of the 4556th. Combat Sepport Saudron and the C-119's of TAC's reserve units. Airlift requirements had been carefully calculated and distribilith of airlift support worked out in the 25th.

^{23.} Msg, SFAC? to 26 AD, Interim Phase I Capability at Freeno, 26 Gct 1962, DGC 22, this chapter: Ltr. 26 AD to ADC, Joint ADC/CONAD Fighter Dispersal Test, 20 Nov 1962, DGC 25, this chapter.

^{24.} Err, 28000 to Sectors, Status Rgt, 2 Get 1983. #/Litch, DOC 24, this emption. The pi termi lection, submitted under separate cover, graphically influsivates the lack of racilities at Situation.

Air Division Wartime Basic Plan. The plan assumed that these aircraft would be made available automatically under certain conditions requiring dispersal. This was shown as "Condition Autolift" in the basic war plan.

That is not the way things worked when the test came.

..rst, ADC notified the division that it needed all the air28
craft and crews of the 4650th Combat Support Squadron.

Having lost the C-120's before they could be used, the division turned hopefully to the C-119's of TAC's 340th Troop
Carrier Wing at Hamilton AFB. The discouraging fact was
then learned that TAC had not consummated any agreement
26
for their use to support ADC's dispersal operations.

This left the division dependent upon its own monger resources. At that time, the available in-commission supple aircraft included one TC-121 belonging to the 552nd AEMaC wing, a C-47 from the 75th Fighter Wing, and a T-25 from the Phoenix sector. Saintenance personnel began immediately to return out-of-commission aircraft to an operational status and instructions were given to operations personnel to provide creas. All internal support aircraft were brought upder central control in accordance with published directives.

^{25.} Msg, ADC to 22 28 and 29 AD Operational Requirements, 22 Oct 1962, 500 25, this chapter.

¹s. See DOC v. this complete.

^{27.} See Sich 2, DC 5. This comprer.

At this point, the 82nd Fighter Interceptor Squadron was successful in getting Travis AFB to provide a C-124 to more personnel and equipment to \$25.00 With this numberpetted help, 22,000 pounds of cargo and 10 passengers were airlifted to Siskiyou the first day. Without this help, surface transportation would have been the only means of accomplishing this move. Since an impenetrable fig enveloped the area that night, there would have been many hours of delay. It was not until the morning of 20 decodes for example, that the first two truck loads of fuel arrived at \$\alpha_{S,000}\$ from Hamilton AFB. Tank cars filled with JP-4 28 fuel did not arrive until 3125 PDT on 25 October.

The TC-121 aircraft airlifted MC-11 compressors, acrospace ground equipment, and other wateriel to Kingsley Field in support of the 83rd and 8'th Fighter Interceptor Squadron deployment. Other support aircraft corried passengers, critically aboded parts, and other items here. parts, and other items here. functioning. In all, in spite of the defense system able, 75,900 pounds of carge and 57 passengers and need lifted by 24 catober.

^{28.} Ibia.; Also see 1.0 7. this chapter .

^{20.} Yb a.

After the first critical period was over, most of the requests for airlift were met. By early November, the 78th Pighter Wing had set up a regular schedule for rotating personnel and delivering mail and other items as needed. The flight operated from Hamilton to Kingsley (30) with stor at Travis as necessary.

Security Problems. Another problem that was common to all the dispersal bases -- and indeed to the home bases as well -- was lack of sufficient numbers of air police. With nuclear-armed aircraft dispersed to locations such as Siskiyon, Williams, and Freshot where security ionoin and lighting and other safeguards were lacking, the need for trained air police was acute. ADC immediately asked for information on the air police manning available at the home and the dispersal bases, but could offer no help in meeting the problem. In the final analysis, each unit had to find a solution from its own resources. Main enance personnel and other non-sir police personnel were used as socurity guards. Such trained air policemen as were available

^{30. 25}g, 78 Ftr Wg to 28 AD, Request to Operate a Scheduled Flight, 29 Oct 1962, DOC 26, this chapter; Asg. 28 AD to SFADS, 78 Ftr Ng. 82 FIS, Approval for Schedule Flight 2 Nov 1962, DOC 27, tels chapter.

supervised the less experienced men, and no untotard incladent occurred.

Security requirements for lighting, walkin-talkins, manpower, and armament for security personnel at dispersul bases was prepared for future consideration by the division. Chief of Security and Law Enforcement. There was little chance that the manning requirements could be met. The shortupe of air police seemed to be a "live with" situation 32 for the foreseeable future.

Sabotage Alert. One security measure that did work out well was the sabotage alert procedure established in early November. The procedure provided for immediate dissecurities of information involving possible subotage.

^{31.} Msg, ADC to Air Divs, Security at Dispersal Rases, 25 Oct 1962, DOC 28, this chapter: Msg, 28 AD to 456, 15, and 82 FIS's, Security at Dispersal Bases, 25 Oct 1962, DOC 29 this chapter: Msg 28 AD to ADC, Security at Dispersal Bases, 25 Oct 1962, DOC 36, thus shapter: Deployment of Air Pulice to Meet World-Wide USAF Requirements, 27 Oct 1962, DOC 31, this chapter: Msg, 456 FIS to 28 AD, Security Status of Curt. 26 Oct 1962, DOC 32, this chapter: Msg, 408 Fir Gp to 23 AD. Security at Dispersal Bases, 28 Oct 1962, DOC 33, this chapter: Msg, 28 AD to Sectors, USAF Levees for Air Police, 29 Oct 1962, DOC 34, this chapter: Msg, ADC to 28 AD, Use of Police 1962, DOC 34, this chapter: Msg, ADC to 28 AD, Use of Police nel Other than Air Police on Nuclear Security P.sts, 3 Nov 1962, DOC 35, this chapter: Msg, 456 FIS to 28 AD. Security Operations at Dispersal Base, 7 Nov 1962, DOC 36, this chapter: Msg, 32 FIS to 28 AD. Request for Walkie-Talkies, 27 Oct 1902, DOC 35, this chapter: Msg, 35 Coc 36 Coc 37 Coc 38 Coc

^{22.} Ltr. 28016-5 to 280DC, Security Requirements for Dispersal Bases, 20 Nov 1902, w. t Aten 1000 3 . Tais emapter

A sentry, or anyone olse, observing an act threatening the combat capability of an ADC unit of a unit tenant on an ADC base was to notify the central security control immediately if subotage seemed to be a possibility. This report known as a "Seven High" report, was then passed to the command post by the central agency and disseminated by way of the tactical network through the commands to ADC. If a preliminary investigation failed to rule out subotage, a "Red Skin" report was required immediately. Follow-up reports giving additional details of the situation were required until the incident was terminated. (When the system was accidently triggered by an airman who took a short gut to work through a restricted area, it was found to work most efficiently.)

had all the problems common to the dispersel bases with a number that were peculiar to itself. As already noted. (4.8.7).

did not even have an interim Phase I capability, energine crisis arose. The dirport lacked accommoditions for personnel, shelter for equipment, fuel storage, and just about everything also needed by an operational base.

^{33.} Msg. ADC to Air Divs, Casotage hotification wascedures, 9 Nov. 962, ECC 39. this compter,

Immediate arrangements were made with the 25th Air Division for circuitry, but navigational aids were not available. On 25, and again on 27 October, the division requested help from ADC in securing mobile, air transformation navigational aid equipment to meet an urgent requirement of the division when ADC tried to obtain these facilities from USAF, they were told that uncertainty over the use of the first and lack of navigational aids Air Forcewick made any immediate support impossible.

At this time the division had positioned 35 people: air-ground communications equipment, herospace ground equipment, two portable light banks, crash and fire vehicles, and a bes, a station wagon, and a weapons carrier at Arrangements had also been made for messing and neuring personnel in the town of 75,75 some 12 miles from the air-port. Two house trailers had been requested to provide her

^{54.}

^{35.} Msg, ADC to Air Divs, NAVAIDS in Support of ADC OPLAN 20-62, 1 Nov 1902, DOC 41, this chapter.

alort incility at the airport. Rental of these trailers 36 was approved by ADC. The division stated that it could and would support a dispersal capability at Siskiyou.

With operations at $(A_{ij})^{ij}$ limited to VFR conditions by lack of nevigational aids, CINCONAD approved the return of the aircraft and crews to Travis Air Force Base on 24 37 October. Ground personnel and the support equipment remained in place to provide for firther use of the base by dispersed aircraft if desired.

Bud weather at 55.0° pro-inted the return of the F=103's until 26 October. About mean on that day, the weather cleared sufficiently to permit time off and all seven directalt were safely back at Travis by 1444 PDT

williams AFB. The main problem at Williams was manning. Tower operators and security personnel had to go on 12-hour shifts in order to keep the base operational include dispersal aircraft. As the 15th Fighter Interespend.

Squaron had no resources from which to assist the base, the

^{36.} See DOC 28, this chapter: Msg, ADC to CSAF. Alort Crew Housing, 27 Oct 1963, DOC 42, this chapter: Msg, ADC to 28 Ab, Alert Crew Housing, 29 Oct 1962, DOC 43, this emptor.

^{37.} a.b.

^{38.} See DOC 11, this chapter,

division requested help from ADC. That command in turn, requested assistance from the Air Training Command to provide additional tower operators and air police. There is no evidence that ATC was able to relieve the situation.

With civilian pursonnel inexperienced in supporting combat aircraft providing the support at Williams AFB, there was also a safety hazard as graphically described below by the Chief of the Airmonitions Division:

One item that scared us all was watching the refueling a Williams. This base has contract relucting. I don't know where they got the refuelity unit operator, but I feel the biggest thing he ever refueled before was a Fordson farm tractor because he spilled 15 or 20 gallons —— it looked like a lot more —— of JP+4 on the ramp right under his truck. He then proceeded to start to get into his truck, start up, and barrel if Naturally, about four hands went up and grabbed his by the collar and pulled him down out of the truck. One thing about refueling hot-loaded aircraft, it has to be done right and it shouldn't be done by contract refueling people

when asked if there wasn't a requirement for an Air Forme man to be on the end of the hose in a refueling operation, he went on to say:

The blue suit man was there at the aircraft, suc the

^{39%} Msg. 28 AD to ADC, Shortage offControl Tower Operators and Air Policemen at %ill.ams AFB, 30 Oct 1982, DOC 45, this chapter; Msg. ABC to ATC, Shortage of Control Tower Operators and Air Policement at Williams AFB, 1 No. 1982, DOC 46, this chapter.

^{40.} See DOC 7, this chapter.

trouble was that the operator of the unit was over at the unit, and this is where you can cause trouble. Of course, he was defueling the aircraft instead of refueling and this is why he ran the unit over... Everyone realized what had happened right quick. The fire engines were on hand and immediately care up and started taking care of the spilled fuel.

Rotation. On 24 October, CINCONAD authorized retailed of Lircraft between dispersal and home bases for the purpose of exchanging aircraft, crews, and weapons and for accomplishing essential training. Maximum training for air cross and ground environment personnel was to be accomplished during.

41 rotation except when aircraft were ferrying primary weapons.

The only time aircraft on rotational flights were to carry nuclear weapons was when there weapons had to be returned to home base for maintenance or for mandatory inspections. Aircraft at dispersa, bases were fully loaded with primary armament except afte, a replacement aircraft arrived. Then the aircraft to be replaced was downloaded and the replacement aircraft uploaded.

The message authorizing rotational flights also sessible the tactical ferry configuration. An immediate problem arose because the configuration directed by CINCONAD required removal of the ejection rack cartividge. This

^{41.} See Atch 2. DOC 6. chis chapter.

instruction was just the opposite of the instructions contained in the Air Force Weapon Safety Rules found in AFR 122-35 and 122-36. Both the Air Force regulations and Abir 55-05 provided for jettisoning of a notear weapon under conditions prescribed in the directives if an inflight energy of made the chance for landing safely with the weapon the greater risk. Under the DINCONAD director crossinguration the weapon value not be jettisoned. Since commanders would surely be reluctant to recommend an energy energy landing with the weapon on board the aircraft Schau of its high susceptibility to fire, even a simple emergency could result in the loss of an aircraft.

The Civision brought the Situation to the dituntion of ADC. Until clarifying instructions were received, the division also the ructed its write not to ferry mechanism weepons between the home base and disc. _____ Nasc.

ADO'S reply was that CINCONAD and JCS appround before sending the message and, therefore the instructions would remain in effect unless changed by CINCONAD. During the effect of the CONAD directives took precedence.

^{42.} See DOC 6, this of pier.

^{43.} See DOC U. Atca d this chapter.

^{44.} See DOC 8 Atch D. this chapter.

The division had no enoice but to order compliance with the CINCO D configuration. Tactical ferry operations were conducted in this manner until all dispersed aircraft were again at their home bases.

Since the problem involved nuclear safety, both the division and the region made recommendations to their planer headquarters concerning the matter after the Cuban crisics cased. The Division recommended strict compliance with Air force regulations pertaining to farrying nuclear weapons. The Region recommended that the weapons configuration be prescribed by CINCONAD in accordance with conditions existing.

47
at the time. That is where the matter stood at the end of the year.

A SAC Dispersal Problem. SAC created a dispersal problem by unempectedly deploying four of its B-47's to Oxnard AFB on 24 October. The use of Oxnard as a dispersal base was apparently a part of the 18th Air Force dispersal plan, but no one in the 2 th Air Division of in the 14th. Fighter Group at Oxnard had any previous knowledge of this

^{45.} See DOC 6, Aton 6, this chapter.

^{43. 1}bid.

^{47.} See DGC 6. " this captor.

plan. When the bombers suddenly arrived, the fighter group made the best of the unexpected situation. A quantity-distance waiver necessitated by the presence of the combers was requested and approved and the group provided such support for the SAC victors as could be given without interfering 46 with the privary mission of the wase.

Although the situation as handled satisfactorily at Oxnard, the need for prior coordination when other commands planned to use ADC bases was brought to the attention of 49 ATC. The catter was also taken up this ugh the NORKE channels and NORCO requested a list of the bases SAC planned to use.

Maintaining Dispersal Capability. Since there was no way of knowing in advance just how long the Cubin crisismight last, there was need to evaluate the capabilities and requirements for maintaining the dispersal posture. At the outset of the crisis, ADC had requisted information as to the maximum dispersal capability that could be achieved

^{48.} Neg, 26 AD to ADC, Other Command Use of ADC Base for Dispersal, 25 Oct 1962, DOC 47, this chapter.

^{49. 1}bid.

by propositioning home base assets at the interim

50

bases. This information was provided by the division.

Chi 30 October, ADC asked for information as to the minimum essential outside resource requirements necessary to cappear a dispersal posture for 30, 90, and 180 days. The computer ments were to be based upon normal training activities.

At the time this request was made, $R \leq 1.00$ was still in effect. On 3 November, $R \leq 0.00$

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^{50.} Me,, ADC to Mir Davs, Fir Dispersal 23 Cet 150° 300 48, this chapter.

Si. Msg, 28 AD to ADC, Dispersal Base Capability. 24 Oct 1962, DOC 49, this onapter.

^{52%} Msg, APC to Air Divs, Fir Dispes 1, 30 Get 1988, DOC 50, this chapter.

^{52, &}quot;ee DOC 11, this chapter.

^{54, 1176, 137}

⁵⁵ Mag, Schild Lottons & Zo AB, Status of History as Dispersal School L. Schilbuz.

In the light of the change in alert status, and also because USAF had indicated that the Department of Detense would soon approve programming action for implementing and funding of the Phase III ADC righter dispersal program. ADC sunt another message concerning support for dispersal. Trime consideration was to be given to use of temperary contractual and rental facilities and services at the interimbases. Other instructions also emphasize, that only minimum manning, facilities, and equipment would be considered since the permanent dispersal bases would replace the interim bases earlier than had previously been expected.

The dispersal requirements submitted by the 2cth Aur 57 Division in response to the first request, were scaled down wherever possible in accordance with the second message, but there were still requirements for additional personnel, such as air police, and for facilities for additional personnel, that base a capability comparable to that of other comparable bases.

^{56.} Msg, ADC to Air Divs, Short Rungs Fir Dispersal Support Requirements, 7 Nov 1962, DOC 51, this chapter.

^{57.} Msg, 28 AD to aDC, Dispersal Requirements, a Novince to 52, this chapter.

^{58.} Msg. 28 AD to ACC. Short Bange Fir Dispursal Support Requirements, 10 Nov 1982. DOC 53, this chapter.

On 30 October, the JCS authorized reduction in dispersal lorges where this would contribute to maintaing the 59 commut ready posture. At that time, the 28th CONAD Region has recommended no reduction so long as DEFCON 3 Charlie 60 was in offect.

On 17 November, with the reduced alert status and the decreasing possibility of war, NORAD authorized the relate of all dispersed aircraft to their nome bases as soon as practical.

Phase II required capability to learn with one load of conventional weapons.

The 25th Air Division immediately instructed the sectors to return their dispersed aircraft, using surface transportation and arganic support aircraft to the maximum extent to return personnel and material. The dispersed dispersed all landed safely by 1144 PDT on 18 [Journal]

With regard to the rearming capability sequirum to.

Phase is at the dispersor lines inch or storage facilities.

^{59.} Msg. CINCONAD to CONAD Rgns, Reduction in Managersul Porces, 30 Dct 196%.

 $^{80^\}circ$, $\rm Mag_{\odot}$ 28CR to CINCONAD. Reduction in Dispursal Forces, 20 Oct 1962.

^{8.,} Mag. CinchOrad to NORAD Agns. Butting of Dispussed Aircraft, 17 (c., 1868)

was the major limiting factor. The division directed that armament was not to be fre-positioned at these bases unless they had suitable storage facilities. Training tlights were to be conducted to the dispersal bases often enough to inside sure a two-hour turn-around capability. Flight safety was be paramount on all deployments. The units were to notify the division of any limiting factors beyond their control waten would prevent achievement of a Phase II capability.

Replies from the field indicated that none of the dispersal bases, with the exception of Kingsley, could support a Phase II (peration. There were either no stevance facilities for connectional argument or security was inadequate. The Jana Fi3 also indicated that it would need additional personnel to support a modified Phase II capability at $4 \frac{1}{12} \frac{1}{12} P$ after 5 November. (A return to normal

^{62. 28} AD msg to SFADS and PHADS, Fir Dispersar. 16 Nov 1962, DOC 54, this chapter.

^{53.} Msg. PHAD: to 28 AD. Phase II Capability at selliams APB, 21 Nov 1962, DOC 55, this chapter: Msg. Seals to 28 AD. Fir Dispersal, 20 Nov 1962, DOC 58, this chapter ltr, 28ADC to 28DDC, Dispersal Dite Limitations, 21 Nov 1962, DOC 57, L. S. chapter: Msg. 82 FIS to 28 AD. Abdilied Phase II Mainlag of 82 PIS Dispersal Base, 1 Phase II Mainlag of 82 PIS Dispersal Base, 28 Oct 1962, DoC 58, this chapter.

readiness on 27 November ended the requirement for Phase 64 Π .)

ASSEC OPERATIONS

Station Manuage Station

. This requirement had to be wall aduring the Coban crisis because of high priority economics made upon the wing for aircrast and for aircrast radii when and maintenance personnel.

Randor manning of ABSUC Stations was collectively when manning of specific stations was required. Dering the portion when the Rt. Hobo radar in the 25th air Division was down because of storm duringe, AEWOC Stations 1 in 3 work manned to cover the critical northern approach rootes. At the request of the Los Angeles Air Defense Sector. Station 5 was manned during a period of serious anomalous propagation.

^{94.} Msg, ClACNGATD to ADC, Phase II Capability. 30 Nov 1962. DOC 59, this chapter.

^{65.} See DOC 11, this chapt to

TDY to the 968th AERAC Squadron. The 552nd AERAC Wing was also required to send aircraft and personnel to McCoy AFB, Florida, to support AERAC operations in that area. A report on 3 November showed that 26 officers and 74 airmen from the 552nd AERAC Wing were on TDY with the 966th AERAC Squadron in Florida. Crews and aircraft were rotated between McCoy AFB and the home base at McClellan AFB to permit maintenance and periodic inspections to be performed on aircraft and to provide for replacement of 66 personnel.

Mickey Mouse. The 28th Air Division was also given two special projects in connection with the Cuban crisis. The first code-named "Mickey Mouse," has to determine the maximum cupate Sities of an airborne control station to detect, in a and conduct interpepts on small, low-altitude targets. The project wal also expected to result in eactablishing the best tactics to be used by interceptor aircrews in detecting and obtaining maximum AI lock-on and positioning to effect a "kixl."

ment of Personnel. 3 Nov 1962; Msg, 552 AEMAC Wg to ADC. Displacement of Personnel, 6 Nov 1962; ksg, 552 AEMAC Wg to ADC. Displacement of Personnel, 6 Nov 1962; ksg, 552 AEMAC Wg to 960 AZWAC Sq. Directed Rotation of Lireraft and Crews, S Nov 1962.

Mickey Mouse was a joint effort by the 552nd, the 78th Fighter Wing, and the San Francisco Air Defense Sector under 28th Air Division supervision. Major Joseph H. Livernush. Jr., and Captain B. D. Powell, both from the 28th Air Division's Tactical Evaluation Office, were project officer and assistant project officer, respectively.

The 41st Air Rescue Squadron provided air rescue service and the communications relay. Tests took place of 67 23, 24 and 25 October.

The targets were B-3A/B, PA-24 (Piper Commence 1113) und gmented T-23 aircraft. The 78th Fighter Wing provided two five-minute alert F-1018's and aircrews to perform the interceptions. No special maintenance was performed to "peak" any of the equipment. The AEW&C crews were not hand-picked and received no additional training. Procedured were generally those used for darly operations, but all the intercept directors were combat-ready, skilled or expert. The weither was good and the sea calm during the torce days.

The rests proved that the AN/APS-95 search radar could provide adequate radar information on small low-altitude targets. The associated equipment also performed adequately

^{67.} Tartical Evaluation "Mickey Mouse," 23-25 Oct. 1'62 BOC 60, this chapter.

with the exception of the AN/APS-45 height-finder and the AN/ARC-27 UHF radio transceivers. The transceiver was inadequate at very low altitudes and at distances of 100 nautical mile. Standard fighter tactics using look-down procedures proved to be adequate.

The procedures and tactics found most effective during the Mickey Mouse tests were included in the report on the project. Because of the success of Mickey Mouse, the 1520d AEMAC Wing project officer, Captain Leland D. Holcomb, was sent to Florida to orief the ADC aircrews that were on TDY at McCoy, Tyndall, Patrick, McDill and Homestead AFB's and at the Key West Naval Air Station. In addition, he briefed personnel of the 966th AEMAC Squadron and of the Girection center in the Montgomery Air Defense Sector.

<u>Fly Speck I.</u> The second project, known as "Fly Speck" was to determine the capability of AEW aircraft to detect and track targets of the U-2 category. Tests were conducted on 30 November, and 1, 2, and 4 December as a joint effort of the 4080th Strategic Wing (SAC) and the

^{68. 15}ts.

^{69.} Msg, ADC to 552 ADWAC Wg. Mickey Mouse Presentation by Capt Holcomb, 552 AEWAC Wg. 3 Nov 1962: Msg, ADC to MMADS, Mickey Mouse Presentation by Capt Holcomb, 6 Nov 1962.

552nd AEMAC Wing under the supervision of the 28th Air Division with Major Livernash again in charge of the prolect.

Specific objectives of Fly Speck were to determine and establish: (1) the maximum and minimum usable surveillance detection range on very high,non-SIF/IFF targets. (2) the optimum altitudes for ADC station stabilization to track very high altitude targets in high scope clutter areas, and (3) the tracking degradation due to target/AOC aspect relationships. These objectives were tested over coastal plains, over mountainous terrain, and over water in line-of-signious fland. The final objective was to determine the techniques and modes of operation to allow maximum blip/scan ratios in the various environments.

The RC-1210's used in this evaluation were not applicably "peaker" for the mission. The AEW&C radar crews were not hand-picked, but on the last mission, all cadar speculars were highly-experienced. The targets were U-2A applicable production vided by SAC.

Amon, the conclusions drawn from the four missions were that the AN/APS-95 search radar could provide excellent positive tracking information on U-2 targets over water, but

^{70.} Tactical Evulcation, Proj Rpt Fly Speck, 30 $\rm Nex-4$ Dec 1962, DOC 81, this charter.

tracking was marginal or nil over extensive mountainous terrain. The AN/APS-46 height finder again proved to be inadequate. Single-side-band radio transceivers were needed in all AGC aircraft required to perform air detense from low altitude station platforms. These, and other recommendations and conclusions. Note set forth in the factical evaluation report on the Fly Speek operation.

Fit Speck II. An environmental test, consisting of two missions, was conducted on 12 and 13 December. The clajectives of this test differed somewhat from those of the first Fly Speck test. The specific objectives were to establish: (1) the maximum and usable detection/surveillance range and reliability on very high altitude, low decibel targets. (2) the optimum low altitudes for AOC station stabilization for elimination of detrimental terrain and sea clutte. (3) the optimum lateral spacing from target track, and (4) the radar and aircrew techniques for very high altitude detection and tracking. A secondary objective was to determine interest control capability at very low platform altitudes.

^{71.} Ibid.

^{72.} Tactical Evaluation, Entropmental Test, Fly Speck 11, 12-13 Dec 1982, DOC 62, this chapter.

Major Livernash and a hand-picked crew from the 552nd APWLC Wing carried out the second test. Equipment was selected to insure optimum performance. Single-side-band (ranscrivers were installed for primary air-to-air and air-to-ground communications, with UMF for backup. The missions were flown over the coastal waters of Southern aprida under varying weather and sea conditions.

This second project proved that RC-121D aircraft equipped with AN/APS-95 radar could positively trace and flight-follow low decibel targets at very high altitudes over water when the recommended platform altitudes and comprocedures were followed. The final report made specific recommendations on platform altitudes and aircraft techniques and on procedures to be followed by each member of the radar craft. The report also stated that the AN/APS-45 neighbor should be replicated and that single-side-bane radial communications were a necessity.

_ FECTS OF THE ALERT

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	 No Gié	hnes at	that

^{75.} Inc.

time how long $-(\beta_0)^{2n}$ need to be maintained nor exactly what the effect of a prolonged alert would be.

Prise.

ground environment was indicated by the Preparedness of Reador des Influencing Mission Effectiveness (PRIME) reported during October and November. Comparative ratings and dispatch of pressure points were held in abeyance during the crisis, but otherwise, the PRIME system remained in effect.

PRIME statistics for October showed that the average hours flown by primary duty aircrews wis off 10 per cent.

The division average number of operations sorties the name 16 per cent below stated requirements. The withdrawal of SAC and Savy target aircraft caused a loss of high allitude and ECE (electronic) sorties. However, in apite of restrictions resulting from the flying hour program was very mear its goal for between in Novelaber, earny of the losses were made up, although shorting of the losses were made up, although shorting to the first targets and some other limitations remained. The enable to the first argument of the computations are average flying time, and the number of computations also increased in Allenber.

^{78.} OF AD Communit Form Brick for Drs 1982 1500 St. this chapter: and for New 1872 500 St. this complete.

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The general feeling cas that intercept director resignificances to id be set under a prolonged of \$2.70.

Figure units could also attain most of the PRIME requirements except for certain required sorties such as those a, and accept (electronic) targets. In contrast, there was a penerus, feeling that aircrew and intercept director prolitization could not be maintained for any length of time under a collection. States, back long duty hours would be required of min and crews and maintenance personnel that fatigue would not be incomed to effect their work. Interest and morale would but the collections and the end result would be less of contat effects.

The effects of the Cataber-Mavember block on the ground cavinament system were not very evident because of

^{75.} Msg, 28 AD to Sectors, Interceptor Aircist & Intercopt Director Proficiency, 2 Nov 1962, DCC 65, this enactor.

^{76.} Msg, SFADS to 28 AR, Interceptor Agreew & Intercept Dir Proficiency, 12 Nov 1962, 200 66, this chapter Msg. 416 Ptr Op to 28 AD, Interceptor Agreew & Interceptor Dir Proficiency, 7 Nov 1962, 200 37, this chapter.

the relatively shot, this that the alert was actually maintuited. The limitations imposed would undoubtually made in suffice in degradation of the air defense system is the alert had been indefinitely prolonged.

The San Francisco Air Defense Sector listed a

1121 degradation factors. Among them were:

A. Ground training

- (1) Wode II, III, and IV training had stopped
- (2) AEW (Reactor) training had decreased.
- (3) SAC BOX radar site training had reason
- (4) AEs director training at Madera had ended (5) Region and sector live exercises and remain
- SSTM's had been cancelled through howeless (6) Cross training of intercept directors had already the depart.
- (7) Sector SSTM training was degraded by lengthreacht for personnel to serve within the battle staff, the combat reporting comparant for director center crew position.

h. Flying training

- (1) ECk targers were not available.
- (2) Combat readiness truining was curtuiling stemped.

C. Technical againment

- (1) CAE radir /Site inspections were ended.
- (2) Radar evaluations were deterred.

The sector also felt that restrictions such us carryllation of staff visits and operational conferences, and uf

⁷³ See DOC Set. 1118 chapter

school quotas for appraising personnel would have a degracing effect on future capability if continued. Use of personnel from non-security sources to meet increased security requirements was also expected to have a disruptive effect.

A restriction imposed during the alert conversing maintenance of emergency generator units at the radar sites could have created a serious problem had the emergency lasted much longer. At the beginning of the increased readiness.

ADC had directed that no major overhaul or any IRAK of the generator was to be undertaken. Everything was to be kept in operation. If this situation had continued for any length of time, the generators sould have required overhauling or rebuilding or else they would have dropped apart like the "wonderful one mass shay." The sites would also have had a serious manpower problem if they had been called upon to operate the generators on a 24-hour basis. The EMD sould not provide manning for such an operation.

a number of the ground radars were shut down for various reasons during the affert period withough at major 79 preakdown occurred. Like the generators, the radars required

^{78.} Transcribed Ept of Round Table Disc of Cont Operations 20 No. 1962, DOC 68, this capter: Ltr. 28IPS to 28CIO-H, Second of Cott Operations, 29 No. 1962, DOC 69, this chapter.

^{79.} Lie, Seille-St, Rodar Breakdown,70 Jan 1881, DGC 70. Topo chapter.

overhauling a little at a time or eventually a complete overhaul would have been required to keep them in operation. The maintenance required could not be performed under the single shift concept. SFADS adopted a split shift maintenance operation with the maining authorized. The problem commander warned, nowever, that any reduction in notice than maining would prevent a split shift operation.

22 Az 3

On 27 November, All incomes of the

under CINCONAD's operational control returned to a more readiness status except the 32nd. On 3 December, that, division also assumed normal readiness bringing the cold to the end so for as CONAD component forces were control reserved.

The phlacebut had been going on gradually object the declaration of \$1.5000. Command posts had closed lown, leave policies were liberalized, TDY and displaced personnel and equipment returned to their home pares and normal staining was beginning to be resumed. The both All Division command post had closed on 9 November.

The division, along with the rost of the ADC communications congregation of ... And communder for a year will be ...
The fact that norther wrapping has been being off-ladded

down-indeed, and terried under circumstances not previously tested within the air defense system was a cause for healt-left practitude. The manner in which dispersal requirement not unficipated until Phase III, had been not under interim Phase I conditions was also commendable.

The division had been given an invaluable epportunity to assess its operational planning and its ability to correct out who plans. The crisis also brought to light conflicts in directives and the unexpected impact of plans andows other commands and services such as those involving dispersal.

Comments on Contingency Operations. Looking only included the situation existing at various times during the Comments, there were a number of times when plans and directions are found to be inasceptible to meet the situation. The spectational planning all seemed to have been based upon a more or less orderly sequence of actions by an observation of the particle are defined by appropriate action on the particle are delived on the basis of the plans had definitely not been as delived on the basis of the prolonged increased readiness. As one of the participants had stated it:

All the plane head to that we will go to an it fear.

^{80.} See DOS 80, this coupler.

state of readiness and then comething is going to happen. The thing will estiner shut down, or the balloon will go up. These is nothing in the material, personnel, or maintenance planning for keeping everything going during an extended period of readiness. One thing is sure.

It just isn't practical.

The existing plans were useful, but, in some areas at least, they worked out mainly because experienced personnel were available to improvise and adjust procedures to meet the new and unexpected situations which arose.

Problems with regard to airlift and dispersal mayorecondiscus edearlier. Dispersal problems were not a matrix, ... inadequate planning but of being catapulted into an advance situation without available facilities.

The inability to follow procedures planned for the Almos wing resulted from Enforcescon, high priority demands made upon wing personnel and equipment.

Requirements were found to exist for engineered endcuits not included in pla s for an esergency operation and sany circuits were called up by the division on by ADC. Ottaloading of tactical circuits resulted in ordering of a preempt feature at the 28th RCC and the four sectors to point a circuit to be seized for a higher priority call.

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^{81.} Lir, 2800P to 28010-44, into on Cold Operations, 10 Mar. 1962, DOC 71, this complete.

 $[\]rho 2$. Lin, 280AC-A to 2800P. Info we Cont Gy rection, 28 $^\circ$ 1902, DOC 72, this energies,

this feature, the needs of the region and sector commanders were not satisfactorily met because of the time it took to clear the circuits. The region commander requested a two-way, four-wire telephone circuit between the region and the 83 sector commanders to meet the need.

Personnel planning in support of the dispersal programmals sound so for as manning by regular Air Force people was concerned. The trouble was that the people were not yet evaluable. Air police for dispersal bases were not nuture ized until Phase III of the program, but additional personnel were needed the minute nuclear armed aircraft landed at dispersal bases.

Plans for extensive use of inactive Air Force Reserve personnel in Air Force Reserve Recovery Squadrons located not. dispersal bases were found to be totally unreliable.

Sibil of actual conflict, there was no way to insere that reservists would be available on short notice. Even if they were available, they would not be able to offer elective support unless they has Foceived adequate advance training.

^{480.} Ltr. 28NROP-E to 28 AD, Commanders' (Red Phone) Tels Svc. 31 Dec 1962.

^{84. 1}st Ind. 28PDC-E to News, 28COI. 26 New 1987. Into on Corongctory Ope, 14 Dec 1962, EOC 73, this chart is

Problems with regard to paying dispersed and deployed personnel arose during the early stages of the Cuban operations. ADC at first denied per diem payment to such personnel on the basis of Air Force joint travel regulations published in mid-1962. Later, this decision was reversed and per diem payment was authorized. Arrangements were also made for getting pay checks to the deployed personnel to prevent financial mardships for them and their jamilies.

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procedures in the ADC and Divisio: WPB's for supporting and funding these units would not live been adequate. The plans 86 were being revised to overcome the noted deficiencies.

The SFADS commander's comments to the division product op questions of unit security and defense which were unswered by the division's Chief of the Security and Law Enforcement

^{85.} Msg, ADC to Air Divs, Recent Chg to JTR, 2 Jul 1962, DOC 74, this chapter; Ltr, 28 AD to All Units, Chg lio to JTR and ALMAJCOM 1167/62, 19 Jul 1962, DOC 75, this comptens ADC to ALMSC, TDY under Present Emergency, 26 Oct 1902, E.C 70, this chapter; Msg. 28 AD to 78 Ftr Mg and 425 Ftr Op. Marlick Chks to TDY Personnel. 29 Oct 1902, DOC 78, this chapter. Msg. ADC to ALADC, Per Bies Entitlement, 9 Nov 1962, DOC 77, this chapter.

^{86.} Ltr, 28AAF to 28AAC, Info on Contingency Ops. 28 Nov 1962, DOC 75, this exapter: Mag, ADC to ALADC, Acet and Fin Support for sobilized Units, 30 Oct 1962, DOC 80, this chapter.

Division. As in the case of security at the dispersal bases, the problem involved providing the best security measures possible with the limited resources available.

The SFADS letter also noted that difficulties had been experienced during the crisis with the new SAGE-BUIC switching communication system. Attention was also called to the vulnerability of the land lines. The cause of the trouble with the switching communications system had been cleared up and facilities soon to be completed were expected to increase the survivability of the communications system.

Operation of the 28th Air Division command post for such an extended period as that of the Cuban alert provided experience upon which improvements could be made. In the early stages of the crisis, for example, the fact that the command post at each echelon was supposed to be the focal point for all operations seemed to be overlooked. Subordinate units made direct contact with state agencies at director, headquarters by message or telephone and the staff took action

^{87.} Ltr. SFADS to 28 AD. Comments Concerning Custom Alert, 51 Pec 1962, DOC 81: this chapter: Ltr. 280DC to 280IG. Comments Concerning Custom Alert, 7 Jan 1963, and 1st Ind. 280IG, 14 Jan 1963, DOC 82, this chapter: Lst Ind. 280AC to Ltr. 280DC, 7 Jan 1963, Comments Concerning Custom Alert, 17 Jan 1963, DOC 83, this chapter:

^{88.} News, by Col Johnson French, Jr., to 280TF, land on Contingency Ops. 28 Nov 1962, DCC 84, this chapter.

in the same way. No records of these messages or telephone calls were available in the command post to acquaint replacement personnel with the situation existing during pre-vious monyo.

Later, copies of such messages were made available to the command post. A procedure was also established for maintaining a comprehensive log and a daily summary report of actions. From these sources, the information necessary for continuous effective action was always available in the command post.

Periodic briefings were suggested to keep eligible personnel completely familiar with all plans, procedures, and requirements necessary for assuming the position of commander assistant commander of the division command rost. An additional suggestion was that a current outline of mil directives and required actions be maintained in the command post for impediate use.

personnel manning some positions in the command post during the crisis were unionilize with actions to be taken or to be conitored by the position. To overcome this problem, manning of such positions was recommended whosever operations orders for exercises required combind post manning.

^{85.} Dys of 2m 4D Chd Post log and Daily Summaries are included with this minn, as 6005 5 and 11 this chapter.

Other areas worthy of further study were those involving possible duplication of effort by the RCC and the
constant post, or where unrealistic demands for logistic ininvention or char - in legistic reporting procedures to
ADC placed an una - sharp borden on division and owit personmel.

Fillow-Up Action on Dispersal. Experience during the Cuban crisis protes the me d for a Phase III capability for dispersal bases as soon as possible. The confulling capsed by uncoordinated use of the same bases for dispersal by more than one conformalish showed the need for a market dispersal plan.

On 22 November, ADC provided the division with a first of dispersal bases resulting from actions taken by ADC possible USAF, and the Department of Defense. The ABrd FIS was proposed from the dispersal program because of plans for inactivating the squadron. The remaining Six Squadrons were all shelded in the dispersal plans. Three new dispersal locations were listed. They were Nellis and Edwards AFB's and the San Viculas island Nazal Air Station. ADC was requesting actionity from the host commands to survey these three locations, and

the division was to prepare programming documents for facilities remained at these additional bases.

The list of bases as of 22 November 1962, and squade or carmarked for them were.

is FIS (F-101) from Davis-Wonthan AFB to Williams AFL 62 FIS (F-102) from Travis AFB to Fish 320 FIS (F-101) from Hamilton AFB to Fish 320 FIS (F-101) from George AFB to Fish (F-101) from Canada AFB to San Nicolas 1: NAS 466 FIS (F-100, Fish Castle AFB to Edwards AFB

On 23 November, information was received concerning the survey of or lian airports by the ADC teams. Facilities that could be provided through M&O projects could be ready two years before those requiring military construction program (MCP) action. This was to be kept in find by division personnel preparing MCP's as well as to so the ADC team.

On 28 and 29 November, a fighter dispersal contexts was held at Edwards AFB to determine the ability of that base to support the dispersal of the 329th FIS during Fluction. SAC, MATS, and TAC were also planning to the Edward AFB as a dispersal base. The entire TWA left assigned to

^{90.} Msg. ADC to Arr Divs. Cite #ADOOP, ADIRP, 2011 ADMLP 2213; Ftr Dispersal Program, 22 Nov 1982.

^{51.} Mag, ADO to Air Divs. Fir Sisperal Program. 20 Nov 1962, DOC 85. this coupler.

MATS and been given first priority by the nost dominanc. All inclicties needed by the 329th FIS were available at Makards with the exception of the aiert readiness building. Priorities would have to be weined out with the other in many 92 for one of inspersal facilities.

28th Air Division representatives attended a dispersui 93 conterence at ADC headquarters in 5-7 December. The new of Nellis AFB for the 329th FIS dispersal and the continuous of F-101's and F-102's at 1 0,: -ere discussed. ADC complained that the use of ______ for both the 82hd and the plained that the use of ______ for both the 82hd and the 84th squadrons can been necessary because of the high cost of preparing a previously selected dispersal base for the 85th. The possibility that ______ would be used as a ferther continuous.

The division objected to the use of the distance from dispersal base for the S29th occause of its distance from the area to be defended and because it was a story of which for DASA. The was subsequently arouped from the first thoses approved by ABC the contract of the c

^{92.} Err 2800P to 280DC, Trip Rps, 30 Nov 1603 600 50, this chapter.

^{90.} Let $28000~\rm{GU}$ 28000, Teap Rpt[11 bec 1030, 200 $\rm{TT}_{\rm c}$ and obspace

ABC had no objection to a switch among squadrons and bases by the division so long as no additional cost was involved. The division proposed the following Phase III dispersal locations:

82FIS - San Micolas Island NAS

84FIS - "5//

29F15 - Edwards AFG

437FIS - San Clemente island MAS

15FIS - Williams AFD

Addition of San Clemente Island to the buses already approved by ADC would overcome the problem of having two squadrons disperse to may but logistical support and airclift requirements would be costly for island sites.

The time required to MOC. All movement is support equipment and personnel could be by surface within means available to the division except for the movement to but.

Clobeste and Sar Nicolas islands. Military Alrinit, turnshed by ADC, or contrast to mercial airlift would be be-nyired for the island sites.

^{94.} Ibid.

⁹⁵⁻ Msg, 28 AD to ADC, Movement to Dispersal Bases. It Dec 1962, DGC a6, this chapter.

When the ADC Operation Plan 50-63 was published on 15 Junuary 1963, all the proposed dispersul bases remain a see program, but the squadrens carmarked for these bases differed from those proposed by the division with the conception of the 15th and the out. The ADC list of squadrens and hases for Phase III was

1511S - Williams 80FIL - Win

84F1S -

339FIS - San'Olemente Island

437FIS - San Nicolas Island

456F1S + Edwards

The interia dispersel bases were to be the same is those for Phase III except that no interim dispersal an planned for the 437th FIS. havy approval had not yet been obtained for the use of the two island sites for dispersance.

Planning for dispersal of the keeks discretify the down anderway for some time. The control of the keeks discretified the control of the control of the keeks discretified the control of the control of the keeks discretified the control of the control of the keeks discretified the control of the ke

^{96.} Ltr. 281RF to 280PF, 28 AD F # Dispersal, Fig., MCP, 14 Dec 1962, DCC 89, this chapter.

^{97.} Ltr, 280PP to 280DC, AEW&C Dispersal Contended 23 Oct 1952, DOC 90, this chapter: Nsg. 28AD to 8A2 AER&C & Dispersal Contended 6 No. 4932, DOC 91, this chapter listed by to 280DC, Trip Report-Report of AEW&C Dispersal Visit 15 Nov 3832, DOC 92, this chapter.

Selected as the dispersal base for Phase I and II. For Phase III, only one squadron would be permanently dispersed to $^{0}S_{1}\times$ The other two squadrons would be dispersed at 1 $^{2}S_{2}\times$, and Edwards AFB. The SS2ma AEW&C Wing Operations Plan 1-ds was being written at the close at 1902 98 on this basis.

Congressional approval and funding would be required before necessary construction could start at the Paulo II. dispersal bases. The division and ADC were taking all possible action to expedite the Phase III program once Congress had acted. In the meantime, progress was build adde toward a Phase II capability at interim bases with April 1965 as a target date.

SUBMERNY

The Cular crisis provided the most realistic uponnation possible, short of actual war. The 28th Air Division (SAGE), together with all other parts of the military establishment, had the opportunity to evaluate its planning, and procedures in this realistic atmosphere and to find our where improvements were needed.

^{98.} Ltr. 2x0DC to 2x0MA. CSO AAC, CIG. COI, and IMC. Development of a Pian for the HEWAC Fleet; it Dec 1962.

If this evaluation was followed by vigorous action, the Cuban crisis would have been just the catalyst needed for improving the national defense.

CHAPTER SIX

THE DUTH AIR DIVISION (SAGE)

3:

Jun v M. Russell

The Boan CONAD NORAD Region did not become directly involved in the Commonder Crisis shift October So. 1983 (Mig.) the Commonder was notified to expect the immediate deployment of part of its interceptor forces. The following dark twolve F-105 directly of the lef Fighter big were populated from Selividge AFE, Sichlagen to Patrick AFB, Florica. So. Detober 22nd, the Continental AIR Detecto Command (CONA).

the 327th Fighter Group at Truux was ordered to deploy with available F-102's to Homestead AFB, Florida.

On November 20, 1962, the 30th Region was given as a mission to withdrew its interceptors from the dispersultaness. These aircraft were reformed to their home passes within a few days. ... 27 have been SORAD. (187).

The detachment of the 18. Fig. 18. House was returned to Selferday by December 8. 1962, and the 0179. Finator Group case which to Truck on December 20. 1802.

CONAD SORAD and the ROAF

 $\kappa_{\rm B}$, s $_{\rm c}$, where 2 on October 22. 1902 by Co. . The $_{\rm c}$

The CONAD device was a sum of the fact the strange to give the Canadian government to, a to some siner the situation usi determine whether it chose to such a continue advanced alore. It was not entire October 21 that for Canadians came to a decision and the North Adeciden A.)

Defense Command (NORAD) also to Egy/A.

The decimation of a COSAD plent wid not pose any problems as for up the subject deployment of threes who

concerned as all of the forces involved were those of the United States. However, it did have its peculiar aspects as it related to the air defense radar sites and interceptor furces manned and controlled by the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF). Most of the early warning system was on Canadian territory and much of it manned by the RCAF. The Canadians also possessed fighter interceptor squadrons and one LONGER site.

The Joth NCRAD Region was authorized some J9 1.74F officers and 62 RCAF enflicted men. Easy of RCAF presonner assigned held responsible positions. The Vice Communication the Joth NORAD Region, the Director of the Combat Center and the Director of Exercises and Systems Evaluation were all RCAF officers. There were RCAF personner employed in the Combat Center and in three of the Director Centers we weapons directors, weapons controllers, CaE stail officers and ACSW twomsteins.

 ^{1.} Unofficially the ROAF air detense forces were placed on an advanced state of readiness on October 22.

^{2. 30} MORAD Rgm had an RCAF authorization of 10 officers and nine en'isted men; Detroit 10/20; Dulute 10/20 and Sault Ste Marie 9/13. Joint Hqs Table of Distribution, 1 Jul 1902.

when CONAD went to an advanced state of air defence readiness on October 22, these RCAF personnel were exceed from operational duties. A strange situation (25) to

DEPLOYMENT

During the Caban Crisis teelve F-105's from Section and theoty-two F-102's from Truck were deployed to observe in Florida. These deployments represented an unusual constance in air defense. While there had been necessary, adeployments of fighters to temporarily fill gaps in the system, the transfer of half or whole squadrons on a constance natice was a unique maneuver. The Century Series fillness interested on a local series of 1962 were elaborate organizations. The temporarily for the complex constance on a permanent base and in a fixed ground environment.

Unlike the fighters of the World War II era, the interceptor of the 1960's was not capable of operating from just any landing strip equipped with a radio and a low 55 garden drums of gaseline. The Γ -10's, Γ -102's and Γ -106's with which the At. Setumbe Command squadrons were equipped -too

normally supported by large maintenance organizations, an elaborate supply system, and considerable physical facilities including alort and maintenance hangars, test stands, test labs and special weapons storage areas.

The massive support requirements of the modern interceptors were demonstrated by the size of the support organiations. The 327th Fighter Group at Truix, which supported one F-103 unit (the 325th Ftr Intep Sq) was authorized over 1.500 neh. The ls. Fighter Wing at Solfridge, which had two F-706 squadrons assigned (the 71st and 94th Ftr Intep Sqs), was authorized almost 3,500 men. While this Group and Wing had other support responsibilities (1.2., Solfridge also supported a large SAC tenant), most of their effort was directly expended on their own U. E. aircraft. The 027th Consolidated Aircraft Maintenance Squadron at Truix, for example, was authorized over 500 men and expended about 80 per cent of its time in support of U. E. aircraft.

The Air Defense Command fighter interceptor squadrons were, in other words, specifically equipped and manufactured fight an air battle in a sophisticated ground environ, ent (SAGE) from an established base. While it was expected that these units might be temporarily "dispersed" or even deployed from one ADC base to another on a short-term basis, there had been little trought or planning given to the

possibility of moving a unit or part of a unit filteen numbered siles on a few hours notice. Unlike the Tactical Air Command, ADC had not practiced such abrupt moves. The deployments carried out during the Cuban Crisis were not only unusual and unprecedented -- they were completely unprecedented.

As relations with Cuba worsened, CGNAD took steps to strengthe, the air delense forces in the southeastern United 3 States. During 1961 Six RC-121 AEWLC aircraft were mixed to McCoy AFB to augment surveillance in the area and a detachment of four F-102 aircraft from the 432nd Fighter Interceptor Squadron at Seymour Johnson AFB was ultimately stationed at Homestead AFB. Three additional gap filler radars were also programmed for Fibrida to improve low level surveillance as serious deficiency in the area. At the time of the Cuban Crisis these forces were augmented by two F-102 aircraft on alert at Tyndall AFB plus twelve Navy F-4H's and eight F-8U's at Key West.

CONAD Op1 1-81 "Continguncy Plan for Augmenting the Air Defenses of Southern Florida," 5 Jan 1961. (htckmaned "Southern Tip").

^{4.} Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1961, Chapter 12.

^{5 30} AD 3000P Briefing, "Participation of ADC is the Costingency Operations in the Cubin Crisis." 31 Dec 1602 DOC 1, this Chapter.

On October 17, 1962. CONAD, after consultation with ABC, decided to increase the number of AEW&C aircraft und interceptors in the Southeast. Thelve F-106's from the actual Fighter Interceptor Squadron were deployed from Linkley to Patrick AFB and six more RC-121's were brought in the October 21, CONAD ordered the deployment of 42 maps F- 66's from Sciffridge to Florida -- thereby increases the number of F-106's at Patrick to 24. At the same time is aircraft from the SSIst Fighter Interceptor Squadro, were transferred to Homestead, Dringing the number of F-102's there to 36.

On October 25, 1962 NORAD (which went on DEFCON Describer 24) decided that there was a serious detacle of the the detense against lessevel attack. All of the interactions then in Florida were equipped to carry officer same air rockets (GAR) or the EB-1 rocket with a nuclear warhoad Nuclear warhoads could not be used against a low level target and the GAR's with high explosive war ends were as considered to be very effective under such conditions. It was decided that an F-102 of the 12.75 rockets would best equipped to deal with the situation.

^{6.} It.d. There were, additionally, this, y-nine Century Sories aircraft at Tyndall and soven more at McDol.

DOTH NORAD REGION Deployment of Aircrait to Florida October 1982

| Date | Deployed | No Tep. 5 C | Deployed | No Tep. 5 C | Deployed | Deploye

307H NORAD REGION Personnel Dispersed and Deployed Oct - Nov 1962

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57	34/275	<u>36/236</u>	
20 644 1	121 1647	1237603	

- Five agreed from 527th Fighter Group (402Ad) at AFB. As of 26 November these were also time (111.11) as special assignment at other bases.
 - 1 Tyndull
 - i Claser
 - 2 %00.11
 - 2 Richards-Schaur
 - U Kay host

Source: 33-PDC Statistical Rescues 25 October - 1. Savemer 1962 | DOC 2. this complete.

2 6

The 325th Fighter Interceptor Squadron at Translates the only ADC F-102 unit whose aircraft has how the modified to carry the GAR-II. It had therefore, he can first 102's with a 2-75 rocket capability * The block was deployed to demosters on 37 October 1962 and to the ATC .

Fighter for receptor Squadron was returned to the ATC .

TF-102 with two seats has considered to be more soften. . .

For low level work as the pilot could concentrate to the computer of the could concentrate the could concentrate

After the directs of two lst Fighter Wind and 10.70. Fighter Group were deployed to Florida, the comparation of the South Comparation of the South Comparation of the South Comparation. The Data Region of the South Comparation of the South S

[&]quot;All ADC F-100 aircraft originally were equipment of carry 50 0.75 Folding fin Aircraft Rockots (FFAR) and second GAR's. During 1961 and 1962 seet of the ADC F-102's serve modified to carry the latter GAR-11 which had a medical mode. As a result of the testication, those library field the FFAR capability. The 32. It aircraft were not southing as the unit was originally programmed to injectivity in 1962.

^{7 &}lt;u>lbid</u>

and their alert consistents were controlled by the U2nit. The Soundard, however, monitor the activities of theme units carefully to determine their support requirements. This carefully to determine their support requirements. This carefully to determine their support requirements.

The Brase) The 1st Fighter Wint was notified at all the CST on 20 October 1962 that they were to deploy to the relative services. I leaded with secondary semiment to Patrice at the secondary semiment and State at the Patrice at the secondary semiment and semiment to Patrice at the secondary semiment and the semiment to Patrice at the secondary semiment to patrice at the secondary semiment to semiment the patrice at the semiment of semiment to the secondary semiment and Auxiliary Cround Equations at the service at the secondary semiment and Auxiliary Cround Equations at the service reads.



^{8.} Is in Eq. Historical Pesage-Cubus Crisis, 400.00 this charter.

At 1515 hours CST on October 21st final natification was received and the aircraft began leaving in pairs at interest minute intervals. Support personnel and constitution at users airlifted at 1700 CST. The first F-100 constitution at 1800 EST and the last at 2000 EST. The first F-100 constitution at 1800 EST and the last at 2000 EST.

The initial aircrew commitment to Patrick was supplied by the Sath Fighter Interceptor Squanted (1997) of the the intercept was ordered, however, the Sath and constitution of data-ready tirthous available and those of 1997 were "burrowed" from the Tist Fights, late, explicitly were "burrowed" from the Fibrida detachment of the 1991 - 100



These appropriate were recovered by personal to the 40 Fir Intep Sq detachment at Patrick as 1st Fire extracted personnel had not yet arrived. 1914.

^{15. 30} Ab. 30-PBC. Historical Rescale 200 2 late chapter.

With antil 15 November 1962 when they were relieved to the Tiest Fighter Interceptor Squadron. Pilots were relieve to me tacca Patrick to Schiridge on a regular basis neglining.

unile the housing and mess facilities as slavel of Patrick were satisfactory, working conditions were in. ...

The ground price withed a seven day week and ...

Local The ground price withed a seven day week and ...

Local remained high during the entire deployment who ...

Local remained personnel performed lemendary feats ...

Li routine. When plans were being made to extablish a

nel routine system after the first week of deployment.

The personnel on temporary daty (TDY) at depth and and on dispersel bases did not revelve advance that the temporary of the control of the co

^{11. 1} ftr Wg. Hist Resume-Count Crists, 560 0. 1.... Chipter. The 71 ftr Intop Sq aircrews began to dirite at Patrick on 5 Nov 1962.

 $^{12-30~\}mathrm{AD}_{\odot}$ Staff ing notes, 200ct 1932 - EGC within chapter.

^{10. 30} AD (36AAC). Eyer Roslady SCC 5. this chapters

^{14.} I far ag. Y. Fis, Hist Roses. DOT G. torr

The insent and type of material required to support this deployment was originally an anknown factor. At first motification, the material and maintenance people did not make the expected Sortic rate sould be, now much suggester introducer support would be admirable at Patrick, or the maintenance support would be admirable at Patrick, or the maintenance support would be admirable at Patrick, or the maintenance support would be admirable at Patrick, or the maintenance support would be admirable at Patrick. Or the intenance of the support of the admirable expanded to filly items. When it was discovered that an AA-1 fire control system, when it was discovered that an AA-1 fire control system, then up was needed at Patrick, one was dismatted support to Fiorida and regisherhold in less than 24 more. The final requirement, at Patrick were indicated by the first time of the required twenty-three C-125 arrerait sortic to transport a rotal of 214.542 pounds of material and 1.15 Selfordge when the only returned in carry December 1902.

All of the F-loo plats required at Paratox Air Fill.

Base (for aircraft of bath the lat Fighter Bing air the late 1900)

P(S) were invariance by the algor also at Selfridge.

Items not available at Patrick were encoded, by telephon.

from Selfridge. Those requests were filled by air shipment. If the part was not available at Selfridge at was ensured into the depot and shipped by the depot directly to Fforda. Selfridge, tous, became the depot for 50 %-...

aircraft (71st. 94th and 48th FIS). During the period

lo. juga.

October 22 to November 27, 1962, Selimidge, as a result of the deployment, shipped 1299 items, satisfied 102 No. Operationally keddy for Sopply (NORS) requirements and requisitioned 3. Items from the depot for suppose to Patrick

The sortic runc adjectating by the lost Filance will, detachment at Patrick was little short of packagement. As was preclausiveneed, the detachment arrives in Fluctum on October 21, 1862 and assumes an alert constraint will lost aircraft the same day. From then until mid-Version on the offic TIS lies as many as 20 sorties and 30 fluctum on any. Between October 21 and November 27 the determined with price up a research of 430 sorties (of which 400 were domained by the actual of 1828 flying hours. The rate was far above that ever accomplished by the same amountail conditions and was, in fact, probably semeinted a record for F-106 aircraft.

^{18. 1}st Fir Wg. 1st AB Sq. Historical Restaud. 1000 this chapter.

^{17.} Ibid., See table. Sortic Raid this waspite.

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DOC 6. inie chapter.

SORTIE RATE

Detachment 1. 1st Fighter Wing (94 FIS)
Patrick Air Force Base: Florida

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SOURCE: 1st Pighter Wing, 94th 118. Historical assume por 5 this chapter.

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Ag. BurAD, Copper Briefing (Aparticipal) of the the copper C. See T. Die 1882 (ACC): the competition of

Deployment of the 527th Fighter Group to Howest and Air Force Babe. The 327th Fighter Group was notified on October 26, 1962, at 1836 heers (CST), that all numbers of Fights arroraft of the 325th FIS, with saintenance parsonal, would be deployed to Homestead air Force Base. Fig. ... all personnel were recalled by 1960 hours and preparations are negative that satisfaction was compileded by the second arroraft erroraft error of the time seven aircraft error of the second dispersal base.

5-11

^{22. 327} Ftr Qp, Historical Resume, DOC 7 line chapter. To DOP Historical Resume, DOC 8, this empiter.

The seven F rel's at Des Moines were returned ...

Thank Field during the night of October 26th. The condition of the U. E. aircraft, were fitted with any tables.

A production line for the paying and processing in gassengers was set up in a mangar at 0500 (CST), which is transport arrived at 0314 (CST) several following passengers and cargo were ready. The first transport is a factor at 0958 (CST) with priority maintenance processing.

The F-102 arresult began leaving in illimits of some ut-0015 (CST) on October 27. Each flight was semanated a name hours. The final flight did not depart, therefore until 0000 (CST) on October 28. The last, or twen year of all ereft, which had aborted from an earlier filling of the sale any.

Twenty-four transports unrived on October 27 and 18 capanted the same day. All personnel were spaint of 2110 (CST) on the 27th. Two titlesports were diverted to Des Moines to pick up the material left correct six correcting aircraft left for Homestead on October 28th. Therewas, nowever, still material to be shapped and the crop-

^{23.} This dolay was chused by the necessity changing alreress on the gransport.

ushed for five addition. Transports. The shipments well not completed, therefore, until October 31st.

The F-10L's encountered considerable trouble on their fright to Homestead. Four aircraft diverted to a cabourne and four to Greensboro. North Carolina because of fuel feed problems with the external tasks. Four constitution of the following and maintenance.

Despite the delays encountered by the F-162's that C27th Tighter Group did succeed in transporting 22 c.E alregait. 24 aircrews, 246 maintenance personnel and 330,000 pounds of freight to Florida within 27 hours of notification. This was considered to have been pretty 25 aped time for first try.

The detachment of the 482nd FIS at Homestead processed supply support for the 127th. Truex Aid not, therefore, 26 have supply responsibility for its deployed unit. The number of personnel at Homestead was neglected, but not

^{24. 30.50, 30}NOCC, Historical Resenc, DC 9, tar-chapter.

^{25. 30} AD, Staff Htg Notes, DOC 4, this emapter.

⁻²⁶ , -32% Ftr Gp. Historical Resume, -200% 7, thus chapter.

substantially. On October 29 there were 34 officers and 205 men deployed. As of November 20 there were only 27 two additional officers and 34 additional men.

The detachment of the 327th Fighter Group octain part of a fighter task force at Homestead. This force was runninged by Colonel John S. Stewart, the 327th Group Colonel Group of the 1st Fight Colonel Group at 11,302nd Region. The 1-102's based at Homestead wave employed on combat air patrols (CAP). They also believe which of the 24-hour Colonel Group alorts Cat Patrick. The MeDill and Homestead. This rather unique alort stops of the guired two aircraft at each base in the Calingshot posicion that is, on the runway with pilots in the cockpit and contract as running.

^{27 30} AD, 30 PDC, Statistical Resume. LOC 2 1615 chapter: See table. Personnel Dispersed and Deployed, p. 179

^{28. 30} Ab. 3 GOP Briefing. DOC 1, this chapter.

^{29. 227} Fir Gp, Historical Resume, DOC 7. this chapter.

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Dr. 30 AD, Ope Pill 2-02. Interior Figure 2 ... Introd-cd Alert Pikas 12 Feb 1902 & Ches 1 - 2 of a 2 of a Costagnesics.

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was expected to provide sufficient operational girerals ... meet the training recuirements.

, his additional burden was placed on a maintenant and supply system which was already hard pressed. Such the aircraft modification programs were hearing completion by early 1962 and while the supply picture showed gradual. -
[...veloat, aircraft maintenance was still operations of a number of hundroups. The material tailare raty -- [...veloat, in the F+166 fire control system -- remained in.

The showed little improvement.

because of these hundraps, the new alert state of the considerable reservations. To provide any testing of the concept in late 1961 tended to state 34 these doubts. However, on January 31, 1962, the possessed tactical aircraft did go on 15-minute constant this status was maintained thereafter. Note to state the state was maintained thereafter.

^{54.} See Hist of 30 All Div. Jul-Dec Hedl.

^{10.} ABC COMAC Test Elrective, 0 Jap 1902;

The original dispersal concept envisioned the equation contesting Air Force Reserve Recovery units to serve the alternation the dispersal bases. In February and many the alternation the dispersal bases. In February and many the appearance of the field on ANO contesting the contest of the field of the fi

These tests were not an angualitied section of the reserve units were given considerable actions. The still required two so three above for the personnel and transport them sixty to one bendied of the personnel and transport them sixty to one bendied of the process of the personnel and transport them sixty to one pendied of the personnel and the process across dependent open the bisconsiderable incidence of the Course considerable incidence of the Course provided the facilities and had the provided the facilities and the facilities and the provided the facilities

Although the performance of the Reserve Receive signatures improved as they became more familiate with the

^{36. 2481} AF Reserve Sect (Hiss), Report of Join. ADC CONAC Vola Fld Semine Tests. Fockman 1962.

^{37. &}lt;u>1515</u>.

the continuation of the test program.

In April 1902 the Division reported to ADC that is tests considered during reordary and March 1902 ips vid that inhalps equipment and trained people in the mills should be reported from the control should be reported from the properties of the was also printed to that inther tests plact people due our about solutions with the Adr Goard who resented the eschaft their invitions and equipment by the Reserve parts. European Strict test program was another drain upon TDV leads which were also by the short supply. ADC agreed and conceiled the relation

Ob. Ray 30 AD to ADC. ADC CONAD Test, a Bar look Lim. ADC to 30 AD, Phase II Test of Dispersal Inject... 4 No. 1862.

^{*} Volk, Hulman, Pholps-Collans, Algeria, Dur Mothes

there, The Division did not, therefore, require any contional support to accomplish Phase 1 of the Dispersal Film.

The Division did expect, nowever, that Phose II are selected to the Dispersal Plan would be beyond the separation of selected in the Air National Courd. Phases II and iff analysis in the Air National Courd, phases II and iff analysis, refuging operators, sadies, and security 1 and 1. These personal of the successful, could be supplied to the Air mesons security and assigned to the Tolland at the ANO instabilities.

The Dispersal Plan would require additional technical squares we entitle and aircrare mechanics, fire continuous accidences as recommendates. It was recommended to these personal could be best obtained by an indicate the ANO landing documents. The AF Reserve Recovery with were not allotted these skills and it was expected that in which have applied to the remarks and are applied to the skills and it was expected that in which have applied to the skills and it was expected that in which have applied to the skills and it was expected that in the skills and a secondary is about the type of interpret product.

BS. Itr. 30 AD to ADC. Support of the Interespent. Dispersol Program 20 Mar 1962.

^{40. &}lt;u>1016</u>.

The Bivision recommended, therefore, that ADC, Used to AAM Farcan, and CONAC arrange to augment the extraction usare detectments at Volk, Alpena, Des Maines, and Farço enected light) with full-time technicians and emergency are less rise support. It further recommended that all the follows of supports to the ARG base commencer.

In the spring and summer of 1962 a number of the scale The Settee' dispersals were carried out during the exercises. These dispersals were valuable in exposum perential problems and deficiencies associated with the dispersal plans.

Daring Shock wave 1V. an exercise held in Eq. 2.05 fourteen interceptors were "flushed" from Kincheloe. Wirtsmith and A. I. Sawyer and recovered at whelps-0 liver 42 Field in Michigan. The "flash" end rewent det to the Shuft Sie worde Sector at 1813 and the first interceptor area, 2d at Fhelps-Collins sixty-seven minutes later. The last interceptor fine not give until 2.85. "Term as wonder collected word about 19 after the arrival of this institute.

Among the problems nightighted by this exercise with incomplete and inadequate pro-positioned ground support

^{41.} Ibid.

^{42.} Menc, J000P-PR. No Notice Disjershi, Philips-1 11. £14. C May 1962.

equipment. There were not, for example, enough ladders or tow bars for each type of aircraft involved. The lighting was poor and this hampered the servicing of the aircraft. It was recommended that portable lights be placed at all dispersal bases. Balf of the aircraws arrived without or sired lock pins, external tank jettison pins and task lock safety pins. The ANG ground crows had to regree with pins and this took time.

The aircrews failed, in some instances, to require their arrival to the Sector as they were instructed to a They appeared, in general, to be disorganized and femica to stand around waiting for someone to service their aircraft. Hall of the aircrews said they were not capable of the packing their dragonates. As one observer put it:

The average crew member is not aware of his a sponsibilities to insure that his place is serviced properly and its status reported to the controlling agency. He is used to having many things done to his at how base and takes it for created that he same set-up exists at dispersal bases. This dispersal operation is a shoestring, pec patch operation and they should be made aware of it it only for their our services.

Some of the planning deficiencies denoted in this propertial were beyond the control of the fir of ground on which

^{43. &}lt;u>luid</u>.

^{41. &}lt;u>1016</u>.

The interceptors were not, for example, permitted to land as soon as they arrived at the dispersal base but were required to remain about until their fuel had been reduced to long a contain maximum. Communications were in general complement and faulty. Although requested to issue although process with a thirty minute lapse to allow for the immargance special and primitive conditions at the dispersal and the Shalt Sector scramified all the fighters:

As a result some harry scenes developed on the 2000 when priots attempted five minute scrambles in the coexpit ladders, minimum qualified ground constitutions and over a mile of winding, does, like tanking to negotiate. Scramble time avenues soven to eight practes under those conductions.

prove that it was possible to disperse a large number of interceptors to an ANG dase and term them around with the simplest equipment and with ground creas unlamified and the directly. The reports sold, moreover, enthusiasing 45 the ANG creas.

The mission was considered a success and a little los ned... The cooperation, proficiency and cit cities case of the ANG people at Puelp +Colling was noteworth. They did a fine job and would be capable of minoring twice the number of interceptors in a one-shot effort

^{45. &}lt;u>16:</u>3

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provide a the regardenest proved different for eath. At a

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^{47.} Lond. 30007, N. Nolice Dispersal (ist Firms, Selicing, to Halman, 13 Jul 1902. Meso, MOMEL-B, Rep. ... Trip to Bilman, 12 Jel 1902.

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test held at Selfriage in July, it look the 1st Fighter with Clist and 64th F1S; $^{12}S_{1}^{(3)}$ get will the Lifets strapped in the directait. At Deluth in which the hoord Fighter Croop (Pith F1°) required $^{12}S_{1}^{(3)}$ in Ref will of the pilots in their seats.

Although the birth of the increased Abert of the Operation was, as has been noted, far from patters of the as a going operation of mid-1962. It was made to built marketer, in less than five months.

Dy Jane 1862 support agreements and been consistent forms I dispersal bases -- Volk. Paolph-e-diametric formation and Heater. (An agreement of the control o

^{48. 30} AD. Oki Fepoli, 1st Fir kg, 37 Aug 1992

^{49. 30} AD. ORI Report, 343 Ftm Cp, 23 Aug. 1991.

^{50.} E & 30AS 10 ADO: 30GGP-PL+66+11~105. 10 Jul. 1962.

. . .

Volk 56
Melps-Collins 69
Les Mornés 92
Clinton County 50
melman 42
Capital 12

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the alc t states $\frac{g_{2}}{g_{3}} \approx \frac{g_{2}g_{3}g_{2}}{g_{3}} \approx \frac{1502}{15002} \approx \frac{g_{3}g_{3}g_{3}}{g_{3}g_{3}} \approx \frac{15002}{15002} \approx \frac{g_{3}g_{3}g_{3}}{g_{3}g_{3}} \approx \frac{15002}{g_{3}g_{3}} \approx \frac{g_{3}g_{3}g_{3}}{g_{3}g_{3}} \approx \frac{g_{3}g_$

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At 1939Z CONAD ordered the figsters aspersed and within minutes one-third of the available to a

^{51.} Ibid.

 $^{52.\,}$ 30 AD, 30NOCC, Historical Resume, DGC v. t...s chapter.

aircraft were scrambled from Truax, Duluth, K. I. Sanger Einenelse. Wurtsmith, Bunker Hill, Lockbourne and Schirlage.

*200 S.

The 30th Fir Division Dispersal Plan, 4s it study in Octuber 1002, envisioned the use of Volk Field, whereast in Des Moines, I wa and Alpena (Phelps-Collins). Nicht in he pairwary dispersal bases. Volk was to accommente historial in the 11th, 45eth and 1st Wing. Des Moines was to be 130 and country train the 325th and 318th. Alpena was to be included by the 62nd, 440th and 87th. Unfortunately, this accommendation of the paracticable at the time dispersal was observed.

On the afternoon of October 22. Volk was able a weathered in and the weather was rapidly closing to be Air man approver, runway construction at Des Moines and that include the construction as per Moines and their constructions associate for interceptors associate than the F-102.

The decision was made, therefore, to receive discount of the 319th FIS and the 1st Wing at a secondary dispersil

^{53. 56} Ftr Wg. Historical Resume. DOC 10.1115 Charlets
507 Ftr Wg. Hist Resume, DOC 11. this chapter: ST TIS. Birt
Resume. DOC 12, this chapter: 519 FtS. Hist Resume. DOC 11.
this chapter: 415 FtS. Hist Resume. DOC 14. this compter: Deliver
Sector, Hist Resume. DOC 15. this chapter: Detroit sector.
Hist Resume. DOC 6, this chapter: 343 FtS Hist Resume. DoC 17.
this chapter: Chicago Sector, Wist Resume. DOC 15. this
chapter: Sault Ste Marie Sector, Hist Resume. DOC 19. this
chapter.

⁵⁴ SOCYC, Dispersal Briefing, DOC 20, this compact 36-00P, Historical Resume, DOC 21, this chapter

FIS sent its F-102's off to Des homes as planned and the 62ad. 45ath and 445th FIS went into Alpena. There which is consumed the for the 87th to get to Alpena before the while. Glosed in selft was diverted to Clinton County AFB 1041. The linear sent westward to Bector in North Dan 11 which has in the area of the S9th Region.

The initial dispersal patter enouged alloss income acting as the 30th began to have the albertail to their principly dispersal bases. The filth FIS albertail care is an item general bases. The filth FIS albertail care is an item general to Volk co October 23rd. The days later included from the garden and albertail at delegan Field were also them. It volk. On November 3 these elements were paraculation on the Volk. On November 3 these elements were paraculation and the Volk. Figures Group to Florida on the 17th. On their bis includes a first firm of the D27th Figures Group to Florida on the 17th. October the dited in the withdraw 1 of their dispersal bis larges.

^{55.} See Table, Dispersal, this chapter.

^{56.} See Table, Dispersal, this chapter: The 87th S was let at Clinton Couly maker than translational two primary base (Alpena) as Clinton County proved makey and easier to support from Lockbourne. §7 FIS, Hist Resume. BOC 18, this entoter.

The number of E. B. alverato it the dispussal mass. Flactanted almost unity as the figure was based on the second of machines "available." Ephantil of the control of machines "available." Ephantil of the control of the dispussal in the dispussal in the dispussal in the dispussal of the bifter Figure Coop, or the control of the control of the coop of the control of the coop of the control of the coop of the coop

After November of Cheromers County Co

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^{57.} See Table. Sumber of Acit Dispersia that company

Si. Ibiu.

^{59.} SO AD, Staff sing Ruther, $21 \ \& \ 22 \ \mathrm{Mag}$ likely this cumpton.

BOTH AIR DIVISION

Dispursal

22 Getober - 22 November 1962

Dr. jonal Sases	Units 22 Oct	Units <u>37 Get-20</u> 3.5
nui Ind	319. 1	
Sount misc		Glass of com
Alpena, Mich	62 438 443	62 408 41
Clinton City: Chio	s7	57
Des Mornes, lowa	CONTRACTOR	
dector, North Dakota	3.1	

- * Change to Dispersal -- 20 October 27 October
- 25 October 11th FIS aircraft moved from Hect of the Value
- 25 October 1st Ftr Wg ziroraft goved : em Hulaga to long
- 27 October 197th Ftr Op deployed to Homestens AF6 F. -- including dispersed arreraft at Ber Majanes
- 6 Revenuer 319th FIS aircraft abyeq from Halman to V. ...

Considering the short notice and poor scatter to initial disporsal went off surprisingly smoothly. The receiver was married, assessed, when no F-106 out at Feltrice conneged the partier on landing of Helman. The runner of smooth field the partier on landing at Helman. The runner of smooth and the eval coate lather. There are no surfaced industrial coate and a smooth to the foundation deads and a single smooth and the smooth sale of the run transfer and the smooth should be sufficiently that the back to Schridge for repair

Other than the incluent, however, hop, or a consummered and the dispersal was recessfull and the consumer of the factor with the consumer of the factor with the constitution of the first property at \$1992. The factor will be consisted on the factor of th

^{60.} Ist Fir Wg. 1WODO, Historical Result (1996). this chapter.

^{61 16:0}

30TH AIR DIVISION Number of Aircraft Dispersed

<u>Luite</u>	Asaslable	<u> </u>
po detable	lus	***
a Optobor	, U.Ö	*
7 Samerone	97	
1: November	101	4.4
11 November	150	

- Reduction in discussed almost the result of a distinguish of 527th Payator Group.
- ** Reflects withdrawal of interceptors to nois where obdegunation 18 hovesborn

Disjosition of Disporsed Forees as at 7 Kineman as-

base o	Lest	2,5 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1,
Sain	11	4 4
vola	3.19	*
Jula,	•	
46 × 11	© <u>0</u>	The second
11 <u>1</u> 5 17 17	438	$t = t - \epsilon$
S 1"	443	1
Cliates Leading	\$7	1 194

204

of afternice dispersal bases -- Helman. Clinton County and Capital -- paid off on October 22 when the weather premiors for use use of Yolk and restricted the use of Alpena. The accordance of Yolk and restricted the use of Alpena. The accordance of the dispersal bases were extensively equipped the basis of the original plan, the dispersal sites had easily a Phase I capability in October 1982. There are the according a Phase I capability in October 1982. There are the according to the according t

The dispersal bases in the 30th Region were noticed officer words, prepared to support an extended dispersal. The funds had been made available to provide the manning or equipment for even minor maintenance. No provision had been under the provide housing, ness facilities or recreation for the crows. Communications between the dispersal bases and the Sectors were frequently primitive. The Air National General

^{62. 30} AD 30-CVC, ω (persa) Briefing, DOC 20. (i.e., enapter.

als not make the men or, in many cases, the facilities of provide much assistance. Their obligation to provide mach assistance at all was not clearly defined.

Although the 'contingency operations' of occurrence November 1962 were a contingency not provided in the contingency not provided in the contingency not provided in the contingency of the Dispersal Plan, the problems were resource of the operations were ended to feve and mouse the people of the contingency of the problems. At Bulman, it meansple, ADL and the contingency of the fortunal attentions afond the contingency of the fortunal attentional Court.

By November 6, as has been inted. (1) ... (1) ... (1) ... (1) ... (1) ... (1) ... (2) ... (2) ... (2) ... (2) ... (2) ... (2) ... (2) ... (3) ... (2) ... (3) ... (3) ... (4) ... (4) ... (4) ... (5) ... (5) ... (5) ... (6) ... (6) ... (7) ... (7) ... (7) ... (8)

^{64.} See photos taken at Helman di Aureratt and eller of 319 FIS. 1 Nov 1962, DCC 22, this complete SAC class of dispersal at Helmin and motel accommodations.

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countries on October 25, 1962, and the base was you conrell operation. The mess hall, officers' open mess no cleaning and theater were spended. As a result, rightnings are set the ofth FIS cross there improved a man-

Although sollicient equipment, parts and has an personnel were elimately transported to the disjoint and makes nothing could be done about the operational makes there. The running of Habian was in poor to account the harrier was poorly placed — exceptionationes sold and the harrier was poorly placed — exceptionationes sold and the harrier to disjoint and the disjoint of the disjoint and there was from the disjoint and the disjoint and the respective with flore was and sold and the disjoint of the disjoint and the disjoint of the countries of the disjoint and the disjoint of the countries and the disjoint of the dis

Resistance seculities were indeequate as nowexistent. There wis an artifable sumpor at lowe,

[,] da. DB AD, Start Comming rates, 20 cm. in Comming Relation 200 cm. in the

^{66. 30} A5, Still weeting Notes, Outcome Dec. 2002 4, this chapter.

^{67. 30} AD 20 MDC Historical Revulational 20. 1615 chapter.

^{66. 30} AD, 30 AAC, Bistorical Resume, Dol D. Correlander.

but its doorway proved to be eighteen inches lower than it. ចំទ tertical stabilizer of an F-106. Providentially, the weather in October and November 1962 was mild. Although treezing temperatures occurred at Volk and Alpena, proc.pitulion can slight and extensive ice and show did not devails. Show removal was not, hence, a problem. Were important, leading and since maintenance could be necessible shed at the dispersal sites on the open ramps. If the dircruit had remained on dispersal on into the winter operattons would probably have been jeopardized. Of particular concern was the maintenance of the MB+1 receives he the dispersed aircraft. These weapons were supposed to a maintained at a certain temperature and no .eally adequate decides less available for keeping them warm world in this is Also in short supply at the dison an alert aircraft. pursui bases was heated storage for the ground support equipment (AGE). At Volk, for example, if the one names was to be used for aircraft maintenance, the AGE would have in be pushed but in the cold.



^{69. 30} AD. 30 MDC. Historical Resume. LOC 50, this chapter.

^{70. 36} AD, Stiff Leeting Notes, 23 Oct 1991. BOC 4 this chapter.

^{71. 343} For Gp, Historical Resume. DOI 17, this chapter.

Savination aids --

45/11

Million Co.

the c. persul bases allotted to the 30th Region did not meet this eriteria. The sometipal airports (see Moines Millian and Capital) were tairly well equipped but the some sational Goard bases (Volk and Albena) and the AF documents at Clinton County had only finited NAVAIDS. Moreover, Volk, Albena and Clinton County were folly operationally saying the sameer months when cannual training and county the Soth had requested that additional NAVAID equipment of the Dispersul countries and provided as a requirement of the Dispersul countries.

Headquarters asked ADC to provide mobile At: Force o, whose equion Service (AFCS) equipment (CCA or TACAN) and white for GDT - Volk and Clinton County. ADC was also writed to whit it could to expedite the installation of a programmed PAA VORTAC at C pital Airport in Springfield, Illinois.

^{72. 30} AD, 30 OAC, Historical Resume, DOC 10, Luke chapter.

The request for a separate TACAN at Clinton County w., rescribed on 5 November 1962, when it was deciment out the let down procedures established off the Patter-a. Lip format were adequate to the task. ESAF would not grain the request for the installation of GCA equipment at rotal and $\frac{73}{1200}$.

Communications -- Dispensed Bases. Communication between the Sectors and the dispersed consisted. An array cases of single, men-faction! lines. In the cases of the Chicago and Sault Sie Marie Sectors, there were no communication would permit the renorm of display anterior teletype to the dispersed bases. On 72 October 1982. A recept to fill region votes and refetype (TWA, viriging where required, ORION crypto systems were also anderso, two of the dispersed bases. These actions were fulled and a surgeony authority. The orders for TWX wervice were

^{73, 1}bia.

regardiated after the fact by ABC which found the TWX service \$74\$ to have been "neither warranted or justified.

Security. The scattering of thirty or forty fully could intercepture all over the countryside represented a Securit.

Oil are algorithm. Air Policemen were already in all adaptive and the security provisions such as fencing at all adaptives all alters left semething to be desired. The require hallow. For example, lay cheek by jost with a main hallow.

Guards for the dispersed aircraft were obtained to a the name bases and replaced by "augmentee" airmen entred from other assignments. As of October 26, there were select Policemen, and five trained augmentees on duty at the grape persal bases. Manying ind equipment (radios, vehicles) were marginal but all bases were regarded as meeting to requirements of ADCM 205-2.

The withdrawal of Air Policemen from the bakes to provide grantes for the dispersal sites, coupled with fine requirement of increased security precautions at all install to the fine spread the regular security forces protty torus.

^{74.} Ibid. The authority was ADC Supp 1 to AFM for-ED.

^{75.} Memo, 3001G-S > 30 CIG. Security of E spersed thire 26 bot 1932, DOC 24, this chapter.

^{76.} In October 1961 there were 759 Air Policemen

after the alreraft alert require, out was increased (1) and (1) and (2) in Japuary 1902, it was found (1) as continuously "borrow" Al. Policesed on Telepholic (1) (1) from the radar sites to potrol the flight limit of the obses. These hen were transferred to the bases (1) periods of (1), 60 or 90 days -- an expensive hold of the process.

The increased requirement for Sensurity Lives and all the Coban Crisis was met by putting the regular and all and all all the life nours on twelve nours off senseals and a grafting a number of trace to serve as 'adjustant's and a life course some problems. The 807th Fighter and all the life in the loss of presented to an all the suggested that the least number of all the suggested that the suggested that the suggested that the suggested the suggested that the suggested that the suggested the suggested that the suggested the suggested that the suggested that the suggested that the suggested that the suggested the suggested that the

[[]Cont'd] (AFSC 71XO) inthorrased in the LO AD'ham, consequed. As was noted, here than 10 per year of the dispersal cases.

^{78. 507} Fir Mg, Historical Resume, BOC 11. 1... chapter.

There were, during the Cuban Crisis, several accounts, all of which proved, upon investigation, to have been groundless. The most spectacular penetration occur of at the Daluth Sector Direction Center at 05002 on october to when a guard fired upon a figure which was alterparameter climb the fence. The whole system was altreed. Further, investigation, however, resulted in the conclusion that law introder was a large animal -- probably a bear.

This sabotage alert had repercussions from Bullio to the Pine Tree Line. When the alert klaxon went off at Bullion to example, the 11th FIS was unable to identify the signal and, deciding that discretion was the series part of valor, "flushed" the alert aircraft. While the situations was clarified and the F-106's recalled prior to become and borne, the incident led to changes in the alert kindle system at Duluth, designed to prevent a recommence.

Personnel on Dispersal. When the dispersal was induced on October 22, some 70 officers and 330 direct were industrial.

^{79.} Cu AD. 30 NGCC, Historical Resame, bod 9. Gas chapter.

^{80. 343} ftr Gp, Historical Resume. DOC 17; this chapter.

To live Lisponsial bases. With the sections deployment of the CST(a Fighter Group on October ST, dight differs and filleen adjust were withdrawn from Des Moines. When the 1st and Sista directal were satisfied by a Halad, to follow Cotaber ESta and November 6th, some that he mile with the prescript one were at Helman were moved to Valk.

November DO past before the dispensal ended, there is to different and Climic County.

While living condity as and recreational follows: at the dispersal sites were far from ideal, horals who has an included for the first few weeks. Attached, despite ruthtion, boreans organ to take its toll. The dispersal was attached of each after the matal quarantime of Cuba was lifted an outcome? 29 Marcover, there was no indication of this struction would list.

^{81. 30} AD. Staff Mooting Notes, Out 23. $\rm DOC(4)^{\circ}$ this chapter.

^{52.} As alleraft were recated from the displace their MB-1 weapons were normally, solived and long, on the represented abscraft. After the first two words it was necessary to rotate the nuclear weapons so that finer at the displaced lase could receive periodic maintenance. Hence, it November "Bazardous cargo" farry flights were daily events. These flights were ilight followed and rotated over less decisely opposities areas.

Salety. Conditions serrounding the dispersal operations were not conducted to safety. Interceptors, man, all them carrying maclear weapons, were rotated between the banks and the dispersal sites daily. Bankars, MANALOS and are racritities at the dispersal sites were, as man all material less than ideal. Nuclear compone were, by merevit, fundament at the dispersal bases with minimum congruences, and equipment.

On Divember T. for example, the Belieft model of its visited volk Field. He loans a moment of active renores which "manpered title effect veners and Rule of the coperation) of an all-weather interceptor force of an interceptor force of a communities were the lack of a GCA unit almostic force suppression equipment (belief perfect), runway overrans, adentify the active approach active approach active experience and the perfect despites active and the communities of explosive despites active active active active (EGD) and recreation facilities.

^{88.} Detroit AD: Ristories Resure, DOC 6, this country.

a 20-hor. Class. They also recommended that the ramps of Clints. County be kept swept a d that a jet parrier by 84 installed.

Moreover, in the timel analysis, the sainty occurs at the dispersal bases was excellent. The lines are saint aperiod, already dispribed, that occurred at Helland and occurred at the land and settled to the charactery operations.

10. Strategic Air taxoned Dispersal. Or Colour and 1905, the day redlowing the dispersal of ACC without Suppressed its beneath. This development convolution of suppressed and selections of a shock to the air desertion of a shock to the air desertion of a shock to the air desertion of a simple little or no coroning SAC 8-47 allegant indicated of suppress and bases in the Soth Region. On the District Milwholes. Helman and Clinton County. A 5-47 and a sufficient supert to hide, the presence of the County.

^{64. 50} CLA MALO, Disposal 2a vs. 26 NAV 1811. ... BO this chapter. 50 IDC Historical Research 1800 to this computer.

^{85. 36} CSA. There were two other district of the state between 22 Oct and 27 Nov. An F-10 burned up at Wertwart. (445 FIS) on November 6 when the cap on the external than failed and spilled fuel rate the air intake. As II FIS I-rule ran into the barrier at Dullth on 11 Not when the prior aborted his takenit but woolen's step the aird in time.

the Confespal airports in Daluth and Milwackee and .) and staced by the local press.

Informati a Officers in the 30th Region were on in a position to explain \$50 activities; boing rather and on the situation themselves. As a result, scaling the us "Four Mystery Bor ers at Milwankee, " and " A t a ... drive Hore...R ported y Armed." The B-47% of trunked themselve. In in Milwhuked but also like a dispersed interceptors of Schman and Clinton Control adding to the woes of the Air Guard and Air Jones (which e units who had must new invited now expected citizen it is In addition to the four bumbers at Milwhuhee, loss of him und toer at Clinton County leight 8-47's arrived in bull or 5.74% on October 25. The resulting situation of account put it, idefinitely resulted from a law of the agreements and Depretantion " The eight by bers in . . . 507th Bomb ling, Lincoln. Hobraska and the 45 bill in , John nois reame as a complete supprise to the Dainin manaci, a Airport and to the Minnesota Air National Cause Unit

^{38.} Capital Times (Madison, Wise), 24 Oct 1502

^{57.} Milwaukee Journal (Ethwaukee, Wise), 24 Cet 1967.

also became evident that the incoming personnel were not one of local conditions such as hazardous runways and taxiways and taxiways and taxiways and the scarcity of housing and mess facilities."

The SAC aircraft were parked in the Air National Guard area as the ramp and taxiways would not sustain their weight that and fighters were moved to a closed running. Reflecting, transportation, security, messing and cillettic were provided, not without difficulty, by the base. Research bedding were flown in from Richards-Gebaur and E. I Sawyer. SAC personnel were first billeted in the base Mymnasium and were later moved to a downtown notel.

^{65 340} Fth Gp. Historical Mischel BOC 17 (1015) Mark

^{89%} Dulwth MSS, Historical Resume, DGC 13, ph.schapter.

^{90. 343} Ftr Op, Historical Resume, DOC 17, this chapter. A second and more significant problem which was related to the unexported SAC dispersal was that or identification. The SGth Region did not in Oct 1962, passess all

DULLING UNDER Gray of

The (we BOMARC "B" Air Defense Missile Squadrons (Abas) usnighed to the 30th Region -- the 37th and the 74th -- normally kept 20 to 28 of their 29 authorized in the ready storage. Their operationally ready rate was continuously very close to 100 per cent. There was continuously ready rate was continuously very close to 100 per cent. There was continuously ready rate was continuously common for improvement under an advanced state of accordance of agreement and advanced state of accordance of the operational status within a formal and amintained a very high commat ready race continuously and amintained a very high commat ready race continuously and amintained a very high commat ready race continuously and amintained a very high commat ready race continuously and amintained a very high commat ready race continuously and amintained as very high commat ready race.

The S7th ADAS at Kineneroe, for example, and I. missizes in ready storage at the " o." o. " o. was closed. The oil the four missiles and available were enact, in shelter scaling coefficient, on, Epother was hid Grade. The meady for Supply (NORS). Of the two missions of the shelters under modification, one was returned in It rafe in one had not the other in two adapta and within ten hours the NORM missile was prought one

[[]Cont'd] of the SAC struke route (Aformation necessary to provide "sage passage" for the SAC already through the drades system. This problem is discussed in detail in this charter.

The 28th Weapon Became available on October 24th July required part (a target seeker system) was received in the manufacturer. Thereafter the 37th kept to the results as a system of the duration of the lines. In late October ADC was asked to provide an additional discussion of the target for each squarron so that they might put their bring massile in operational configuration.

The bOistic units also increased security products and provided 24 maintenance security. As a level with a good notice of persons on the site occurs. And high that the demand for sleeping facilities and received vice was higher than normal. The BONARC site ways and a considerable distance from their adjusts the security and Kineneloe and the prolonged devanced since the remaining readiness demonstrated contain delicity to the support system.

4 E. 15.

^{91. 37} ADES. Historical Research DOC 57. 1.115 (.........)

 $^{92.-36~\}text{AD},~36\text{-MDC},~\text{Historical Resume},~\text{200}~\text{Bi},~\text{this emapter},$

the squadron was, ich i ree days, anable to get additional rations from Kincholoe simply because no procedure had even been established for providing additional rations under sach circumstances. After this experience the unit took of the control of the control

The additional manhour requirements of the cathodist materials placed a heavy burden on the personnel of occur, the missile squadron. The D7-m recommended, which is a caparience, that their wartime augmentation is indiced and tional cooks, drivers, air police, massile and tenance efficers, electronic maintenance can burners. See technicians, launen area personnel and civil engineering 54 maintenance types.

MIND

The NIKE batteries in the 30th Region cool actions.

U. S. Army Air Defense Command), like the boson's united prints
ally maintained a high state of readiness. The increase in
air defense readiness and not, therefore, Peschi in any
momentous changes in their operations. Security presentions

(G-2) were increased. All batteries kept more than low

^{93. 37} AURS Eistorical Resume. DeC 27, this visibles

^{94.} Ibid.

...

mornal neasonr of men on the site. Tome installations and your personnel living and sleeping in the launch areas.

when the emergency developed, the Army made an error; to bring all tire units undergoing maintenance or max_{ij} eatien up to operational condition. $(2k_i)$

the units were permitted only 45 nours of the Darge star maintenance. Nearly 100 per cent of the NYRD method, were maintained "\$\frac{1}{2}\gamma\rightarrow\ \frac{1}{2}\gamma\rightarrow\ \frac{1}{2}\gamma\rightarrow

The Annual Service Practices (SMAP) were a manual

AIR NATIONAL CEASES . AS THE CUBAN CRISIS

The relationship between the Dith Regiment of the Margonni Goding (ASG) units therein was beth congression.

^{95.} S Rgm. ARADCOM, Misterical Reports. D. L. C. Compoter.

^{96. 30} Rgn. Stail Mtg Notes, 31 Oct 1962, 560 4, tage enapter.

^{97. 1}bid., 14 Nov 1962.

491

table. The four ANG fighter interceptor squadrons in the measure -- the 179th at Duluth, the 124th at Des Moines, the 176th at Traix and the 151st at McGee-Tyson -- had an Maha; assignment to the 20th NORAD Region. The 30th Air Diri ion (Ends.) had a responsibility to inspect these units and a supervise their training. There were, also, some example and factical Fighter Squadrons (TYS) with an description of the Sound to the Soth Region. Meither the Division and angle in the day responsibility for the training of these units.

^{98, 30} A5, 30-OOP, Historical Resume, DOC 1, this chapter

the 325th, however, the 176th FIS (ANG) was the only unit on alort at Truax.

The 124th FIS (ANG) at Des Moines began conversion area F-sdE's to F-89J's in April 1962. This unstants much therefore, combat ready in October 1962 when the Cobbb Crisis began. A combat capability evaluation was note because 14-17, 1967 and the unit was found to be expensed to performing its mission and was declared conset some

It the ASG FIS units were not affected of the increase in air deferse readiness, the ASG personnel at total and a condition were. As a result of the dispersal of SEC and the same cases) SAC aircraft, the ASG personnel parties at these bases were called upon to perform a support familiar for union they were neither manned nor equipped. Although there was initially some confusion when the dispersal acts craft arrived, (sometimes unannounced) the Guard case and for the coverfully assume the additional burden. The contents of the coverfully assume the additional burden.

^{99, 30} AD, 30-CIG, Historical Resume, 500 24, 1,15 chapter.

^{100.} The unexpected arrival of the 11 FIS actuat nector Fld. on 22 Oct apparently three confusion into the ranks of the ANG thore. Support there was considered to be ranked out." 340 Fir Go. Historical Resume. DOC 17. this charter.

224

THE GROUND ENVIRONMENT . " 51"

The Cuban Crisis and the increase in Air belows $6 \geq e^{2r} \qquad \qquad \text{did not have as great an impact of the pround environment as it did upon the lighter units.}$

The Combat Center established a Command Position October 21, 1962, which was manned 24 hours a which, a minimized antil November 28. The Combat Center and the Direction Center Buttle Staffs were fully manaced on control 22. This position was manifestined for a period of the Staffs of Staffs and the Staffs were such that the Staffs were such that the Staffs were such that the Combat 22 all conjunctions are such such that simplex operation with a five minute record of the second of the Bormston to allow maintenance and contour of the second of

because of the silm manning at the room only the constraint barden. The constraint barden. The constraint placed their personnel on 15 or 30-mannie recall the constraint all degrees and recalled son they personnel from the constraint.

^{101. 30-8000,} Buty Officers Log. 21 Oct = 28 N DOC 9, this chapter.

most site personnel worked a seven-day week during the 102 crisis and many worked twelve-hour shifts.

Security precautions were increased. Additional parallel posts were cannot, alternate Sabotage Alert teams increased and area lighting increased. Many units conformation with local civil decembe and law enforcement agencies and local civil decembe and law enforcement agencies. Some units prepared and stock in the cylindran shelters for personnel and their accordance. Others sandbagged or otherwise improved the faile-out production of their operations beildings so that site in these courses by all the course of the contract on in the event of nuclear failed.

All radar units provided 24-had, communications an electronies unintenance. East of the gap titles do not be, a made with maintenance personnel. Beyond ties, and has little that the Radar Squadrons (SAGE) could do not primary function was the security and the maintenance of the radar and communications equipment on the six.

^{102.} Historical hospids, Radar and ACas Scienciscos, 509, DOC 29, this chapter: 661, DOC 30, this chapter: 665, DOC 32, this chapter: 676, DOC 34, this chapter: 693, DOC 35, this chapter: 676, DOC 34, this enapter: 693, DOC 35, this chapter: 707, DOC 36, this chapter: 752, DOC 37, this chapter: 753, DOC 38, this chapter: 754, DOC 35, this chapter: 755, DOC 46, this chapter: 755, DOC 46, this chapter: 755, DOC 42, this chapter: 755, DOC 42, this chapter: 756, DOC 45, this chapter: 756, DOC 46, this chapter: 751, DOC 46, this chapter: 751, DOC 46, this chapter: 751, DOC 47, this chapter: 758, DOC 46, this chapter: 31, DOC 47, this chapter.

The ACER units on the Pine Tree Line were not just of the SAGE system and still had a control function. A. such installations full surveillance and control massis. was maintained throughout the emergency. These commen were not but not without difficulty. The seven-may area and twelve-hour shifts began to affect morale. A security cant derivate new as far as many field units were constitut. was the virtual Absence of intelligence information, to the auticipated operation of "Fig. 1618 a. cuticial information was not felt in the line was alter the government acciared itself satisfied that i Solvets had removed their missiles from Cuba character 2. and listed the quarantine the popular press win . (Ser' broiled Salitelant justilized for ter 'come alien of the advanced State of air between their recounted working lithout smalls with or the collegalt to badrastand why this entraordance of timued to be necessary. If their cliebts were and justified lacy were noter told why.

was one observer at a Price Tree ACAS sinc cise into 103

> ...throughout this entire period, except its colorations craining, all business went on a usual That is, normal daily military routine was mattetained. The maintenance of guards and appropriated

^{103.} EDS ACEM Sq. Physical Result is and in this



. ...

p. C. crews caused a considerable drain on manpower available to periors the necessary roatise dottes. Although the situation was met and air personnel performed additional duties without mestitation, it became obvious that the increases alort posture would be most difficult to maintain for an extended period of time.

Another serious problem grew throughout the build-up period and that was one of morale. It soor grew obvious to all personnel by same is media that the Cuban Crisis was cooled and that he threat existed, yet we remained an a aga state of alert. The alert build-op some and its meaning because all personnel could carrie see the discrepancy between the actual world situation and the state of alert of the forces. Forthermore, there was no intelligence information to indicate that the might stall an alart should be maintained. The overall effectiveness of this unit would have been greater had the states of alert followed Lord closely the world situation as indicated on hows sources and intelligence reports.

Some of the rathr squadrons (SACE) were stated.

Coccur Manual Control Centers under the Back by faces of a second control (BUIC) Plan. Shall this program was earliers of the control centers would have the communications and equipment to manually control lighters in a Mode of the SACE) environment. In October 1962, nowever, additionally a fits early stages and name of the Control Centers as operational. Some of them did made the supreme of the animal alimited manual expability during the every method.

[Cont'd] empter: : >ne point 3: Rgn latelligence queeto NGRAD on why information appeared on the News Service acceptance at became available (hough latelligence community DO UES, distor cal Resonce, DOC 46, this chapter.

on Garange 22, 1962 the G92nd Cada: Squadron (SAGL) as passed ite. Minne oth, had most of the equipment was some to function as an alternate manual control center but a con-.. the newly installed equipment had not been connected cared or tested and personnel training had not been conthe Commission Lt Colonel Lindoury, decided by actain on operational capability as sons as washing issued, a tuber 29 a vertical plotting board had from here and parated, equipment was connected, peaked and terrain manage, open tion creas were chosen, duttes and job' docwere as allested and ablance of responsibility we delice used. At the paint the unit was prepared to operate an inequency in a Edit IV BUIC configuration site . . use such any identification capability. After consent . . beman . receive identification intermedia ... Link Direction Center.

on October 27 the 692mv [1.5] (1900) in the control of their time (1.5)

^{10. 692} Hdr Sq. Hiltorical Research Each 10.3 Secure of the Secure of th

District no criticalic instances of sabotace conversed of the District during the Coban Crists, there is a continuous coles alares. The excitement occasioned in the court of Deleth, already mentioned, resembled the miss of the first on system and resulted to underes if sabotace alors the coles being the coles form to peeted, fully arread, rate the cold. A cole of sites also sufficied occasional and to propre monthly ones loss on terminant loss of communical money in the cole of the

When the 912th lost contact with the State Sin North Anther on Geinber 25, the Sile commander got through the common falline and made arrangements for a C-17 to third even the Station as a communications (milital rosline. Although the telephone communications have restored where this idea could be implemented, the idea was filled and for future reference.



^{103.} P13 ACRR. Historical Resume. DOC 47. this

140

In addition to the additional manhours required to. haird duty and increased maintenance, a few radar units were subjected to personnel levies to support the some... deployment or the dispersal program. The "lst at Self. for example, sent two senior directors to florida and and Thorn at Believille, Illinois loaned two weapons controlled to that it installation at Fey West. The Tolk: Squadron at Rockville. Indiana assumed the responsibility for supporting the dispersed aircraft and cross as more as Field in Terre Haute, Indiana. From October 20 t. s. 1962, the radar squadron provided cooks, rations, rank. tovels, soap, BX service and recreational equipment is a the The 782nd also turnshed a complete copacipersonnel at Hulman. 107 rechnician for Bulman. The 755th at waterie, i.e. the took TDY to Rickville and a crysto strain to the contra to Assist the dispersed forces there.

As a result of the Count Crisis some model.

^{106. 661} Rdr Sq. Historical Resume. LOC Dec. 1. Seasyter: 798 Rdr Sq. Historical Resume. DOC 16. This complex.

^{107. 782} Rdr Sq. Historical Resume. DCC 41. 1.45 chapter.

^{1 168.} Tim Rev Sq. Ristorical Resume 1000 40 (circulary)

operations during the emergency. Other modifications of contributat conversions were pushed to provide an injunction societificate or control preture. For example, DLS (journal decision) was peliped at Lowther (C-119) and the installation of ECP-91 at Stock Lookaut (C-16) was also as so that the WECO testing could be accelerated and leavest downers at the accelerated and leavest downers capability at the Pine Troc Line had restrict a concession could be booked.

The ground environment of the SOUR Region (1), ...

... a commondable fasaion curing the entire period (1), ...

... a.c. 12-November 27, fo32). Radic performance (1), ...

... a.c. 14-14-15 mind (1), ...

... a.c. 14-14-15 mind (1), ...

... could be presented -nowed considerable initially (1), ...

... coulty in excepting the System operating and in coult (1), ...

... a.c. 2-rangements to provide for all possible (1), ...

WHITHER SAC

when the Joint Chiefs of Staff proceed an incanera state of alert for all United States military forces on

^{100 30} AD, 30-0AC Ristorical Resque. (kg/ 16 1135 chapter.

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which that the diagon of war had increased the control states of its allies would in the mass, where the control states of its allies would in the mass, where it is allies would in the mass, which would state the mass of control of the control o

The Coban Crimis developed when the action of the middle of this transition. Commonwell in the state of the ShiB's (Strike Route into the commonwell into the state) commonwell into the state of the commonwell into the state of the commonwell into the complete commonwell into the creation sheets necessary to complete the middle commonwell into the complete commonwell into the complete commonwell into the complete complete complete commonwell into the complete complete

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∠b; P . . . CHAINING AND THANSPORT

The ident status actually obscious several coefficients during the Cuban Crisis. Prior to october 12: 1:62

At labox on wetober 22m.

the Continental his Defense Communit (CONAD) 🤔 5 , 75

The E0702 CDNAD ordered $(-6.5)^{1/2}_{100}$ nor $(0.5)^{1/2}_{100}$ nor $(0.5)^{1/2}_{100}$ notes. Followed suct in 17042 or detailer 24. The horizoner 370 works $(2.5)^{1/2}_{100}$

This condition was maintained until November 27

-non Agg 1 5 77 After November 27

m -- 4

action as its interceptors from the dispersal master.

Transpar On October 22 when the

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The Borner

Poisson inflating a simulated input for an occasion, or income particle was too b ratiole to concemptate. The concemptation of the concentration of the concentration.

Continue above, a continue of the solution of

111. MINICON was ordered on 22 Oct and fire a constant sold on the Sound of the

512. 3 Bgs, Bo-son His correct Resauc, Dr. 50 (1)thaptor Stati ata Bates. 91 t St Oct. (20 4) Pr.

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Conclusion of the 1914 Separation of the 1914 AND of the 1914 AND OF THE SERVICE OF THE SERVICE

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After the alere colors

^{110. 1013.}

^{114 36} AD, C16, Bistorical Resume, EGC 94, (115 chapter.

" D 11"

file Stimulion Complete Co.

unition introducer T when all defense readings, subjective ($^{46}\mathcal{O}/^{25}$

The maintenance of such a complex afert selection demanding. It could also be confusing. To quote the comment on the highest three selections of the dispersor, bases

" 5 1:

^{115. 340} Ftr $G_{\rm P}_{\rm F}$ Historical Reduce. 200 11. In schapter.

"51"

This problem was partially resolved arm to the contact of aircrait and discress rotation between the dispersal bases and the more base. Their this system can aircrait as flown every 72 hours. However, even the conceptual only about 25 per cent of normal schemeser. The respection of some sort of flight training was conceptual to the staff was relactant to train out of the compensal three which systems for the staff was relactant for the normal schemes.

761

Assuming root developed in reference to the scape loading feeled who accompanied the let Fighter with detachment to Paterick SFB, Florida, evidency weapons law-.

^{116. 30} AD, Staff Meeting Noes, 31 Oct 1962 (AC) .

11 and less their qualification under the proficiency 117 foreign requirements for neclear weapons.

Transport. A critical factor in the success of the appearant and the southern deployments was the air transmissort. Although the dispersal bases were all supported an partity added transport, most of the personnel and majorate each entry and transport resources were heavy. The bases and only appearance alternative deployment alternative used to pick up parts and only a the dispersal sites. The units deployed to Figure 1 have every depended meanify upon airlift furnished by the above top, or Squadron at Riemards-Gebaur and the 4611 Support 118 Squadron from Stewart APS.

The demands placed upon air transport by the dispersal is indicated by the records of the two C-47 directors a signed to the 507th Fighter Wing at Kincheloe. Between Cotober 32 and November 22 these aircraft carried space Low personal and 28,075 pounds of cargo between Kincheloe and Alpena

^{117.} ADCM 136-1, para 3-7. Ist Ftr Wg, Historical Resume, DOC 3, this chapter.

^{115.} For a detailed log of all transportation requirements during this period, see the transportation Statification Registers in the 30-MDC Resume, DOC 25, into chapter.

200

The sec saity for obtaining dirlift on a few nodes motice resolved in some memorable scrambles and a few argitrary revisions of priorities. The lst Fighter wing sea consumed by ADC and the Division for diverting a C-320 octonsing to the 4650 Support Squadron from a scheduled life resolved fine to supporting the dispersal to Hulbert.

control the deployment and the dispersals were a quitely supported, the Cuban Crists demonstrated that the areality resources were none too large to support an element to several entering and dispersal.

riv. Let fir $\sigma_{\rm R}_{\rm R}$ Historical Resonat DOC 1. Incomplete.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE 32ND AIR DIVISION (SAGE)

Бv

Jean Bartin

"Caurantine of Cauc." Even before the term of the analysis massehold word, interceptor elements - some of squaders strength - of other air division and CONAD regions person Dand units in the deployment to Florida air bases. The initial augmentation of the ADC interceptor force, which can sisting of the four F-100's of Detachment legislike first at homestead, was ordered by ADC on 10 October. Similarities directed by the Command was a considerable increase of the number of EC-121D "Constellations" of the EcCoy-based Model.

^{1.} Esg. ADC, ADCCR 62-261, 19 Oct 1962.

outher missed with, Mechellan AFB. Collifornia, as well as the clother's jurent wing at Otis A.B. On 21 October two more sometage, also discontant series interceptors were alerted with the first series of modes of receipt of wells; but unders which were dispute, of the same day.

The post three days, therefore, the B2nd CONAD herical pasts of the F-lad the day burner and of F-lad the day burner and of F-lad the day burner and of F-lad the day burner, and advanced to Fortion and and her section, in addition, it has expect to Fortion and and her section. The Balance of the burner and the West NAS Placed on the day the Typical Alb Florida, during the same period section, and Toolid Barts the got F-lab threedoms and six F-TY-152's, the two-sear version of the TH-lad Expects of

The day preceding the Presidential Televisia, a...
Faire Courses the SSNS COUNTY Region established Cobib List
Force DS and Octabasent 1. COMB Pask Force SS with manu5
Sourcers at any west and Homestenn. Colonel Table 1.12...

³ Log ARC, ADCCK 61-203, in Get 1963

^{0.} Mag ADC, ADCCR 62-272. 21 Oct 1962: Mag 41%). ADCCR 62-274. 21 Oct 1982.

^{4.} NOADS May MCOOP+6 2182, 22 Oct 1962. Although this may was classified TS, its contents are eited because later "Scorer" status reports prejures by 82 AD AMA revenues the balas information.

^{5. 33} CR 00-11, 21 Oct 1652, 800 11, this country.

Lower and Colonel Paul H. Kenney took the nels of the statement

mirriedly originated, and dith only a handful of []. held signed. The two new meddysarters were small, him of the case, to be writty of the name, but not, as every more that to small to tachle the bigosides []. Since the small to tachle the bigosides []. Since the allege the provident with Castro's Cold theory to the Select pullistic intestic and nuclear bounce pullish in the Carrobean fellow security.

Curat 1 45% Force 52

Considerat force 32 aux established by upport of national detense reasures about to a plant to a stabilished by upport to a stabi

^{€. ·} ibig.

^{7. 32} AL SO T-1931, Et Got 1962, DOC 12, this complete.

taken to meet the Soviet areas believed in Cuba. Cent...

continuously plans for military operations under the object.

continuously the Seminador-in-Chief Atlantic Floot (Cibinota
man and open made, and CONAD participation in the Processor of

cuiton was first discussed by the commanders embody to the

Communities of the second of them that what continuously the

conformation part activities that the contract of contraction in the

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SHEEL OF 18 October Supprepriate political .
Cinciliar, CinCAPLEAST and CONAD plans took effect (2000).
5.112 was ordered to Key West Green, on 20 October

with the responsibility for them existed in a vector community of the comm

Lares contestable. Secure field officer.

o. Although evidence is made Fere to TS field operation Plans objects and Statell and Statell Colors. Large, the drives can spelled out in corresponding made the jurisdiction of the commandar-in-edition and the forces (CINCAFLANT). CSAF component command in the circumstance forces assigned to CINCLANT. Acting in the circumstance of commanders are now advanced in adaptations for the fact of a successive force of the second at Homestend AFE. CONAD plans circumstance is seen and acting a superscaled by CONAD to State 1-62 and 2-67 anion was superscaled by CONAD to State 3 Nov 1902.

^{9.} Col Diliz "Narrative Report of Table First of Operations, 19 Oct to 1 Dec 1992," to Cad. RANGE but 10 title chapter, belose otherwise indicated by documental cititions, too summary of CTF 32 operations is unsed in information contained in Col Diliz report and 52 nd miss incompared by 50 Diliz at MoADS, 14 Dec 1862.

manual cound Tubic Force of commander. A notes trainer onpassed to the CONAR CC ("EnchNSTONE") served film us all
monagonators and alcoping quarters to assure his available,
to the control center commander 24 hours a day, or 25 c. one. Et. Cylonel S. J. Kirschbaum, chief of the offine Assuments by a great decimal trainer, joined the causalmanuals at its cherations officer.

the problems including the Cask large were as will force and position of 118 Community? unitents and purposes, Colonel Biltz' tracers مستنده لمغلمه بالكا المعلية فالمركان أبارها المعدولة فالموادي والمرازيين Don't CONAD Legion and LOADS in the Key West with. initiation it was the local paint for he compainment California, CINCLAPIANT alla Codda last operationes The discount of the Later States والمرابعة فالأنا فالمنساط فالمالي والاستراء فالمنطق فيعكن فالمنطي وليا ಎನ್ನು ಬರಕಾರ ಬಿಡಗಳಿಗೆ ಮುಖ್ಯ ಮುಂದು ಬರುವುದು ಬರುಗಳಿಗೆ ಬರುಗಳಿಗೆ ಬರುವುದು ಬರುವುದು ಬರುವುದು ಬರುವುದು ಬರುವುದು ಬರುವುದು ಬರುವ 000 والم المن المناشنية والمنازية عالم 12.... nted battalics whole four butteries were integrands DEDWASTORE" environment subsequent to the outland. us 24 Quicker, . 10

TO. May Inc ARADCOMMENT Equipment of the CC D. ...

because of the proportions the air traffic and now reached, hertier the split control nor the system of inciderelation has differive any longer. To overcome the advensathe the CINCLAST and CINCMEANT representatives alreed to prince their execut aircraft under the operations, come-Not of Colod Tank Force 32 and the CCC. Recom operationa the occer and gentimed to be the responsibility "(Addes)" in one instance of departure from fair account went the CIACAFIANT representative learned the ingolinion of compacting with the CONAD tuck force. Attempts and somethic interceptors dering instrument light relation which we conditions, he tends that is the absence of a con-والمراج والمتدارية والمتال المنافع والمنافية المنافية المنافية والمنافية وال the fathering and thought taken is designed inclined to be a place from the Pane As a caseff of this angless access included the placed amies COMD task toric estimate the Control of the Launen, difficing COAM Able process. بالمامية بموضعتها الإستان والسا

This operational relationship between Checker, according to the sas successfully continued of the the earlier of continued of the first of the continued operations and Colonel Diltz' return to also morning during as NOADS deputy for operations. In his narrative apport he painted out that, although close out those of the continues the income had been count insert to the

Insocited with the CCC of day Nest against the John Air neconnaissance Control Center (January) and applicated of the Newy, shared the CONAL facility.

Assume that the Control of all reconditions of the Challest and Olicardant - as well as their reconditions. In addition to tracking those injury. If the instantial dir Defense Investigation done the Challest also agentified these flights for the conduction to the Conduction and the Conduction to the Abig. The system assumed that the conduction that the Conduction the Conduction and the Cond

^{11.} Wag 32 OR. 32000P 0005, "Plum for integration main Battalian in to the Defense of May West," 23 out room May 02 OB, 32000P 10160 citing CINCOAD approval of plum 1. Now West 000, 24 Oct 1983, DOC 15 Jack Chapter.

^{12.} May USCR, CROOP 1140 to CTr C2, 4 Ker 1645 to C 16, this chapter.

of the arc traffic under its control. This situation was comparations which meshes comparations which meshes compared to exercise. "BROBESTONE," as a result, had to exercise the another and borden of having to screening CONAD and account of a private to private the result of private to private the account.

conditions to air Commons (SAC) alteralt engaged in Table ...

missions. This became necessary when the SAC limit condition in the set was vitherast on TO October, leaving the rost to set in vitterast on TO October, leaving the rost to set in teletype transmissions of SAC (limit plans).

missages were invariably late, making it impossible to decide were invariably late, making it impossible to sacround and taken to insure that the identification of the capture was taken to insure that the identification of the capture was taken to insure that the identification of the capture was to be made in intercepts to the late that shows the capture was to be made in intercepts to the increasing the execution was to fact that shows the receptors were not intention lly accomption on and are cruftic they were went aloft to identify only "darkaments."

^{13.} M.; MOABS, MNOOP-W 2266, "ID Passes on SAC Allegatt," 7 Nov 1962, DOS 17, this chapter.

The intercepts were made by the F-4B's and F-4B's of the Nuvy's VF-41 squadron and VFAW-3 detachment, with procedures calling for the lock-on mode. Colonel Dritz, electrone, queried CONAD to determine if the no lock-on in tructions constituted a change in the standard practices of these interceptors. Not ply was received. The Conal-SaC difficulties were resolved when a SAC representation octable? To key best and maintained a direct telephone in the mes command headquarters for flight plan information.

But unother impasse in identification bright.co...

Considering up between "TARPON" and "BROWNSTONE." The constraint during the sharp rise in CISCLAST and Cinclastant reconstraints at the end of October. Buth obtained were daily conducting from five to eight lost altitude "The Noon" missions over western Cook. Institute as many in 12 to 24 estort fighters on patrol 10 to 30 tries south of the ADIZ. The CINCLANT hiromatt were vontroited by the JARCO: CINCLANT's, however, were under a control at all. CONAD interceptors under "BROWNSTONE" otherwalls too, were in the same general area against SILP's, while other recon and hir-sea researc planes were engaged in their respective tasks in 1815 vicinity.

Recause of the proportions the air traffic had now reached, neither the split control nor the system of identifirstion was effective any longer. To overcome the adversitics, the CINCLANT and CINCAFLANT representatives agreed to place their escort aircraft under the operational control of CONAD Task Force 32 and the CCC. Recon operations. on the other hand continued to be the responsibility of "TARPON." In one instance of departure from this arrangemen, the CINCAFLANT representative learned the importance of cooperating with the CGNAD task force. Altempting to scramble interceptors during instrument flight rule (IFR) weather conditions, he found that in the absence of a TAC-Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) "Agreement for Fighter-Intercents Operations," instrument take-off clearance had to be obtained first from the FAA. As a result of this incident, CINCAULANT aircraft were placed under CONAD task force commander's control prior to launch, chilizing CONAD AF10 procedures without exception.

This operational relationship between CINCLANT, AFLANT and CONAD was successfully continued until the end of the contingency operations as Colonel Dille, resure to his normal duties as WOADS deputy for operations. In his narrative report he pointed out that, although of the out lines at responsibilities between the forces had been established in the

and a plane, no such provisions existed in press when your medianted operations became necessary. Colonel L.D. Force 32 semabled, controlled and results with the force 32 semabled, controlled and results. This has wrote, led to the task force becoming the results and colonel the "conduct actual anilitary operations" has been colonely of the United States."

THE GROUND ENVIRONMENT

The normal Nude I condition in MOADS is the Second SAGE Linual concept of operations in which the the factor of the second areas the represented by Key West and Jacksondillo

Letter's CC is located on M-114 and manned by the UT:

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Radar Squadron. Until 17 December, were the second ...

SAGE approximatel by means of its FST-2. Backsondillo .
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turned its Manual area responsibilities.

^{14.} The 679th, fermerly an ACM squadron, was co-designated on 1 Oct 1962. One month later its Det 1. Pairies AFE, became the 32nd Alm Div's 645th Radam Squadron.

^{15. 679}th RADROA distorted Report, Oct-Beg reak on 114 with USAF Ristorical Division, McCaell Arb. Alc.

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Jose I reporting processed braked the Rey Leaf in Joseph and Cults directly to the SACE direction control control of the steat of a Made (1) = 1. Indicate AFB, and only in the event of a Made (1) = 1. Indicate of a constituent of they report to the John Miller of the John Silverion center-Europe (SEC-8) at Typical AFB. The companies of Course Contingency speciations, nowever, a permittine of the Contingency speciations, nowever, a permittine of the Contingency specialisms, resource of the Contingency specialisms, resource of the Contingency specialisms (BEOMASTERN) which is continued to the Con

^{17.} The Modes with options and masters of territorial assigned to CCC's are outlined in Operational Configuration. Annex, DOC 18, this enapter, which has been extracted for a MASES Operation, Plan 1-60, 12 Get 1982, inter segment of the MASES Operation, Plan 1-60, 12 Get 1982, inter segment of the MASES Operation, Plan 1-60, 28 Nov. 1982.

is. jugdin See 100 14, this chapter, On paint

Atternsis onse, the CCC was still located in a parameter operations shelter specied adjacent to the parameter control room which was then being removater. The controlessal maty FPS-07 search radar, too which is warm model, attens. Travers "ERGWESTONE" to depend on in Joseph sort and related engapement supplied and installs. The controlessal room with the specialisms shells.

Temperary stillimition of the modele facility lassifiest recommended by the S2nd Air Division in 21 Sequence to be security repairs of the FPS+37's unternal drive system. The S2nd's recommendation met with the approval of active systems.

[[]Cont'd] "Marrative Report of Task Force 32 Operations, In Oct - 1 Dec 1982," horeafter cited as CTF 32 Sarrative.

²⁰ . Mag 32 AD, 52 OAC 659 to Cade KNEST, Σ_1 be, held bot 20 , this complete.

111

particl colerned, including TAC and ESAF. The forces will a compatible considering the peed of a compatible printiple colors of Colors (colors best witch, with the codition of all colors (colors) and finder colors in fact, organized late, newered by arrangement between CONAD and TAC, the Colors colored to precise many back-up for "BROWNSTONE" through the critical period of contingency operations.

can be desirable the CCC was book on the air inc. In can be also be an analysis of the PPS-07 and Free-order of the PPS-07 and Free-order of the was a surked separation of the temperature presents and examples of the conditions will pro-curious in the accelerated temperatures.

In line with previous degisters, its dual communication for the CTFs to Equation and the COSAD CT was discrete and the COSAD CT was discrete and the COSAD CT was discrete and the Cosan source source and the Cosan Section Section Edward Edward Cosan Section Section Edward Cosan Section Section

TAC isg DCC+2 (211: "Operation of TAC Cut with a sest MAS," to CI. CONAD, 1 Nov 1952, DCC 21; they complete.

^{32 32} NR CO-10, "Change in Command of Key West NO.AC CC," 19 Oct 1962: DOC 22, this chapter.



....

sent controller slots were filled by Majors Debitt Calified Jr.: W. E. Grr: John 2. Ford [111], and helps E. eller. Their arrival at Key West between 19-21 Consecution, the manning of the senter controller's familian in a 24-neurs-4-day basis.

galomer McTargant and the four cappers hereby sponminute one influx of personnel being assigned to the offofficer (DY or as personnel party). The already overconduinguities were thus further strained, and while see Secmis juried when the operations soon was extended in the million, the relief was negligible.

There then eatering the iner use of personnel line in the view of confidentions and electronics (IME) and it will not not not also a TaC AN, TRC-60 Tropospheric Scatter Commission System between the life and Homestead AF Base, and occurred in ACC on 19 October, USAF approved the project to the second that the Boschannel system wasted commission divides not seen CONAR and TAC, and that the commission doubt install, operate and maintain poil. The second commission of the Eastern Ground Engineering

^{33.} Mag Da Ch. 320240 1077, "Key West Factod Programmer Circuit Be out 1989, 200 23, This chapter.

lusticition Agency (GEETA) assisted in terminating the 24 TO channels.

But trouble areas, it seemed developed as capitally as the variety of CaE goar couls be intermited into the key west environment by joint USAF-Navy creas and difficult contractors. From the TRC-66 to the FPS-37, and additionable problems maltiplied at a starting, the law two posteriors and territory are the trived by all on 25 december. The USAF-Navy creases and contractors are the provided and the receivers. The first has a contractor and two necessary and two nuts, the manner of two nuts, the manner of two posteriors are 25 december, establishing communication and the contempart, between delying and selection got it on the air, and to be replaced on 4 November.

On 26 October the C71st forwarded 2 CLE status where to MOALS. As quoted by the C2nd to ADC, the region showed the FPS-S7's A channel to be the crative because in cleate in its guaranteric amplifier's EF (190 Stillwatte. 20 1941200) Stilly. When repairs proted to be at its inclusion.

^{21.~} Esg EGEE1A, ZEF 62-73 to 22mm Ci. In over most LCC 24, this enapter.

 $^{25.-671~\}text{ACWRON}$ Historical Rpt, Get-Lee indu (buse) heresiter cited as 671~Historical Report.

^{26.} Mag 32 AD, 320AC+ER 79 to ADC, 28 Oct 1862 quoting CCC Mag 67,NNE 10-82-86 to MOADS, DOC 25, this complete.

the parametric applifier was removed and sent to the Zenith Comporation for overhap). A later model substitut, was borrowed from Fort Bliss. Tenns, and installed in a communication 10 November. Epon return of the original sindays later, the Army parametric amplifier was smitted action rador set's B channel to complete the PPS-07 laterial setting plant and approved live manths previously.

The difficulties encountered with the search manner certainly contradicted a CINCNORAD message of 24 October unique stated that "information available this headquart is inside the FPS-37 operating satisficitorily at Key mest."

Now did the information available to NORAD correspond on the data the disposal of General Cent who, on a North-lear, indicated the radar's deficiencies in a personal 20 message to General Lee. Referring to his letter in the same subject of 5 October, the 32nd commander whose in approximation of the same subject of 5 October, the 32nd commander whose in approximation.

The design correctoristics and the capital of the FPS-3T racer to satisfy sored and acceptance

^{27.} Ibid.: 671 Historical Report.

^{28.} Mag CINCNORAD, CCRC-C-34 to 32 Cadr, 24 oct 1902, LCC 35, this chapter.

^{25.} Mag 32 AD: 32 COR 1170. Gen Lee from Com Gent: "Rador Cumbility at Mey west," 8 Nov 1982, DOC 27. this chapter.

requirements have been in doubt for several sorths. This headquarters brought the serious deficiencies of this radar to the attention of CONAD and ADC sine months ago. The panacea for the search deficiencies of this set has been the parametric amplifier which the manufacturer has not been able to make work satisfactorily during this period.

General Gent turther pointed out that, although the 50ml Air Division had stated the requirement for an LCCM fix as early as Kay 1962, no definite action appears to have been taken to satisfy the need until 3 November.

He ended his message to the ADC commander with the request for General Lee's "personal assistance in securing a modernized 178-20 to include the latest ECCM fixes."

C. Lone! Diltz, too. called the PPS-27 "completely inadequate" for the job it had to perform. As the crisis gained domentum, the "PRSANSTONE" radar convironment as a content of two AFFAC stations for a jotal of three by the addition of one USAF RC-121D and a two-engine Navy SF-5 radar alteraft. Radar picket ship stations were significant outsily increased from one to nine, with four of them admits by radar picket destroyers (DDR) serving CINCLANT is a factional air agrigation (TACAN) empacity.

^{30.} Gen Gent refers here to ADC Wag ALDC 3007, "ECCL Requirement for Ground Radar," USAF, 3 New 1962, NDC 28, this chapter.

^{51. 1516.:} DOC 13. CTV 35 Nativitive. 32 COC responded as many in hims 1985 an effections during delice, time position.

This many inputs to an already marginal facility made it virtually impossible to receive and correlate ultimous internation. The situation was allowated solvable code internal control center precedures were established union, rowided for the filtering of the data transmitted by ultra-high frequency (UNF) and single side-oand (SEL) of radio equipment. By many of this system the information could be correlated and displayed in such a manner as to a serious to the CCC commander.

For a two-week period beginning 22 October, identification in the CCC were normal and remained in writer until the arrival of TDY and permanent party personnel. Eightenour tours of duty, sizeh days a week, then become the order of the day, and many a CC member worked as ranguar 40 days without a single Eq-hour break. The center's which load is best described in terms of the following size is the months of October, November and December:

*NTERCEPTS CONTROLLED

	CONAD CC	vea-c	Picket Ships	Unicipality
Getober November Desertions	244 96 2 1152	51 23 88	34 4 10	22 (2) 23 (4) 5 (4) 5 (4)

^{32.} Ibis.

23. haid. : 671 Mistorical hopert.

Most of the CaI equipment placed at Key west and installed between 8 October and 7 November represented quirements of long standing for the CCC's Phase I is a closed amount - co ligaration. The fact that shipment and inclosed action were given unprecedented priority as a result of the Cause general, particularly in the province of dominations and include a matter a material and entire the meaning total lack of the 671st - 1 of the trade before that time.

The accomplishments of USAF, Navy and cliffing to her lution teams during the 6 October - 7 Royember period acmerred by circumstances again beyond "BROWNSTONE" contract As the contingency operations gained momentum for the conhavy electrical engineers determined that the station and but possess sufficient power to carry the additional community Thirteen diesel gonerator units were, therefore, wirling to Ker west to supply both extra price and back-on touch inthe additional CaE equipment. Ten of these arrive count wanting in parts or dejective to the point of proving our mervireable. Of the other three, one burned out with the two days of operation. To assist the 671st in putting the mower eruduction including on its feet, and then bely makes ISIN II, 10 More direct from other 32nd Air Division William implious were sent IDY to Z-209, beginning 23 October.



If its trials and tribulations were sany and various one offset did at least have the consolation of knowing that they received attention in the highest quarters. On his trip in rate have been to the major installations in routher. Therefore we was given an extensive prioring on the context and Conar was given an extensive prioring on the context and Conar was fiven an extensive prioring on the context and Conar was force 52 operations by Colonel Bilts. The CCC communion. Colonel McTalgard, briefed the ICS on the same subject. The President, who had been not at a constraint and estimated by General Gent, to Key Sest, also address.

Direction of a conab TREE FORCE DE

The task torce was active in the operational environment of Key West, involving certain tactical decisions to us active in the operational environment of Key West, involving certain tactical decisions to us and the other hand, lay in the task of the concentrations and use the other hand, lay in the task of like one hand, lay in the task of like and the Class.

^{51. &}lt;u>leid</u>.

havisor on CONAD operations. For this reason, the medicule hand was represented on the battle staff in the compactors, circlatiant's ADVON at Homestead.

Colonel Kenney was principally assisted by Li C. Lon. 1 L. D. Soviemberger, 32nd CONAD Region CAE stati difference of Et Colon. 1 N. C. Johnson, chief of MoADS' plans and received their givision. Their neadquarters, after several modes, were floated in the Abbestead barracks of the 64st minum.

Suppose.

Conflicts of aission interests are difficult to used when elements of the different ailitary services and major commands share a comparatively small theatre of operations. Southern Florida was such a theatre, and its start, as rypresented by Homestoad, key West, Patrick, Warbill and N.C..

was filled to more than normal capacity by units and weapons of the Army. Navy and Air Force. The prevention of conflicts - or their expeditious softlement, if and when they ald occur - was the prime objective of Detachment 1, CONAD Task Force 32.

Not quite unexpectedly, the most serious difficulties in this respect arose in the CONAD-AFIANT relationship and the utilization of AFLANT, 1.e., TAC, fighters for air defense missions as provided for in CONAD-TAC acreements and plans. Despite the fact that the employment of TAC interceptors as Category 'I air defense augmentation torces has a practice of long standing, the 32nd Air Division had previously experienced TAC relactance to reliminable aircrait for that purpose. This experience was made a additor of record is early April when the ADC commander visited 32nd headquarters for a thorough briefing on all aspects of the Division's operational life. At the times the 32nd carried three TAC wings as augmentation sources. each obligated by agreement to furnish to interceptors to the Division. Efforts, however, to secure their partiriparion in Divison exercises failed to realize . A than here token support. It was, therefore, recommended to General Lee that ADC either interede to bring about a more

effective ecoperation by TAC organizations or that these units be dropped from the 32nd roster of augmentation forces.

The problem confronting the task force detaenment was not the availability of AFIANT fighters for CONAD strikent a but the juestion of who would control them while engaged in air defense missions. A top secret TAC message of 27 octol appliced contain AFLANT F-100 "Super Sabres" at the disposal of CONAD, without, nowever, making specific references to 36 control procedures. The MOADS commander felt that short of absolute CONAD control from scramble to recover, was acceptable before the F-100s could be employed in a 37 CONAD role. Local AFIANT commanders disagreed, standing on the prerogative of "ownership" and insisting that they decide when and where their "Super Sabres" would be diverted to air defense sorties and alerts.

The disagreement was never quite resolved, planament settlement appeared to be in the effing following the

^{35.} Except from 32 Al briefing given Gen Lee on 5 Apr 1902, 1902 29, this chapter.

^{45/3}

^{37.} Log entries for 27 Oct 1982 taken from "depart of Events 21-31 Oct," of Dot 1, CFF 5K, BOO 30, this empter. The complete report 1, two volumes covers period to Oct - 30 Loy 1908 and is on life to Both.

intercept on 27 Gotober of a flight of AFLANT-scrambled F-100s from Homestead by two F-106 "Delta Darts" under 38 "BROWNSTONE" control. In the ensuing investigation to F-100 flight leader was relieved, and Colonel Kenney located a CISCAFLANT message directing that two "Super Sabres" be placed under CONAD control at Homestead, McCoy and MacDiff. The directive, which originated in the AFLANT ADVON. Warescinded by TAC the same day, perpetuating the CONAD-TAC stalemate for the duration of the contingency operations. At base level, however, closer coordination became remainly as a result of improved communications between individual units and oriefings on air defense procedures given FLC personnel by CONAE flaison officers.

But the workload of Colonel Kenney and his stall inorecased at a rapid clip. Because of the AfLANT tenumcy to go it alone in virtually all phases of operations, to

S8. Ibid.

^{39.} Ms. AFLANT ADVON. HTA-CP-10-171, 28 Oct 1902. BOC 31, this chapter, and Msg TAC 60-283, 28 Oct 1902. Buts usgo cited in log entries for 28 Oct 1962 in detachment's "Report of Events" referenced above.

^{40.} MacDill CONAD Ligison Office "History, 25 Oct - 2 Dec 1962," submitted to Det 1, CTF 32, 3 Dec 1962, DOC 32 this empter and McCoy CONAD Ligison "Stail Report #1"for period 25 Oct-8 Nov 1962, Scomitted to Det 1, CTF 32, 10 Nov 1962, DCC 32, this chapter

task force detachment was kept busy just crying to stay abreast of divelopments which, while primarily of recesmaissance mature, vitally affected the CONAD forces in regard to type and volume of air traffic. Trouble-shooting was the detachment's order of the day, a task which was rendered ware complex by the influx of additional COSAD units into the already heavily congested area. AFLANT's repeated fariure to notify CONAD authorities and coordinate with them low-level recommaissance sorties was also scored by CINCONAD is a "swivel chair" message of 39 October. Stressing that non-receipt of mission information by 60543 forces chased unrecessary intercepts within and cutride the ADIZ, CINCONAD again reminded CINCAFLANT that coordimation procedures were spelled out in CINCLANT Operations Order 29-62 and had been agreed upon by all agencies concerned.

November showed a marked improvement in AFLANT cooperation. In the MacDill area, TAC elements agreed to participate in low-level Army Air Defense Artillery (ADA)

^{41.} Msg CINCONAD, COOP-P-X503, "Swivel Chair Msg." 36 Oct 1962, DOC 34, this chapter.

exercises, and joint instructions to that effect were signed 42 on 24 November. Preparations for the presidential visit to Southern Florida installations at the end of the mouth dominated the detachment's activities for most of November other visitors to Homestead included General Cortis LeMay, USAF edief of Staff, the ADC vice-commander and a Boot of other right ranking officers representing the various services.

when AFLANT ADVON ceased operations per sc on 1 becauser, the task force detachment, too, prepared for their seman continuation. Detachment personnel returned to their seman stations within just a lew days, leaving benind only Colonel Kenney and remained at Homesteac until 6 December, he stayed to welcode and brief the new commander of the CONSD lighter detachment, Colonel Vincent P. Gordon, Lorder 11 inspector general (10) of the 20th Air Division.

^{42.} Joint TAC CONAD Operations Instruction 62-1 "Hission Planning for Air Jefense Artillery (ADA)-Lou Lovel Parget Requirement," 24 Nov 1962, DOC 25, this chapter.

^{40.} But 1 CET 32 "Summary Reports" (2) covering period 1 Nov-30 Nov, to Ondr MOADS, DOC 36, this chapter.

^{44.} Det 1 CFF J2, "Report of Events 1-6 Dec," to Cadr, HOLDS, DOC 37, this chapter.

THE FIGHTER INTERCEPTOR FORCE

The 52nd Air Division's only USAF/ADC fighter face, coptor squadron - the 331st - was directed to deploy is ...
Its 22 P-102 "Delta Daggers" to Homestead AF Base in the afternoon of 21 October. Within 45 minutes of receipt of orders the first of six three-F-102 flights was ullibrate, the last cleared the runway of the unit's home station, near, Air Force Base, just four nours in er. Refueling at modern, Alabata, and Tyndall Air Force Bases, all 18 aircraft action blace at Homestead in the pre-dawn hours of 22 October. In the evening of the same day, and within two hours of these into Homestead's SAC alort area, the 331st and 16 F-102s - 7% - 7%

In the absence of scramble communication mover, a timetral telephone system sus installed between the new reacy augmented Detachment 1 (noZhi FIS, and the head squadren, hecessary scramble communications, hecessary scramble communications, hecessary against against against a few modes rater.

built relieved by the 325th FIS flow Troux Field, Risconsin, op 20 October, the 331st flew a total of approximately 500 nours for 213 sorties. In audition to the is

^{45. 331} FIS historical Report, Oct-Dec 1965, At-46.

arrevait. 3) officers and 141 airmen had been sent to the southern Florida air base. The group was headed by Lt Colonel Jack C. Price, squadron commander. Ten pilots remained at issessiond when the BBlst contingent was ordered much to Texas. Four of them were given TF-102 - or F TF-102 there asserments with the 452nd detachment, with the school sin were attached to the Such Air Division's 02'th Fis. Air or them resormed their unit by 13 Sovember. The will are on or the 331st from southern Florida became necessar when CINCOMP, in an effort to improve the low-level to decide commutate against low-fiving targets in the area, directed the cillization of aircraft armed with FFAR 2.75 cromme. . Since the Waba "Delta Doggers" had been sodified for you Gal-11 nuclear "Falcod" air-to-air missile, their 2.75 cm agit sur reduced to one saif the normal load of Mi of the conventional rockets. Consequently, replacement of the Livision's only fighter unit was ordered by ABC on UT Jetulet.

The SSIst was first aborted to propert for 1
to an "established F-102 base" on 19 Detabet. Protections
at that time stipulated a minimum of two illights of six

^{46. 121}G.

^{47.} Mag AEC. ADC/R N-As. 27 Oct 1962, EGC US. (Also complete).

elirerait and sufficient ground personnel to be ready for active and three-moor notice. These instructions were somersound by the previously cited top secret ABC messaling of 31 Geober.

anen outlining its concept of approved low-level intercept capability, CINCONAD specified that the interceptors armed with 1.75mm rockets be based in close proximity on the largets they were intended to defend.

for FoTF-102 garreraft was disjected at Alexander Force Largest and ReCov Air Force Larges.

the air divisions to turnish the required aircraft from their resources. With the exception of those belonding to their resources. With the exception of those belonding to the 325th FIS, or its parent organization, the 527th required Group, all P/T/-102s a re to be assigned to the homestone determinant of the 482nd FIS. The latter was directed simulatineously to return its F-102s without roll 2.75 exchange capability to Seyhour-Johnson Air Power Base on a pic-in-the 50 thm. The F/TF-102 levy imposed in a separate measure of

^{48.} Mag ADC, ADOCHAM 3661, "Seployment," is detired: DOC e., this chapter.

^{45. **}g CINCONAD, COOP X 497.26 Oct 1983, EdC 41. this compter.

^{50,} kag mGC, ADCOC M468, 2, Oct 1962, DGC 42, tile complere.

the 73rd Air Division's 4756th Air Defense Group at Tyndril included all the Group's available aircraft as well as sufficient ground crews and equipment to sustain the sirip alore operations at MacDill, Patrick and McCoy.

The Command objective, as relayed to MOADS by the Stad, was the substitution of 36 "Delta Daggers" at Bonestead by an equal number of "herr two-seat counter-52 parts. The E/TF-102 strength finally mastered, nowever, never exceeded 16 aircraft. Nor did the AFLINT F-100s, which were to be made available for CONAD duties ever mater-inlike, forcing NOADS to revise its strip alort semedules as will four bases as planned in a NOSOS message to 10 Stad Air Division on 27 October. Three days later, therefore, NOADS realigned its low-level intercept forces accordingly. At MacDill, a two-plane strip alort manner was maintained by the Typsail group became mality, while betweenest 1, 3520c TS, was ordered to take similar measures at 24 NOCOY and Patrick Air Force cases as soon as powerbly.

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^{51.} Mag ADC, ADCOR X=90, 27 Oct 1932, DOC 40, this dampter.

^{52.} Msg 32 AD. 320DC 1042 to MOADS, 27 Oct 1962.

^{53.} May MOADS, MOTCR 2282 to 32 AD, 27 Oct 1962, DOG 40, this chapter.

^{54.} Mag MOADS, ACOOP-4 2226, 39 Bot 1962, BOC 45. tale chapter.

Beginning with Tyndall's F/TF-1026 at MacDiff, the low-level interceptors were retained on 24-hour strip glerts at the four Florida bases through most of November. The 73rd Air Division aircraft were withdrawn on 28 November, 33 while the Patrick requirement was removed on the 30th.

ReCoy and Homestead followed seit on 3 December.

Despite the fact that the 32nd CONAD Region, through the Lintgomery Sector, assumed control of an unprecedented interceptor concentration, the 531st's departure from Romestead left the 32nd Air Division without fighter representation in southern Florida. While utilization of the Division's ANG squadrons was possible only in the event of DEFCON 2 or higher, Texas' 136th Air Defense Wing and the street its 147th and 149th Fighter Group to take certain steps in line with an "accelerated training program." The measures included cancellation of leave for air technicisms, keeping 50 per cent of their F-102s up-readed trin scapins and arranging for the commanders and members of their sharts to be on call at "all times." In MOADS, the two "belta Dagger" squadrons of the Florida and Logistana Ler guards.

^{56.} Mag 136 ADW, No-24-21 to Cad 147 and 148 Fir Cps, 24 Oct 1962, NOC 65, tabs complete.



^{55.} Msg 33 AD, 320000 1278 to Cad MORDS, 36 Nov 1962. DOC 47, this chap are

contrata and other

57 All the Division's

and forces were instructed on 26 October to review their for bossible updates in preparation for possible deployment

One air guard organization assigned to the 30nd for training, inspection and tactical evaluation, nowever, because actively involved in the Coban contingency operations. By request of CINCLANT, Paerto Rico's 198th FIS places router its full complement of 25 F-b6H "Subrejets" on forward about at Rame. Air Force Base. CINCLANT further, recommended that the squadron's rive active duty plot space. for training purposes be impressed to nine and that all of them be offlized for actual operational about states.

CONCEPT OF FIGHTLE OPERATIONS

At the peak of the Region's interceptor cuitswip, the 32nd and 154 ADC and New fighters at its disjoint . .

^{\$1.} PubS Ristorical Report, Cor-bec 1962 [bm.].

^{58.} Mag 32 AD, 33509 1917, 26 Oct 1962, DOC 48, this chapter.

^{59.} Mag CINCLANT to SAC. 25 Oct 1562, SOC 50 (MIS off pres)

^{80.} Mag COMANTBEFCOM to CINCLART, 20 Got 1983, 200 51, this chapter.

this total as many as 137 actually participated in the 5555 507 ties flown from southern Florida bases and Tyndall.

The ADC aircraft engaged in combat operations numbered FID, runging from the two versions of the Delta Daggers" to the F-101 and F-106. The Navy's CONAD chores were divided between the 14 F4B "Phantom IIs" of VP-41 and the eight F4Ds belonging to the VFAW-3 detuchment at Key West.

The provinity to Caban hases and the fact that daylight was considered to be the most inverable time for
attack greatly influenced the concept of lighter operations.
The need to reduce CoNAD reaction time as much as possible
was not by the establishment of 11 strategic orbit points.
Seven a these were random-manned by the dawn patrol* conting
the crucial early norming hours to minimize, the element of
surprise in an attack lainened at that time. Buy and mignor
random-manning extended respectively to three and to or
live southern STOPs along the fifth parallel. On 25 october,
ADADS was directed by the O2nd commander to implement this
made of And-Navy fighter deployment. It was stipulated
that is \$5/3\$ I ami 3 be manned by the F4Bs, and 7 and .1 by
the F=102s from Tyndmil. All points were to be assumed by



^{61.} Included in the total of 154 fighter allocate age ADS and Mays interceptors on where at installations other than Twistell and those in substitute Florida.

two interceptors, but utilization of aircrait for the remaining $\frac{457}{62}$ was left to the decision of the SOALS commander.

As weeks 35 9

which a much prolonged crises appeared in the offing, revisions of the system became because to permit sustained operations. Penaing Cound approval, Colonel G. G. Athrison, 52nd Air Division vice commander, rentarively authorized 200.DS to substitute

OBJAC CONSIDER THE CONSIDER OF STREET OF STREET CONSIDER.

^{62.} Mag 32 CR, U2ChCk 975, 23 Get 1962; Mag 33 CR U2ChCR DD1, 24 Qet 1962, DGC 52, this empter.

D3. No. 32 CR, 32 CCR luis to MOADS, 26 Get 1902. DCC 53 this enapter. Although Col Atkinson did not northly fill a COSAD NORAB position, he was delegated authority with CONCORAD comeout to represent General Gent in the latter's absence and pending the arrival of Hr) Gen J. R. Winn, then on route to succeed May Gen D. B. Juhnson as 2nd USARLICOR Region command and 32 CR departy of amonder. (Historian's interview with Colonel A misson, DG New 1172).

with appropriate amendments in a message to the S2nd CONAD colon. Alert procedures were further relaxed in subsequent exeminges of verbal and teletype communications between CONAD, the Region and Sector.

Go 6 hovember the 32nd proposed and outlined to 60%20 and wCADS three additional methods of attaining the description 350.77

Sabattied breaust agence

mentalling of certain phases of these plans seemed factors as an entire the Region recommended that $-2 \, {\rm Sph}(z)$

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The Region's latest 14 ...

[&]quot; j= -/

^{65.} Mag 32 AD, 320DC 1121 "For Gen Gent Prior to Beginning of Cadra Conference at Mg CONAD," 1 Nov 1963, DOC 55, this empter: Mag 32 NR, 32NOOP 1140 to Cacr MDADS, 3 Nov 1932, DOC 56, this empter.

^{68.} May 31 OB 320009 1856, 6 Nov 1962, 500 17 into sumpsor. The planet, or options, of CIBCAFLAST and Cistinat

With the easing of political tensions through apparent Soviet willingness to remove its offensive weapons from Cuoan soil the implementation of an aerial quarantine and other contingency measures became more lemote. This, in turn, permitted the 32nd Air Division to release the 4780th air Defense Wing from all alert requirements on 10 November. The Wing, which retained an "immediate reaction capability" at Perrin Air Force Base, Texas, was thereby freed from its commitment of 16 compat-ready aircraft to the band. The overall support rendered by the 73rd had already been est back on 6 November in order to minimize interference with that Division's training mission at Tyudall and Per in.

[[]Cont d] plans referred to pertain to military operations necessary to assure the destruction of Cuba's offensive weapons capability as introduced on the island by the USSA, in audition, the 32nd CR fighter force was consisted to CONAD support of CINCLAFT's aerial quarantine of Cuba. If and when fully implemented. Ranging from diversion to destruction of aircraft suspect of carrying prohibited materials were outlined in CONAD operation by the 32nd and other regions in message form on 20 Cot 1962, DOC 58, this chapter. Of the published its own Ops Pian 2-62, 27 Oct 1962, DOC 59, this chapter, which was rescanded when the CONAD plan was superseded by Oplan 3-62 on 5 Nov 1962.

^{67.} Msg 32 AD, 320DC 1190 to 73 AD, 10 Nov 1902, DOC 60, this chapter.

^{68.} Mag 73 AD, 730DC X 896-K to 4780 ADM, 24 Oct 1962, DGC Si, this chapter.

^{69.} Msg 72 Ab. 3200R 115: to AbC, 3 Nov 1962, 200 62, this chapter

The 73rd's participation in 32nd CONAD Region tighter operations is reflected in the total of 498 sorties them no the division's various types of aircraft.

ALBOHAFT MAINTENANCE AND ARMAMENT

The variety of interceptors dispersed to southern Florida bases alone precluded centralization of responsibility for logistics in the areas of maintenance and aromament at any one air division or location. Instead, cash unit deployed relied for support on its home base and parent organization. Included were aircraft parts, aerospace ground equipment (AGE) and personnel. When maintenance could not be performed at the dispersal installation, the aircraft was returned home in exchange for another.

The success of the "home support" system hinged in no small measure on the nirlift resources available during the critical seven weeks. The lion's share in this respect was borne by ADC's 4650th Support Squadron. In better than 1100 missions and 4700 hours flown during the period, the 4650th carried more than 1400 tons of materiel and 2400 passengers. The 32nd Air Division's contribution consisted of 171 morties made mostly by T-33, C-47 and D-3 aircraft for an aggregate of 403 flying hours, 6.2 tons and 387



passengers. Corresponding figures for MOADS were 150, 411, 120 and 480. Excluded from this concept of logistics were the F.TF-102s gathered in Florida from throughout the Command. Because of the small quantity of the two-scal "Delta Daggers" involved, Tyndall and the 73rd Air Division could and did assume the respective roles of home have and purent organization for this particular aircraft.

FAA ACTIVITIES

Air traffic control functions and restrictions as more and instituted by the TAA in southern Florida preclause many unnecessary identification scrambles on the part of the Region's interceptor force. Without the med uses taken by the FAA, the already high fighter source sate eight have climbed beyond the capabilities of logistical support.

On 24 October the Federal Aviation Agency warmed all aircraft of U.S. ownership and registration to acord delian airspace inless prior approval was obtained from the repartment of Defense. At the same time, the agency's representatives within the 32nd CONAD Reg on were directed to deny

^{70.} General Gent's review of air detense buriq-up during Cuban crists, as presented it a pricting of ABC commander's Conference held it San Antonio, Tax., 24 Jan 1960, DCT 63, this chapter.

Cubin authorities all flight movement data previously reported on a reciprocal basis. This was done in retaliation to Custro's earlier refusal to honor this exchange of information and his establishment of a Cuban Flight Information Region (FIR).

Also on 24 October, the FAA published and put this effect a Special Civil Air Regulation which established this

* B. "

On the other

^{71.} FAA SCAR SR-454, "Special Operating Rule within Certain Areas of the State of Florida and over Adjacent Waters," 22 Oct 1962, DOC 64, this chapter.

^{72.} Ibid.

hand, CBS was allowed to operate a television relay aircraft in the area to beam Cuban broadcasts into Miami.

Beginning 2 November, when Pan American Airways and permitted five daily flights through the MEZ and Comm. First Intermation Region is which CINCLANT and CINCAFLANT recommulesance missions were still being conducted, the rules were relaxed and more waivers issued. On 23 November the TAA directive was superseded by another which realigned the LUZ to include only the southern tip of Florion and the TAX. However, the FAA reserved the right to reinstate the total restriction by publishing a "notice to airmen" (LOTALD), although the normal exchange of flight information between the FAA and its Cuban counterpart had since been resource.

WEATHER 'UPPORT

Weather support for CONAD fighter open tions curing the crisis was provided by the Sina Weather Squadrer and its four detachments communded by Lt Colonel L. V. Gillespie. Detachments 4 and 2 are colocated with 32nd Air Division and WOADS headquarters, while 5 and 6 operate their scather stations at Typdall and Perrin AF Bases, respectively. The

^{73.} FAA SCAR SR-454-A, 25 Nov 1962, DOC 65, this chapter.

meterological data flow from the four detachments was channelled through the MOADS station to the CONAD CC at Key heat from where it was flashed to the dispersal and recovery bases of the Region's interceptor force. To eliminate weather as the unknown quantity in fighter operations is much as possible, full utilization was also made of prior in-flight reports from all installations on the ORed's tactical weather loop as well as the National Eap Center's Ridar and Jet Stream analyses.

In his suggery of the 32nd Seather Squadron's definition vittes during the critical period, Colonel Cillustic cupressed the opinion that the unit had desonstrated its "ability to perform under wartime conditions." Although the organization's operational and administrative working loads reached three times their normal expacity, the committee



felt that "the results realized fully validated as adequate established weather support procedures for air defense $\frac{74}{2}$ operations."

ARMY AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERS

The 32nd CORAD Region's first ground-to-air firepower in southern Florida was provided by the World War II vintage self-propelled 40mm guns of Battery u, 1st Battalien, 59th Artillery. Arriving unannounced at Homestead on 25 October, the unit was deployed in close-in, low-altitude perimeter defense of the air base under MOADS control. Because of its very limited capability, its assignment of would-be targets was restricted to low-flying aircraft strating or bombing Homest ad and the immediate vicinity. Engagement was authorized only during daylight hours and at the direction of the battery commander. Despite its questionable value even in respect to herimeter defense, the ALM contingent no-mained in position until early December.

^{74.} Interview with 32 Weather Sq Command $\epsilon_{\rm s}$ 9 Dec 1962.

⁷⁵ Mag 32 CR, 320009 996, 25 Oc. 1963, 500 86, this chasse.

CONAD, in the meantime, continued to press for the much more sophisticated and versatile HAWK missile at 76
Rocestead. The Command's efforts here fruit in early November when two batteries of the 8th Missile Battalian, 77
15th Artillery, were assigned to that installation. The battalian's remaining two firing units were deployed to battalian and MacDill is a single integrated battery defer 79
configuration. The 8th Battalian arrived on 2 November, the same day the 2nd Missile Battalian, 52nd Artillery (Hercules), reached Missile Battalian, reached Missile



^{76.} Msg ClNCNORAD, COOP-O NCRC+60 to JCS 26 oct 1962, DOC 67, this enapter.

^{77.} Msg 32 NR, 32NGOP 1075 to Cad NOADS et :1. De Oct 1962, DOC 68, this compton.

^{78.} Msg CINCONAD, VCRC-C-88 to Cmd 32 CR. 28 Get 1962, LOC 69, this chapter.

^{79.} Msg CINCONAB, NCRC-C-106 to Cad 22 CR, 30 Oct 1962, DOC 70, This chapter.

^{80.} Msg 32 CB, 32000P 1131 to Gmd MDADS: 2 New 1862, DOC 71, this enaptor.

Texas, be placed at CONAD disposal as well upon its return 81 from duties outside the continental United States.

The arrival of both the high-altitude NIKE and low-level HAWK weapons completed the ground-to-air missile build-up in southern Florida. The first HAWK battalion, the 6th of the 65th Arrillery, had since been deployed in the Ery hest area where its advance party arrived on 24 Oct-bi2 ober. Two days later two of the battalion's four batteries, A and B, were already in possession of 18 missiles each, according to a CONAD AEA states report to the JCS 63 of 26 October.

Ca 10 November the operational locations of the Herceles and HAWK firing units in the Homestead-Elast arc. and at Patrick and MacDill core reported in a C2nd NOMAD & health and macDill core reported in a C2nd NOMAD & health and macDill core reported in a C2nd NOMAD & health and macDill core reported in a C2nd NOMAD & health and macDill missing was the detached Lattery of the NIKE unit which, however, was expected to juic as parent battalion about 26 November.

THE PROPERTY OF THE PARTY OF TH



⁸¹⁻³⁵g CINCNORAD, BOGF-SO BORG-CC-68 to JCS, 27 Oct 1962, DOC 76, this chapter.

^{82, 1}bid. See DOC 14, this chapter, 2 ARADIONAWEST Stateon Officer's Mag to CC 22 NR, 04 Oct 1962.

^{83.} Mag CINCHOPAD, NCRC-C-61 to JCS, 86 Det 1968, 800 78, this chapter.

^{84.} Mag UZ CE GOCCOP Has to CINCONAD. 10 h.m. 1962, DOC 74, this chapter.

^{85,} Mag 3200 320000 1511 to cld MDADS of all 14 No. 1982, DOC 75, this capture

Two factors bord heavily upon planning the utilization of ADA units in southern Florida. It was imperative, first of all, that one CONAD facility control all ground-to-air weapons being committed within one specific area of responsibility. This was necessary because successful ADA integration into the air defense line-up required the closest of coordination. Secondly, it was of equal imperation that the same CONAD agency have surveillance over the abat's sector of deployment.

Since MOADS operated in a split SAGE/Manual configuration, ADA control, too, was divided between the SEC at Gunter AF Base and the Manual control centers in Jacksonville and Key West. The Jacksenville CC controlled the one HAWK battery at Patrick AF Base by means of the rolled circuits between the CC and the firing unit's command post. One of the lines was used for intelligence, and the other for command and control.

The HAWK firing unit at Nachill, on the other head, operated in Mode I under the SDC. Its communications consisted of one teletype and one voice circuit, Pespectively used for intelligence and command and control between EIADS and the ADA command post. On 17 December, when Jacksonville became SAGE operational the Patrick ALA element also conserted to that system. In the event of Mode III, Bowever,





it was to revert to the manual method of control, while its NucDill counterpart would be placed under the Tyndall CCC.

at doubtead AF Base as well, the ADA weapons were controlled by the SDC in the Mode I environment, Under Mode III conditions, the Key Nest CCC was designated the controlling agency for the Homestead ADA contingents as represented by the NIKE, HAWK and 40mm batteries. Two we be circuits were leased and installed between the Key West and the ADA command posts at Homestead for the purpose of Mode III specialism.

The Gin Missile Battalion, Gith Artillery (Habk), at Key West functioned under "BRD-NSTONE" control in the Mansil portion of the Montgomery Sector. Two voice directions

is formed the communications link between the center and the command post on Stock Island. Command and administrative responsibilities for all ADA units were vested in the 18th Artillery Group whose headquarters were established at 80 Rowestend.

The deployment of HAWN to southern Florida was a mistorical lirst in the annals of air defense. In view of this, and considering how rapidly the butteries oblived

^{86.} Discossion of Operational Control of ADA in Southern Florido, as projected by ELS Cohello, USA, 32 CR GR Officer, DOC 76, the conspicer.

operational readiness, the weapon's integration can be termed an unqualified success. HAWK effectiveness was clearly demonstrated in low-level training conducted by Battery D, 8th Battalion, at MacDill on 27 November. In joint exercises with 12 FAC F-84F and two RB-36 aircraft, all but the lutter two were successfully acquired by the HAWK radar and "destroyed." The following day, two out of three similar 67 missions against ADC B-57s were also accomplished.

problems arising out of the nurried integration of the Army weapons, such as lack of a surveillance scope of the Key West CCC for full-time ADA use, were solved before they grew into major issues. Operational procedures as to alert status, target assignments as well as essential maintenance were also satisfactorily established.

^{87.} Weekly Summary #4, COMAD Lisison Office, MacDirl 1 Dec 1962, DGC 77, this chapter.

^{8.} Msg MOADS, MCADA 2270, "Use of Radar Scope..." 8 Nov 1982, DOC 78, this chapter.

^{89.} The following series of 32 CR and 32 AR mags, pertaining to ADA operational and maintenance proceedures, are included in one supporting document: 32xOPS 1037, A7 Oct 1962; 32COCR 1184, 9 Nov 1962; 32COCP 1229, 16 Nov 1962; 32COCP 1281, 30 Nov 1962; 32COCP 1294, 4 Dec 1962, DOC 79, this chapter. For HAWK integration at Key-West, see also EOC 10, 32 CR Msg., 32COCP 005, %3 Oct 1962, this chapter.

Contrary to the cutback of the 32nd's fig ter force to 20 F-102s at Homestead, none of the ADA missile battalions was withcream from southern Florida at the conclusion of the contingency operations. The interceptor strength was to be cultifuned at 20 circuit by rotation of ADC lighter squadrens, in accordance with the Command's Operations Plan 26-02, dailed 21 November. No such arrangement had been made - or was in the making - for the NIEE and HANK weapons, nor was a larget date to. Their departure established, Notice could be certain that the retention of ADA units beyond one could be certain that the retention of ADA units beyond one could be certain that the retention of ADA units beyond one could be the fact that the retention of ADA units beyond one could be certain that the retention of ADA units beyond one could be certain that the retention of ADA units beyond one could be certain that the retention of ADA units beyond one could be certain that the retention of ADA units beyond one could be certain that the retention of ADA units beyond one could be certain that the retention of ADA units beyond one could be certain that the retention of ADA units beyond one could be certain that the retention of ADA units beyond one could be certain that the retention of ADA units beyond one could be certain that the retention of ADA units beyond one could be certain that the retention of ADA units beyond one could be certain that the retention of ADA units beyond one could be certain that the retention of ADA units beyond the provided by the ADA units beyond the add the

FAILLING LEAVES

"Failing Leaves." the project of surveillance and detection of Coban beliastic a said lamonings, assignce to the T2nd Air Division its first supporting role in the Ballistic Missile Early Sainting System (BMEWS). The pecturent operations plan, which was published by the Oth Aero-pace Beronse Division linked the AN PPS-G3 frequency diversity (FD) scarce regar at TM-107, Thomassills, Alabama, to that

division's space surveillance network. The site is manned and operated by the 32nd's 698th Radar Squadron.

On 26 October ALC advised the air division that necessary modifications to give the FPS-35 missile detection capability would begin the following day. The special sensor equipment needed for that purpose was removed from two radar stations in Pennsylvania and Virginia where it had been 90 used in recent tests. Included in the installation was a furl-period voice circuit from the missile surveillance scope at the Thomasville site to the BMEWS Central Command 91 and Display Facility (CCADF) at Colorado Springs.

The job of bringing the FD search radar to the festres wissile surficiliance and detection specifications was dimeby the Sperry Corporation in cooperation with 698th personnel. It was completed on schedule, 29 October. In the predain hours of the next morning, the 9th Aerospace Decience Division's Task Force "A" at Thomasyille assumed operational

^{90.} Mag ADC, ADOOP-EL 2899, 26 Oct 1962, DOC 66, this chapter.

er. Ibid.

control of the reconfigured FPS-35, assisted by 20 additional airmen sent to the squadron by the 32nd Air Division.
The 698th's BEEKS mission terminated on 5 December when the
sensor gear was dismantled and the long-range search reconverted to its original dimensions.

LOW-LEVEL SURVEILLANCE

Low-level radar coverage during the crisis was, in the opinion of many participants and observers, the weakest link in the air defense build-up. Paradoxically, it was the very augmentation of the surveillance forces which most threatened the effectiveness of the coverage. The establishment of additional AEW&C and picket ship stations as well as the deployment of TACAN destroyers taxed existing communications facilities to the danger point. This was

^{92. 698} RADRON Historical Report, Oct-Dec 1962, DOC 81. this chapter.

^{93.} Unless otherwise documented, this chapter cites information contained in 956th Msg 870, as retrunsmitted 27 hov 1962, DOC 82, this chapter. Although addressed to its parent unit, 551 AERAC Wing, with information to 32 AD, cited msg replies to 32 AD msg MDC 1236, "Object Lessons from CONAD OPLAN (-62," 18 Nov 1962. The 32 AD analysis of 966 msg is contained in 32MLP lir, same subj. to ADC, 5 Dec 1962, DOC 85, this chapter.

evidenced by the number of low-flying targets that escaped detection in the Key West CCC's area of responsibility.

Although surveillance, intercept and control techenques were developed with reasonable success, the openattenui environment remained in jeopardy because of logistical This was particularly true of the budga suggest problems. ADDAC Squadron at McCoy whose aircraft strength was prompted trom an initial five to 12 RC+121s. The arrival of the late. Air Division's "Constellations," while enabling the manning of one more station, created a host of difficulties for the Sooth and McCov. The air base, at the time, is alread, saturated by TAC forces which, the ADC unit was informed, were assembled for exercises not involving aimborne durity warning and control participation. A few days later the Nace's six WF-2s with crews were also assigned to EcCu. entil their resocation to Key West was approved at the end 95 of October.

^{94.} Low-level detection tests were conducted by ABC under code name "Mickey Mouse," 23-25 Oct. Paper Commetter. USA and T-33 targets were flown at 100, 200, 700 and 2500 it altitudes with radar platform at 16,000 ft. Ol 25 controlled F-101 intercepts attempted, 19 MAS, 39MAS and 3 MIS were posted. Source: ADC Mag ADOTT-D 2973, "Low Altitude Capability..." 31 Oct 1962, DOC 84, this chapter.

^{95.} Mag 32 NR, 325HCR 1090 to Cad MOADs et al, 25 Oct 1602, DOC 85, this chapter.

Many of the logistical difficulties were traced by the 966th to the lack of timely notification, including the RC-121 augmentation and commitment to man two AEAEC stations. It seemed that nother the squadron nor its parent organization, the 551st, was made the recipient of all Cuban contingency operations plans. According to the 966th, the only such document it received was MOADS Operation Plan 2-62, published 19 October, which, however, was not sent to the 551st. Failure to coordinate with the squadron and wing made it impossible for both to meet mission requirements with the utmost efficiency in crimer the operational area or realm of logistics. Added to this plight was a general disregard of command channels by "higher authority agencies."

Without naming these "agencies," the 956th stated that the unit's next higher echelon was by-passed in direct requests for launching of special missions as well as parformance and capability data over and above the required reporting procedures. This particular complaint, along with others, was validated in the 32nd's analysis of the squadron's report on "Object Lessons" and included in the Division's letter to ALC.

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^{96.} Ibid.: See 500 83, this chapter. Because "Ourget Leasons" were still under bivision study at year's end,

When reviewing the air delense build-up for the ADC commanders at the January conference, General Gent spoke about the "unparalleled opportunity to study the problem areas that were generated by the crisis." His enumeration of specific items included the disregard of the normal course of command which had played the 966th AEWAC Squadron as well as the low-level radar coverage.

with reference to the latter, the 32nd community sale that the 2009 foot low-altitude requirement around the coast of Florida from Patrick to MacDill Air force Base was unrealistic because "the low-level threat against southern Florida is greater than against any other portion of the United States." He further stated that, in view of this threat, the Region had requested a change in the ABC Control and Warning Support System (416L) from the 2000 to a 500 foot minimum "completely around the coastline of 97 Wiorida."

[[]Cont's] only those perturning to low-level surveillance have been included in this narrative and documentation. Enwever, neither the Bodth's report nor the 25md's analysis of its contents should be considered conclusive because both the rile of the AEWaC squadron in the 35md's operational environment and its relationship to the Region and Division were also being reviewed at the time.

^{97.} Lar. 32 NR, "Change to ADC 416%," to CINCNORAD, 28 Dec 1962, BOC 17, this chapter.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Little, if anything, can be added to General Gene's summary of the air defense build-up in southers Florida. We as presented by him at the ADC commander's conference. Tournam upon both the strength and weaknesses retaried ourns, the seven critical seeks, the Division Region commander highlighted the assistance rendered the 22ms of the accomplishment of 1th mission. "It was a wendering technic," he said, "to receive, just for the asking, are most everything and everybody we needed." This, he remarked, was especially true "after having lived with a relatively low resources priority for so long." General General Generals also paid tribute to the pilots and support personnel those achievement was best exemplified by better man 11,400 ADC, Navy flying noors logged without a single air-

If, because of the short lapse of time, any conclusion as to the future of Florida's air defense posture candous sount to no more than speculation, one thing was constituted.

The 32nd would never be the same again. A new disciplination

^{98.} Ibid; See General Cent's review of the detense build-up during Cuban crisis..., DOC 62; this chapte...

had been added to its record of singularity among its Abc 2. Ab counterparts. Always unique by virtue of the paradomteal relationship between its geographical size and an erroal size, i... the 32nd had become the first air deferse componcative ac directly under the gun of a self-declared enem, of the inited States.

by the addition of new air defense weapons and systems remained to be seen, but in the meantime 22nd officers and airson could say with justiciable pride that they become to an organization. But had done the most with the least.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE 70RD AIR DIVISION (WEAPONS)

Sy

Benjamin T. Siler

At 9015 mours CST, on 20 October, the 72rd Air August directed its Tyndull based units to bring his interceptor aircraft, which included the F-101. F-102 air F-100 series, to alort a lital including architect and continuit

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. By 1400 hours that witernoon, al. Division.

interceptor 16/2

^{1.} Hence to 4750 Air Bill Mg Condition 4733 Air Day C. Cast, "Sutvition History, 15-27 but 1503," 30 Get 1502 (a). This oner ϵ ,

and described at that status until 1722 hours CST (i.e., including day), $(-e_{\frac{1}{2},j})^{\rm eq}$

Fine first CAP scramble of the crisis period as included from Tyndali AFB at 8053 hours CST on 20 octom. From Division forces at Tyndali AFB, a total of rim acceptable scrittes were flown during the first week of the crisis.

on 23 October, CORAD made known a requirement for an improved low altitude fighter interceptor capability in ... Floriou area. The F/TF-102 was selected as most sections for the mission; however, the availability of Chebruch, without the mission; however, the availability of Chebruch, without the uncertain. The affect that to be employed through the 2.78 from rocket. After the matter than become considered by General John K. Gerhart. OHAD Communder, which considered the hory Mr. Lee, Arc Communder, it was semicored at 1, F-102s with seen capability be identified. A Semicor of the 102s with the capability semilored above was semicord.

^{2, &}lt;u>lb:d</u>.

S. Ibid.

for Homestead, MacDill, Patrick, and McCoy Air Force Bases.
4
all located in Florida.

Following through on the low altitude capability plan, the next day the 73rd Air Division was directed by 8DC acadquarters as follows: the 1756th Air Betense Gross and provide MOADS with ail available TF-102 aircraft (and, it is for rowsets) and aircrews in support of MOADS strip wheel requirements.

The next day, on 28 October, MOADS directed the depicyment of all rocket capable TT+102 aircraft, fully area, including FFARS to Homestead AFB for attachment to Decomment 1, 482md Fighter Interceptor Squadron deployed there. The aircraft were to be accompanied by ground support equipment and personnel sufficient to support about two services per day per aircraft. Preventive maintenance was to be perhapsed at Tyndall AFB.

Regarding the employment of FATF-192 arrellip at Homestead, on 29 October the 73rd Air Division was directed to select 25 combat ready F-202 priors for immediate degrees...

^{4.} Msg COMADIC COOP X497, 26 Oct 1962, DOC 2, this chapter.

^{5.} MOFORN, May ADO, ADOCA X-90, 27 Oct 1962.

^{6.} Wag MDADS, MOCCR Ollt. 28 Oct 1902, bot 1, this chapter.

to the 482nd detachment, with complete personal equipment plus parachutes for an indefinite period of temporary duty. The aircrews were drawn from the resources of the 4780th 8 Air Defense Wing, Perrin AFB, Texas,

On 30 October, an additional requirement for 10 more F=102 pilots for deployment to Homestead was pinced upon the $\frac{9}{4780}$ th Winn. The first group of personnel deployed to Homestead remained there until 11 November, at which time the weekly rotation of personnel was begun.

In furtherance of the low-altitude capability, on 28 October the Montgomery CONAD Sector directed the 4750th Air Detense Group at Tyndall to use available UE TF-102 uspecial to maintain the TF-102 afferalt, call sign Ecno Kills on alert at MacDill AFS, Florida, including sufficient around support equipment and personnel to support about two softics 11 per day and 24 hour alert. As of 1700 urs CST on 29 October, deployed TF-102's of the 73rd Air Division's



^{7.} NOFORN, Mag 4DC: ADCC: X118, 29 Oct 1962.

d. Loid.

^{9.} NOFORN, MSK ADC: ADODC X+133, 30 Get 1962.

^{10.} Msg 4780ADW, WODC-T 262L, 9 Nov 1962, DGC 4, this chapter.

Psg %untgomery CONAD Sector MCCOPsk 2220, 2s Oct 1862, DOC 5, this chapter.

4756th Air Defense Group 55 5.7

Color was added to the MacDill deployment when the detachment, led by Major James S. Simon, Jr., was high-mixed "Simon's Marudors." After departing Tyndall for Emedili, the detachment to be, consisting of a flight of three TY-102's was directed encode for a Homestead recovery. After cheeking with the ADC Task Force commander, the comprehend for operational socies out of Himestead. Pall after one sortic and only eight hours on the station, "were again scrambled for deployment to MacDill AFD work the "Marudors" were to spend the remainder of the Cobin. 13 crisis, returning to Tyndall on 5 December.

In an effort to provide for crew rest early accomply-one run, the 73rd's air defense ression at Tyndall AFB. The co-coptor aircress were divided into two shifts with 24 mags on daily and 24 hours oil. $\alpha_{\rm ACC}$

A' I ight consisted ...

interceptor weapons Sensol and 4750th Test Squadros directors.

^{12. #}dome 4756 Air Dei Gp Cmd to 4756 Air Dei W. C.J., "Activities History, 18-27 Oct 1962;" 30 Oct 1862, 560 ;; this chapter.

^{13.} historical Record 4757 Air Dei Sq (1%S), i oct-31 Dec 1952, kons 4755 Air Dei Sp Esst to 4756 Air Dei ks, sactisticas Biztary, 18-27 Oct. 1962, 30 Oct 1962, BSC 1, thus chapter.

and "B" ilight was composed of crews from the 4750(a Algorithms Squadron (Weapons) which has since been recess, moved the 4750th Combat Crew Training Squadron.

In the execution of the Cubas crists about requirements than Tyndall the Interceptor Weapons Sancof, egold in by the 4757th Air Delense Squaddon (185), with its conequipped operations center and capability of canding on access of about aircress for extended periods, became combination dispatch desk, comput about center, and form quarters for all of Tyndall's about alort aircress.

As a general rule, organism 22 detools, holling and

The system worked

ewoppt thick WOADS would

Libally from 0100 hours local color

All C

^{14.} Historical Recrod 4757 Air Def Sq (198), 1 cc. 31 Dec 1962; Meso 4756 Air Def Gp Cmdr to 4756 Air Def $_{\odot}$ Cmd, "Activities History, 16-27 Oct 1962," 30 Oct 1963; Ec. this chapter.

^{15.} Historical Eucora 4707 Air Det Sq (BaS), I Co. - 3; Dec 1962.

0700 hours local. "5 / "

Peacetime flying limitation and restriction were

Lived by Air Defense Command headquarters on 26 October.

On 3 November the 73rd Air Division was directed to establish a TF-102 pool, consisting of five aircraft at Tyndall, to support southeast area TF-102 requirements. The aircraft for the pool were deployed from Perrin AFD (475eth Whil), arriving the following day.

In a message, dated 6 November 1962, from Daul A.,
Division neadquarters, confirming a telephone conversation
Detween Bajor General Benjamin J. Nebster, ADC Chief of
Staif, and Bajor General Tiomas J. Gent, Jr., 32nd Air
Division commander, concerning the utilization of 75rd Air
Division resources in support of 32nd Air Division's standay
atom requirements at Perrin AFB, Texas, and Tyndall Arg.
Florid. Weald be reduced to attribute interference with the

^{16.} August 4756 Aug Dof Gp to 4756 Air Def Wg. "Activities History, 18-27 Oct 1982;" 30 Oct 1982, 500 i. this chapter.

^{17.} NOFORN, Msg ADC, ADGOPWN 78, 26 Oct 1961: kag 73 AD, retranseittal 79000 X508-E.

^{18.} Man | DC. Abcop-W 3040 3 For 16-2.

70rd's training mission.

4 5 12.

(5.7)

Additional AGE and personnel requirements at taken an round wast was oterwined by the 32nd Air Division and sequences, and from 73nd A. Division or other ADC resources.

22 Inid.

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^{19.} Mag 39AD, 32CCR 1151, 6 Nov 1982, DOC 6, this emptyon.

^{30. &}lt;u>Ibid</u>.

^{21. 19.6.}

The message stipulated further that daily requirements were to be turnished the 73rd by MOADS by means of fragmentary order is early as possible so as to permit efficient schedulin and orderly flow to STOPs with minimum disreption to the 75rd air Division's training program.

These arrangements and no bearing on existing 70rd air Divisia aircraft and personnel support being provided at Mosesicus and BacDill Air Force Base.

On the following day, in a message to ADC, the 72rd Air Division proposed that it guarantes from eight to 12 F-101 and F-105 sorties per day until Combat Crew Truring Class d55 started on 19 November in order to properly

AFB. 95. Committed station range of Typicall AFB. 95. Table of Typical propused to deploy all five F-102 aircraft to the Micbill detachment, where they would be under the complete openations, cont.ol of MOADS.

Sinder the Division's proposal, primary F-102 main-26 tempore whele be accomplished at Tyndali.

^{23.} Ibid.

^{24.} Ibid.

^{25.} Mag 73AD, 73CCR X41L, / Nov 1932, DOC 7, this chapter,

^{26. 1}bid.

In addition, ()

The message asserted. . at

to bring all arroraft up to status as was the case at the case at

In reply to the 73rd's proposals for the river, was suture air defense support of the crisis, ADC stated and objection to the caployment of the F-102's and former. Informed the Division that the proposals for F-101 28 F-105 support were under study.

As the tension of the crisis eased, the central college of the 4780th Air Defense Wing, Perrin AFB, Texas from all alort requirements at 0344Z, 10 November, was communed by a message from 32nd Air Division headquarters, our manager of City, Oklahoma. The Wing was reminded that it was concentral to maintain an immediate reaction capability.

ADC advised CONFO, on 16 ht yer, that it was require ative to re-establish weapons trailing and weapons tost

^{27.} Ibid.

^{28.} Mag ADC, 450DC 3090, 9 Mov 1962.

^{25.} Mag 32 AD, 320DC 1100, 16 Nov 1962, NOC b. t) -- chapper.

programs at Tyndall, necessitating a further reduction of 73rd forces in support of the then waning crisis. Effective 12002, 18 November, ADC stated it would withdraw from the operational control of the 32rd Air Division all F-101 and F-100 aircraft of the 73rd Air Division. However, the Division was to continue to provide five F-102 aircraft and three Tr-102 aircraft in support of 32rd Air Division Silver alert commitments, and five TF-102 aircraft as a marking multiplication of the F-102 aircraft operating in southern the Fibrida.

45! "

A message relating to the above stated intentions was sent by ADC to the 32nd Air Division, and also directed the 73rd to program combat erow training school on a 7-day per week basis.

The last air defen a scrtie in direct support of countries operations was flown by division forces at Typenail on 18 November. A normal air defense elect status was then

^{30.} NOFORN, May ADC. ADODC 3144, 16 Nov 1962.

^{31.} Ibid.

^{32,} Mag ADC, ADOLA 0145, 16 Nov 1962.

resumed. The 73rd's air defense sorties in support of the crisis from Tyndall AFB and MacDill AFB are shown in Document 33 9 of this chapter

POSISTICS

Although unknown to the personnel of the 73rd Arc Division at the time, the first activities in support of the Cuban crisis commenced at approximately 1100 hours CSD on 18 October. At that time the 4756th Air Defense Group commender at Tyndall AFB was notified by NOADS that the Group would be required to provide turnaround support for one squadron of F-102's and a squadron of F-106's scheduled 34 to 3rrive at approximately 1300 hours that fay.

To provide a central operating location for the two fully combat ready and equipped squadrons, supposedly deploying on an exercise, a support liaison activity was opened on the Tyndall flightline. One officer and five NOO's were assigned to aid in turnaround of the deploying squadrics and to assist with any required maintenance.

^{33.} See DOC 3, this chapter.

^{36.} Memo 4756 Air Def Op to 4756 Air Def Wg, "Activities History 18-2" cet 1982;" co Oct 1852, DOC 1, this chapter.

^{35. &}lt;u>Juid</u>.

The deploying squadrons were the 452nd and 48th Fighter Interceptor Squadrons. The last aircraft of the two squadrons departed Tyndall for southern Florida bases at 1430 hours on 19 October.

On that same day, by priority message, the S2nd Air Division requested the immediate integration of the 671st Radar Squadron, Key West, Florida, into the sepply support responsibility of the Tyndall AFB Base Supply EACC Section. The squadron was originally scheduled for support by Tyndall on 1 November 1962.

Also included in the massage were requests that all priority requests from the 32nd Air Division ACM Radar vites supported by the Tyndall EACC be delivered by airlist to the maximum extent, and that U. S. Navy electronic gent located at Key West NAS be supported from available USAF 38 stocks when possible.

All requests were honored and the EACC Section of Tyndail Base Supply was instructed to comply if at all

^{36.} Memo 4756 Air Det Gp to 4756 Air Det bg. "Activities History 18-27 Oct 1962;" 30 Oct 1962; DOC 1; this chapter

^{37.} Msg 32 AD, 32MDC 10072, 19 Oct 1982, DOC 10, this chapter.

^{38. 15}id.

possible with supply consists. Transportation of Greener terms of the appropriate office account to 75% and because for the appropriate office.

thus evident mowever, by 19 October, that a

. eliment. The Director of Sopply and Sortic v. (7) ...

a... Sher droup at Typharit, was directed at the short,

to place double decked but in seven and one-mass

outliers. The comporation with the Base Equipment

outlier (BENO) and Lase Sopply the project was start ...

case managements and diameter pilling and ...

decked one place in each outliers. The diverse was a law ...

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and electroity to complete Assistance was a law ...

must happer. Atabase.

Fire was were suit to Fort Racker to pick apply authors as a contressor, and 100 bods on temporary loan in areas and the outher, so part houses in a later, activesses and also it to throse type. The Type 11 BENG, who to see states of the times type, by performed the moderates into a later of 20 areas through, performed the moderates into a laggificant countries were used by augmentation theres.

To provide to istical and administrative segment covered at staging obvious loopted at 1 and 1 AFA. . . . Ally Singing Area Corps (ASAC) was increed at Typesil unit.

... First week of the crisis with a total strength of the crosses.

Some of the onits making op ASAC work in the crosses.

... Some of the onits making op ASAC work in the crosses.

... Some of the onits making op ASAC work in the crosses.

... Some of the company (Terminal Services). Out Const. ...

... Some of the Company (Medical Trk). The Chamber. ...

In the same time the Third Provision. Who is a second direction of the Command was also being formed in Typhania. The community of the Edition of the provision is a same to impass and coordinate transportition for the will provide a coordinate transportition for the will be considered by Top of the continuous of the will be same as about the continuous of the will be considered by Top of the continuous of

At Tyndall AFB, which could be considered the country of Division operations during the criss, and all in the Croop Supply and Survices office was allered spanishing of controlling all SEQ, transit air.

^{39.} ASAS Nieston Statement, Organizational Parket and Entr and Personnel Statem Chart, 100 11, they encepted.

^{40. &}lt;u>101d</u>.

^{41.} Mag 5 Prov $a_{\rm p}$, "Proposed New Release, of 1862, 5000-12, this chapter

Darracks of mous assignment. The project was a continuing one. In all cases when individual major air command surplated arrived, they were placed in the double deck particularly wasterness so they could preserve a command integral.

put to the interpated planting for some everyone of section problems were encountered, and no compared the eccuried from the occupants of the carries temporary plant.

The accuracy quity figure for quarters accepted by The accumulation precinct was lab officers in 80Q, 13 in the quarters, and between 600 and 700 collisted personnel and efficient the transit quarters or individual by racks set as size by Sugally and Services. The statistics includes as a manual force utilities and enlisted sets.

The Tindall Supply and Services Office was also an element for coundination with material project officers for both the Anny the the augor air commands having to reside a played to the base. Their needs for differ fermiture for turnous command posts and points of operations were founded to the Base Emisphent Mana, ment Office or on some costs, direct from the project officer to the BENO. At the end costs crists period all needs had been satisfied; however, it point had been reached where the supply of all excess disciplination, office, had been committed.

BR

G. 22 October, MCADS logistics reporting in wolver.

Lieu whall 400+1 was initiated. Reporting was accomprise. Accomplise to comprise the boars. On 25 October, the reporting processors.

Lieu while of the onec every four modes.

The Aero, Graund, Marine and Vehicle Transfordum.

The Told Air Division Deputy for Naterial was notified a controlled that extra refueling units for AV Cas where a control in sepace that the Division's support wishing the Community will be a controlled and a support wishing the Community will be controlled for AV Cas. The core product dark in service to support the facility were product dark in service to support the facility which is

Beginning a two shift around the clock operation.

12 hours on, 18 hours off, the Base Fool Supply Section and

12. Fe' feeting units converted and in operation by 21 ordinary.

13. The units work returned to temporary storage on.

14. December:

Depth , the crists period at Tyndali AFS appreciation of 2.460,000 gallons of JP4 feel, 334,798 gallons of 115 plus included a constant and a constant of the crists of the constant. The base had a capability 100,000 gallons of Ay Cas available by truck in a constant.

... Then air Division was advised by ADC bediever. ...
on 15 october that due to the operational status of misit was importance that all WRK (spaces and consummations of
house, to maximum percentage of completion, and insure anstructions that all shortages would be immediately respective.

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^{42.} Neg Abd, ADMDC-CP-X-19, 25 Oct 1962.

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^{44.} Medio 73 AD Dar Comma Elec to 75 hd Profit of "During Activities Report, 15 Oct 1963," Boo is a sure of months

^{45. &}lt;u>Ibid</u>,

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^{47.} Remo. 73 AD Dir of Commo-Fire to 70 AD Dep. (or Ope, "Emergency Comm. Respondent), 22 Set 1962; " DOC 14; tile (mapter).

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^{-8.} Thid.

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^{51. &}lt;u>loid</u>.

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- 32. Ibid,
- 50. <u>Ibid</u>,
- 51, USE ADD. APMEDO-CP-VINS, 28 Oct. 1902.

Thirty-six F-102's were involved in support of the international situation. Due to the 73rd Air Division's terious commutaents at Tyndall AFB, it has pointed out that in order to provide rear echolon F-102 support, support plans, and and supplies would have to be drawn from other.

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Code and AFSC

Enterial management policies pertaining to the Click House" penject which applies to support of F. TF-10% type directly deployed into Housestead and Typidall Air Force houses were obtlined in a message received from ADC on to October 1962. The 10mg was directed to provide the maintenance support and facilities at Typidall AFB, a reserve replacement aircraft pool of five TF-102 aircraft and have begoly support for spares and equipment, begond T. Maintenance Seven, were to be required into appropriate.

^{55.} Memo for Record 73 AD Dep its Majoriel (c., Jan DuBose, Jr., 29 1952, DGC 15. this chapter)

^{56.} Msg 73 AD, 73ME 517K, 29 Get 1962 DOC 16. this chapter.

^{57.} NOFORS Msg. ABC. ADMDC-CP X129, 30 Get 1962.

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^{5 .} Mag ADC: ADMME 2977, 51 Oct 1962.

^{60,} Mag 73 AD, 70MME A527L, 2 Nov 1862, Duc 17, eller

^{61.} $M_{\rm B} \gtrsim$ 70 AD 70MDC X522%, Cl Oct 1960, thus in Chira chapter.

^{62.} Nog ADC, ADUSE-AB 2239, 26 Nov 1962.

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^{63,} Mag ADC, ADMMP-AB 2070, 51 Oct 1962

^{34.} Mag MOARA, APML 737, 31 Get 1962, DGC 10. threempress.

^{65.} News for Record, 73 AD Dep for Material Table Association Personnel, 31 Oct 1962, DGC 20, this imagical

^{66.} Mag ADC, ADMOC+CP-X146. 1 Not 1962.

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^{67.} Her MAC. ADOGPER 3 No. 1563.

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^{69.} Lar 32 Ab. M3500, "Eaglistic Responsion) the masses of the Abrillon Anti-Replayed to Residence 111, 17 Nov. 1569, 200-22, the solutions.

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^{70,} sg 73 Lo. 70100-Xeart, 16 Nov 1962.

^{71.} Had ADC. AL. RP-M 3241, 20 Nov 1903

^{73.} Lin 73 AD. 71 SEP. Requirements for GAR consist Sturmey, 22 Oct 1982. BGC 25, total congress.

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 $[\]rm M_{\odot}$, $\rm M_{\odot}$ 75 AD, 75 May with 5404. 27 New 1993 (i.e., indeed thoughten).

^{77.} Jope for the Record, "MCARA Selection of the (1,1) . 1933, LOC 25, this imapter.


^{78.} NOFORM BUG ADC. ADCOP-41 BUU2. De Nov 1600

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A resume of object lessons learned in support of Caban erists operations as directed by CONAD Operations. Plant 1-82 was prepared by the ford Air Division Deputy for Saterica and his staff and Habmitted to ADC headquarters on DT November.



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26TH AIR DIVISION (SAGE)

PARTICIPATION in the CUBAN CRISIS

October - December 1962

SPECIAL STUDY

Prepared by

CLASSINED BY

HISTORICAL DIVISION Office of Information Headquarters 26th Air Division (SAGE) Hancock Field, Syracuse 25, M.Y.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

NARRATIVE	,
Introduction	1
	1 2 3
Alert	2
Command and Control	3
NORAD Actions Reserved to Commander	
26th NORAD Region	6
CONAD Actions Reserved to Commander	
26th COMAD Region	7
Dispersal and Deployant	7 9 14
Texas Towers	11.
Missiles	16
Problems and Lessons	16
Conclusion	19
POOTNOTES	21
CPRONOLOGY	26
A: PENDICES	29
Fighter Interceptor Status at Home Buse	29
26th Air Division Aircraft Deployed Status	
Status of Alert Conditions	31 33 54
DEFCON Instructions	- 55
966th Airborne Barly Warming and Control	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
Squadron Statistics	3 6
Map of Station DOG and Station ECHO	38
Map of Station DOG, ECHO, and FUX	39
Current Emergency - Cutan Situation	
Revised Net Addition	
Obligations	40

PART II

DOCUMENTS



PART I

NARRATIVE

INTRODUCTION

During the evening of 22 October 1962, President John F. Kennedy in a major policy making speech announced to the people of Cuba, the Soviet Union, and the United States that he was going to take affirmative actions toward the curtailment of the Soviet Military buildup in Cuba.* He listed seven steps the would be taken to enforce this policy. The first step was the quarantime of Cuba; the second was increased military surveillance of Cuba and an increased military for any other eventuality; the third was to consider a nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any mation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States; the fourth was to reinforce the U.S. bar, at Guantanamo; the rifth was to call an emergency meeting of the Organization of the American States;

^{*} Footnotes to follow at the end of the Study.



the sixth was to call an emergency meeting in the United Nations; and the seventh was to plead to Fremier Nikita Khrushchev to halt the buildup of Cuban military might by Soviet Contributions.

The first, second, and fourth steps had the greatest effect upon the 26th Air Division and 26th NORAD Region. The command was immediately placed on alert. Units were deployed to dispersal bases and to Florida. Aircraft from the 55lst AEW&C Wing began contributing to the aerial quarantine in the Atlantic Ocean.

ALEAT

The alert began at 19182* when COCC color was implemented.

All Battle Staff members of the 26th NORAL Region were in place
within the hour. Minicom was implemented at 20252. At 23002

Defense Condition (PEFCON) 3 was declared.** In these early
hours of frenzied activity, CINCONAD directed the 26th Air Division,
after it had attained LLTA alert status***, to revert to CHARLIE
alert status. Approximately five hours after the alert was implemented, the 26th NORAD Region had achieved full DELTA alert
status. Within NORAD all units were placed on SHARLIE alert

^{***} Explanation of alert posture may be found in Chart III "Status of Alert Conditions."



² refers to Zulu time. All times are in Zulu time unless indicated differently.

The various defense condition postures may be found in Chart IV "DEFCON Instructions":



status at 2255Z on 23 October. CHARLE alert status remained in effect until 3 November when DEFCON 3 BRAVO was implemented. The deployed aircraft did not change their alert status with the new status but remained on the same alert poeture. Not until 28 November was the 26th returned to DEFCON 5, the normal alert 4 status.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Upon receipt of increased alert status, Battle Staff members took their positions and war plans were reviewed. Up to date intelligence summaries were furnished by the Intelligence Staff through intelligence briefings. Major General Henry Viccellio notified commanders that m imum security measures would be initiated, increased effort would be made to maintain the highest incommission rate for all types of equipment, all flight leaders and commanders would be thoroughly familiar with current war plans and rules of engagement, and each commander would make the maximum use of personnel, squipment, and supplies.

As the direction of the flourishing crisis was unknown and could progress toward actual aircraft engagement and major armed conflict, rules of what to do wher confronting a hostile aircraft became of primary importance. A CONAD Supplement to 6 HORAD Regulation 5; 6 set forth that first instructions. These





instructions were modified by CONAD Operation Plan 2-62 which gave a general synopsis of the crisis, duties of participating 7 commands, and the rules for engagement. Generally, the rules for engagement specified that CONAD Region commanders had the authority to permit aircraft engagement. All destruction actions would be with non-nuclear armament. Nike-Ajax or non-nuclear Nike-Hercules missiles could be considered for employment only when the safety of the surrounding areas from falling components was assured. In the event that an aircraft was deemed hostile, engagement would be conducted as follows:

- 1. Attempts by every practical means would be made to direct pilot to land the aircraft at a non-critical airport under U.S. centrel for purpose of capture.
- 2. If the aircraft was responsive to attempted forced landing actions, attempts will be made to divert the aircraft to a non-critical airport for capture. Capture would be attempted using USOR visual interception signals as indicated in the encoute low-altitude flight information publications for Alaska, Canada, and North Atlantic. The intercepting aircraft would escourt the hostile aircraft to a non-critical airport for jurpose of capture.
- If the suspected aircraft failed to follow the intercepting aircraft, shots or rocket or flaxs could be fired in such





a manner that the aircraft was not endangered but that the pilot could not fail to see it.

- 4. If the suspected aircraft continued not to respond, the interceptor pilot would so advise CONAD region commander. Then the CONAD region commander could authenticate the order for destruction using non-nuclear weapons or issue such other instructions as were appropriate. Engagement was to be conducted within the Air Defense Identification Zones.
- 5. Pursuit, attack, and destruction of any Cuban naval craft or airplane, attacking or attempting to attack U.S. military shipping, aircraft or naval unit was authorized. Attack on the basis of such craft or airplanes would be authorized by the Joint Chiefs of Staffs only in the event that it was absolutely necessary in order to protect American lives.

Besides the responsibility for authorizing aerial engagements, Major General Viccellio, as 26th CONAD Region and 26th NORAD Region Commander, had other responsibilities reserved specifically to him. These actions are listed on the charts titled: "NORAD Actions Reserved to Commander of 26th NORAD Region" and "CONAD Actions Reserved to Commander of 26th CONAD Region." If one of the reserved actions of the CONAD or NORAD Commander took place during the absence of General Viccellio, all decisions related to these actions would be







NORAD ACTIONS RESERVED TO COMMANDER 26TH NORAD REGION

Declaration of Air Defense Warning Red in the event of a no-warning attack.

Declaration of airborne objects as Hostile prior to the initiation of hostilities.

Declaration of airborne objects as Hostile subsequent to the initiation of hostilities.

Declaration of full or partial SCATER.

Placing "Fop-Up" procedures in effect.

Authorizing engagement by Air Defense Artillery of ECH emitters.

Releasing AEWAC aircraft to adjacent Regions for purposes of reestablishing operational control.

^{*} Ltr, Maj. Gen. Henry Viccellio, Cmdr Z6th NORAD Region to 26NOPS and 26NOCC, NORAD Actions Reserved to Commander 26th NORAD Region, 30 Oct 62, Doc 7.





CONAD ACTIONS RESERVED TO COMMANDER 26TH CONAD REGION*

Authority to divert or engage Cuban/Sinc-Soviet tactical aircraft penetrating the ADIZ or CONUS airspace.

Declaration of target as CINCLANT - designated aircraft enroute to Cuba after visual identification by interceptor pilot.

Authority to engage CINCLANT - designated aircraft enroute to Cuba.

Specific authority in each instance for use of NIKE AJAX or nonnuclear NIKE HERCULES in engaging CINCLANT - designated aircraft enroute to Cuba.

Declaration of target as Sinc-Soviet Bloc aircraft after visual identification by interceptor pilot.

Authority to commence harrassment, denial, seisure or destruction of Sino-Soviet Bloc aircraft.

Specific authority in each instance for use of NIKE AJAX or nonnuclear NIKE HERCULES for the destruction of Sino-Soviet Bloc aircraft.

Ordering the use of nuclear weapons in air defense against objects determined to be Hostile in accordance with NORADE 55-6.

Unmodified Rules of Engagement as contained in NORADE 55-6 are applicable in all instances in which it has been determined that aircraft approaching from the South are participating in a coordinated Soviet attack. In such instances nuclear weapons may be authorized.

^{*} Ltr, Maj. Gen. Henry Viccellio Cmdr 26th CONAD Region to 26COPS and 26COCC, CONAD Actions Reserved to Commander 26th CONAD Region, 30 Oct 62, Doc 8.





accomplished under the following chain of command: Major General J.T. Snodgrass, USA, Deputy Commander; Colonel G.R. Bickell, USAF, Vice Commander; Colonel W. P. Mace, USAF Deputy for Operations.

Position manning for the Continuous Battle Staff consisted 11 of:

- 1. The Commander, Deputy for Operations, or Director Combat Operations.
 - 2. Fighter Officer, Interceptors or Fighter Officer, Missiles.
 - 3. Air Defense Artillery Navy.
 - 4. Combat Reporting Center,
 - 5. Communications and Electronics.

In addition, one of the following officers, Major General Viccellio, Colonel Mace, Colonel Bickell, or Colonel W.E. Thurman, would always 12 be on duty in the headquarters.

A command problem developed concerning control of U.S. Forces of the Bangor Sector. In September 1962, Dangor NORAD Sector was transferred from the 26th NORAD Region to the Northern NORAD Region. The Northern NORAD Region was located at St. Hubert, near Hontreal, Quebec, and was under the Command of Air Vice Marshal J. B. Rarvey, Royal Canadian Air Force. When the Cuban alert was initiated, operations were limited to U.S. military Participation.

Numerous countries offered assistance early in the crisis, but Canada delayed a policy announcement until 29 October causing some





Numerous countries offered assistance early in the crisis,
but Canada delayed a policy announcement until 29 October causing some consternation among Canadian military personnel on duty
like with U.S. military personnel. Therefore, CONAD, rather than
NORAD of which Canada was a member, had the responsibility to
conduct the air defense of the United States. Thus for CONAD or
Continental Air Defense policies, Bangor Sector had to be reassigned. To correct the situation, CONAD directed that Bangor
Sector would be placed under the operational control of the 26th
CONAD Region in matters pertaining to CONAD and the Cuban Crisis.

DISPERSAL AND DEPLOYMENT

Upon the receipt of the dispersal message, two units of the 162 th Air Division (SAGE) prepared to deploy to bases in Florida. The 48th Pighter Interceptor Squadron (FIS) from Langley AFB, Virginia, deployed its F-106's to Patrick AFB, Florida, and the 482d Fighter Interceptor Squadron from Seymour Johnson AFB, North Carolina, deployed its F-102's to Homestead AFB, Florida. During the crisis, the 482d kept five F-102's operationally ready at Homestead. The 48th FIS had 12 F-106's ready at Patrick AFB,*



For status of the deployed and dispersed unit see Chart II "26th Air Division Aircraft Deployed Status."



Two F-101's from the 444th FIS at Charleston AFB, South Carolina, were rotated to Langley AFB to fill alert commitments left by the departure of the 48th PIS.

Aircraft from six 26th Air Division fighter interceptor squadrons were sent to dispersal bases.* The 76th FIS at West-over AFB, Massachusetts, sent F-102's to Burlington Municipal Airport, Burlington, Vermont, where six aircraft were placed on alert. The 539th FIS at McGuire AFB, New Jersey, dispatched four P-106's to Olmstead AFB, Pennsylvania F-101's from the 49th FIS at Griffiss AFB, New York, and the 75th FIS at Dow AFB, Maine, were dispersed to Niagara Falls Municipal Airport, Niagara Falls, New York. And to Atlantic City Airport, Atlantic City, New Jersey, the 98th FIS at Dover AFB, Deleware, sent F-101's and the 95th FIS at Andrews AFB, Maryland, sent F-106's.

The aircraft remained on alert status at the dispersal bases until 17 November when CONAD sent instructions for them to redeploy

^{*} Evaluation of the 1965 war games indicated a need for fighter dispersal bases situated away from high potential target areas of Soviet missile attack. The war games disclosed that under the present posture, no base within the 26th Air Division was immune to heavy fall-out danger following such an attack. As a result of these studies, dispersal bases were selected within the 26th Air Division where units could send fighter forces and associated support equipment for survival and restrike. These additional bases also complicated Russian targeting and increased tactical deployment to more realistically meet a predicted bumber threat.





their home bases. By 19 November the dispersed aircraft had
19
heen returned.

The aircraft in Florida were not released at the same time as those aircraft at the dispersal bases. As the crisis continued to dissipate, further reductions were made in the military might posed near Cuba. President Kennedy lifted the quarantine on 20 November. Eight days later, the F-102's of the 462d FIS were returned from Homestead AFB, Florida, to Seymour Johnson AFB, North Carolina. Then on 6 December, the F-106's of the 48th FIS 21 redeployed from Patrick AFB, Florida, to Langley AFB, Virginia. On 8 December, with the departure of the last F-106, Major General T. J. Gent, Commander of the 32d CONAD Region, announced that the 22 Cuban crisis had come to an end.

During the crisis, Major General Gent stated that fighter interceptor aircraft flew 8901 hours and that airborne early warning and control aircraft flew 3754 hours without a major accident.

These aircraft missions were performed from strange airfields upon short notice under conditions that were not always the most 24 desirable. Early in the crisis, all flight restrictions concerning the carrying of external fuel tanks on fighter interceptor aircraft were waived. In addition, division commanders were authorized to waive operational and safety limitations imposed on F-101, F-102, and F-106 aircraft by handbooks, safety of flight supplements,





and other restrictive directives issued by ADC and other headquarters, during actual conditions of DEFCON 3, 2, 1, or Air De-26 fense Emergency. To increase force survivability, local commanders were instructed to keep aircraft loaded with nuclear weapons for an indefinate period and were permitted to waive the high explosive criteria for a period of 72 hours during operational 27 *** emergencies.

Region commanders were also authorized to approve rotational flights of tactical aircraft between home and dispersal bases for the purpose of exchanging aircraft, crews, and weapons, and conducting essential training. Certain limitations were imposed, however. CONAD recommended that aircraft on rotational flights carry nuclear weapons only if the weapons needed to be returned to the home base for maintenance or mandatory inspections. Then the MB-1 would be ferried with the igniter safety pin installed and the ejection rack cartridges removed. The GAR-Il would be ferried as prescribed by Air Force Regulation 122-23, paragraph 15, dated 2 April 1962. Before one aircraft could be down-loaded and rotated, another operationally ready aircraft was to be in place at the base. All operationally ready aircraft at the dispersal bases were to be fully loaded with primary armament at all times except during the exchange of weapons. Primary armament would be downloaded prior to all rotational flights. Loading safety and





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technical directives were always in effect. The 26th Air
Division amplified CONAD instructions by authorizing sector
commanders to rotate conventionally armed aircraft and aircraws
every 72 hours. When it became necessary to transport primary
weapons for maintenance or mandatory weapons inspection, the
commander was to notify the 26th Region Duty Deputy for Operations
and receive permission for each flight. Flights with
primary weapons were kept to an absolute minimum and conducted
during the daylight hours. Flights followed minimum safe distance
routing consistant with normal landing weights for the aircraft.

Due to the congestion at bases where ADC fighter aircraft and SAC bomber aircraft were collocated, fighter flushing* instructions were reveiwed early in the crisis. Under the instructions, dispersed aircraft would not flush. Home based aircraft on 5 and 15 minute alert status would flush, and all other would "come up" and flush as soon as possible unless DEFCON 1 or Air Defense Emergency had been reduced. Category 1 Air National 30 Guard aircraft would also flush. As for the possibility of flushing all aircraft, the 26th Air Division did not foresee any problem areas, but did direct its subordinate units to 31 coordinate their flush policy with collocated units.

**Flushing means to scramble aircraft for survival by any means,

Flushing means to scramble aircraft for survival by any means off runways and taxiways, upon receipt of a missile attack warning.



SEOR! T

At the begining of the crisis, all planned exercises, tactical evaluations, and simulated tests were either postponed or 32 cancelled. But as the crisis began to subside, exercises 33 and tactical evaluations were rescheduled. Thus, APACHE NOOSE*, AUTUMN MOON and DESK TOP V Part III were scheduled 34 tentatively for February 1963.

TEXAS TOWERS

During the Cuban Crisis, the Texas Towers were in operation but weather continued to be an obstacle. Deteriorating weather on 30 October caused concern when minimums were reached. In this regard total evacuation or Phase III of the Texas Towers was to be accomplished when the advancing storm and associated "wind wave" obtained a 31-knot speed at 35° 00" north latitude or within a 350-mile radius of either Texas Tower. At the towers, the safety of the personnel took precedence over all other considerations, including the air defense mission during conditions of normal readiness. ADC had directed, however, that for alert periods in DEFCON 3** or higher, the Texas Towers were to remain manned unless a tropical storm or a 35 hurricane was approaching. On 3 November, weather forcasts

^{**} ADC changed this to DEFCON 2 with Change 1, 17 Nov 62, to ADC OPLan 19-62.




APACHE MAGIC, to be held in December, was cancelled.



indicated 50-knot winds at the Texas Towers. However, the towers continued operational except for 12 minutes on 4 November when Texas Tower 3 was down due to loss in the air conditioning. Bad weather continued with helicopters being sent for tower evacuation on 5 November. Weather conditions necessitated the towers to be placed on evacuation alert status again on 9 November and 14 November. Then on 16 November, General Viccellic and General Greenfield ordered the manning at both towers reduced to seven men* because of high waves. Thus, on 16 November, Texas Tower 3 and 2 became non-operational at 2105Z and 2115Z, respectively. As the storm lessened on 18 Movember, inspectors arrived to perform under water structional inspections. Fifty-three men were returned to Texas Tower 3; but, when the inspectors found severe scouring and erosion around the tower's legs, the tower was re-evacuated on 20 November. Manning continued with seven men at both towers throughout the remainder of the Cuban Crisis while USAF evaluated future utilization of the towers

^{*} The usual complement of a tower was approximately 80 men.







possibly the most serious problems of the crisis. The lack of readily available airlift caused delays in the arrival of support equipment and personnel at dispersal bases. Had it been necessary for deploying aircraft to be employed immediately upon their arrival, the lag caused by the airlift might have had a disasterous effect.

Another problem was the shortage of security personnel. Security personnel were not available at the dispersal bases and only a working minimum were present at the regular bases. Augmentation people had to be supplied from other sources: then, in some cases, airlifted to priority positions. Seventyseven air police were deployed during the first three hours of the alert to 26th Air Division dispersal bases with the last complement arriving at Niagara Falls shortly before midnight on 22 October. This method of gaining supplementary people had disadvantages in that many had inadequate security experience and needed training. No Air National Guard or Air Force Reserve people were used although the Air National Guard offered assistance. The extended period and nature of the alert further complicated the security problem and pointed up a need for more pre-planning to increase the number of security personnel and equipment and the organizing of a



security force fly away kit during a period of emergency.

In an area of high Soviet targeting, force survivability continued to concern the 26th Air Division. Dispersal concepts, tested during the crisis, pointed out the need for a greater deare of the crisis, pointed out the need for a greater deare of the crisis, the continue that the capability to operate attack, the 26th Air Division needed the capability to operate from a greater number of airfields than currently designated by ADC. Thus, the 26th Air Division recommended that the number of dispersal bases selected be increased to improve force flexibility and survivability.

The Bangor CONAD command and control problem, discussed under Command and Control, was resolved with a change in assignment. Effective 1 December 1962, the Bangor CONAD Sector was transferred from Headquarters Continental Air Defense Command to the 26th CONAD Region. Effective the same date, the 26th CONAD Region was assigned an area of responsibility consisting of that U.S. territory and adjacent U.S. territorial waters and international waters contained within the 26th NORAD Region and the Bangor CONAD Sector.

Other problems, such as supply support, long hours, and loss of flying time while on alert, were present; but, overall,





the absence of problems, in what could have been a most serious situation, was one of the most noticeable items of the crisis. The absence of major problems was attributed to previous training that made alert and dispersal assignments almost routine.

CONCLUSION

The Cuban Crisis demonstrated that units of the 26th CONAD Region/26th Air Division (SAGE) could react quickly and effectively upon short notice to an emergency. Training and experience had sharpened the units so that dispersal and deployment assignments were accomplished with a minimum of problems. Thus, the crisis confirmed the training and testing procedures conducted within the Command validating earlier assumptions. The importance of planning was reiterated, especially if the basic plans were valid and flaxible. In this regard, units dispersed and maintained an alert to unfamiliar fields with only a few modifications to basic procedures caused by conditions peculiar to the base. Hext, the crisis introduced an excellent motivating element for all personnel not found generally in a test, exercise, or training. Finally, the Cuban Crisis fulfilled an important facet for the 26th





Air Division; it testified to the Command's high state of readiness and capability to perform the air defense mission.



FOOTNOTES

- Speech, Report to the People, "The U.S. Response to Soviet Military Buildup in Cuba", President J.F. Kennedy, 22 Oct 62.
- Log, Record of Events, 26AD/26NORAD Region COC, 22 Oct 62 to 27 Nov 62, hereafter referred to as COC Log, Doc 1; Msg, CCRC-C-1, CINCNORAD to 26 HORAD Region, et al., 22 Oct 62; Hsg, NCRC-3-31, CINCNORAD to 26 NORAD, et al., 23 Oct 62.
- Mag, 26NCOF-FL 11352, 26 NORAD to Boston NORAD, et al., CINCNORAD/CONAD Declared DEFCON 3 BRAVO 03/16322, 3 Nov 62, Dec 10.
- 4. Interview with Major General Henry Viccellio, Ordr 26 NORAD/CONAD/AD (SAGE), 5 Dec 62.
- Meg, 2600R 62-10946, 26AD (SAGE) to BAADS, et al., Personal Viccellio to Sector Commanders and Commander 55lst, 23 Oct 62, Doc 2.
- CONAD Supp # 1 to NORAD Regulation 55-6, 9 Dec 59, Rules for Engagement of Cuban/Sino-Soviet Tactical Aircraft (SECRET), 22 Oct 62, Doc 13.
- Msg, NOPORN COOP-P X-488, CINCONAD to 26 CONAD, et al., CONAD Operation Plan 2-62, 26 Cct 62, Doc 6.
- 8. Ibid.
- Itr, Maj Gen Henry Viccellio to 26NOOPS and 26NOCC, NORAD Actions Reserved to Commander 26th NORAD Region.

- (Con't) 30 Oct 62. Doc 7; Ltr, Haj Gen Henry Viccellio to 26COFS and 26COCC, CONAD Actions Reserved to Commander 26th CONAD Region, 30 Oct 62. Doc 8.
- 10. Ltr, Maj Gen Henry Viccellio to 26NOOPS and 26NOCC, NORAD Actions Reserved to Commander 26th NORAD Region, 30 Oct 62. Doc 7; Ltr, Maj Gen Henry Viccellio to 26COPS and 26COCC, CCNAD Actions Reserved to Commander 26th CONAD Region, 30 Oct 62. Doc 8.
- IOM, 26COPS to All Officers Concerned, Hq 26th CONAD Region; Hq 26th Air Division, Continuous Battle Staff Henning, Hq 26th CONAD Region 23 Oct 62. Doc 14; Msg, 26NOPS 10-25-47, 26NORAD Region to CINCNORAD, et al., 25 Oct 62. Doc 15.
- 12. Ibid.
- Msg, 26NOIN N62-7026, 26NORAD to Bangor NORAD Sector, et al., NORAD Intelligence Item, 25 Oct 62. Doc 16.
- 14. Mag, NNFO-164, CINCHORAD to 26 NORAD, et al., Canadian Personnel, 29 Oct 62.
- Msg, NCRC-C-69, CINCONAD to Cmdr CONAD Sector Bangor, 27 Oct 62; Msg, 26COOP-FR, 662-7050, 26CONAD to CONAD Sector Bangor, et al., 30 Oct 62; Msg, COOP-E X-517, CINCONAD to 26CONAD Region, 6 Nov 62. Doc 5.
- Msg, CCRC-C-1, CINCNORAD to 26 NORAD Region et al., 22 Oct 62.
- 17. COC log, Doc 1; Msg, CCRC-C-1, CINCNORAD to 26 NORAD Region, et al., 22 Oct 62.
- Msg, NCRC-C-184, CINCNORAD to 26 NORAD Region, et al., 17 Nov 62. Doc 11.
- 19. COC Log, Doc 1.
- 20. Syracuse Post Standard, 21 Nov 62.

- 21. Interview with Major General Henry Viccellio, Commander 26NORAD/AD (SAGE), 5 Dec 62; COC Log, Doc 1; Mag, 26OOP-W 62-12096, 26AD (SAGE) to WAADS, Force Withdrawal South East U.S. 30 Nov 62. Doc 12; Mag, 26OOP-WF 62-12113, 26AD (SAGE) to WAADS and 48th FIS, Withdrawal of Forces S. E. USA, 5 Dec. Doc 17.
- Hsg. 2600F-WF 2226, 26AD (SAGE) to WAADS, 68FIS, 482FIS, 55LAEWAGC Wing, Message for General Gerhart from General Gent, 12 Dec 62. Doc 18.
- 23. <u>Ibid</u>.
- 24. Ibid.
- Msg, 2600P-WF 0591-C, 26AD (SAGE) to BAADS, et al., External Fuel Tanks, 30 Oct 62. Doc 19.
- 26. Msg, 2600P-WP 0588-C, 26AD (SAGE) to BAADS, et al., Waiver of Peacetime Flying Limitations, 30 Oct 62. Doc 9; Msg, ADOOP-WI I-72, ADC to 26 AD (SAGE), et al., Waiver of Peacetime Flying Limitations, 26 Oct 62.
- Msg, ADMDC 2902, ADC to 26AD (SAGE), Limitations to Force Survivability, 26 Oct 62.
- Msg, 26COOP-O H62-7028, 26GOBAD to GONAD Setr Boston, et al., 25 Oct 62. Dec 3; Msg, CCEC-C-28, CINCONAD to 26GONAD, et al., 24 Oct 62.
- 29. Ibid.
- 30. COC Log, Doc 1.
- Msg, 2cdOP-0585-C, 26AD to BAADS, Fighter Flushing at ADC/SAC Collecated Bases, 25 Oct 62. Doc 4.
- Hsg, NOET-E-134, CINCHORAD to 26AD, et al., HORAD Training-Exercises, 25 Oct 62, Msg, NORC-C-51, CINCHORAB to 26MORAD, et al., 27 Oct 62.

- 33. Msg, 26NOOF-OE 11-21-71, 26NORAD to NORAD Setr Boston, et al., Exercise Postponements, 21 Nov 62. Doc 20; Msg, 26NOOF-OE 11-21-69, 26th NORAD Region Exercise Schedule for the Months of Dec., Jan., and Fab., 21 Nov 62. Doc 21; Msg, 26NOOF-OE 12-28-48, 26 NORAD Region to CG 1st Region ARADCOM, et al., 26 NORAD Region Exercise Schedule for the Months of Jan., Feb., and Mar., 28 Dec 62. Doc 22.
- Meg, 26NOOP-OE 12-28-48, 26NORAD Region to GG lst Region ARADCOM, et al., 26 NORAD Region Exercise Schedule for the Months of Jan., Feb., and Mar., 28 Dec 62. Doc 22.
- ADC OPlan 18-62, Texas Tower Evacuation Plan, 10 Nov 62; Change 1, to ADC OPlan 19-62, Texas Tower Evacuation Plan 10 Nov 62, 17 Nov 62.
- 36. COC Log, Doc 1.
- Meg, APOOP-DE-WC 60608, C of S USAF to ADC, 7 Dec 62, Doc 23.
- Interview with Maj R. D. B. Schmidt, 26AD Msl Br, OPs and Training, 8 Jan 63.
- 39. Interview with 2d Lt M. G. McHulty, Base Provost Harshal, Niagara Falls Airport, Niagara Falls, Bew York, 14 Mov 62; Interview with Lt Col John E. Gannon, Chief Security/Law Enforcement Division, 26AD (SAGE), 16 Nov 62; Interview with S/Sgt V. O. Turner, Provost Sgt, 35th Msl Sq., 14 Nov 62.
- Interview with Maj R. D. B. Schmidt, 26AD Mel Br. Ops and Training, 8 Jan 63.
- 41. Ltr, 26AD to ADC, Object Lessons, 27 Dec 62. Doc 24.
- Interview with Lt Col John E. Gannon, Chief Security/Law Enforcement Division, 26AD (SAGE), 16 Nov 62.
- 43. Ibid.

- 44. Ltr, 26AD to ADC, Object Lessons, 27 Dec 62. Doc 24.
- 45. Ibid.
- 46. GO 29, CONAD, 30 Nov 62.
- 47. Interview with it Col Donald V. Miller, Ex Off, DCS/OFS, 26AD, 19 Dec 62; Interview with Capt. Bell Detach C. O. 75FIS, 14 Nov 62; Interview with Detach C. O. 49FIS, 14 Nov 62; Interview with Maj K. L. Patrick, 2600P-WF, 19 Dec 62.
- 48. Interview with Col W. P. Mace, 26NOPS/2600P, 9 Jan 63.



CHRONOLOGY

Date	Event
22 October	President John F. Kennedy spoke to the Nation concerning the missile buildup in Cuba.
	DEFCON 3 declared at 2300Zulu.
	Units of the 26th Air Division were deployed to Homestead AFB, Florida; Patrick AFB, Florida; Langley AFB, Virginia; Niagara Falls Municipal Airport, Niagara Falls, New York; Atlantic City Airport, Atlantic City, New Jersey; Burlington Municipal Airport, Burlington, Vermont; and Olmstead AFB, Pennsylvania.
23 October	DELTA alert status achieved five hours after alert was implemented.
	Freeze placed on military personnel.
24 October	At 1000Z, U.S. quarantine of Cuba began.
	Russian merchant ships began turning away from Cuban destination.
	All elements of 26th HORAD Region was placed on CHARLIE elert status, after attaining full DELTA alert status.
25 October	Soviet oil tanker, the Bucharest, was intercepted but not boarded.
	CINCONAD sent a message confirming that all planned exercises and training would be suspended until further notice.
26 October	Russian chartered Lebanese freighter, the Marucla, was intercepted, boarded, and searched without incident.
	Bangor CONAD Sector was placed under the 26th CONAD Region for matters pertaining to CONAD and the Cuban Crisis.





Date	Event
26 October	Notification received that certain Air National Guard units might be mobilized.
27 October	Major Rudolf Anderson Jr., a SAC U-2 pilot was killed while on a reconnaissance mission over Cuba. He became the first casualty of the Cuban Crisis.
30 October	Quarantine was lifted two days while U Thant, the acting Secretary-General of the United Nations conferred in Cuba with Fidel Castro.
	Russian trawlers and mother ship were sighted approximately 20 miles off of Cape Cod. Another group of 24 were seen about 60 miles off of Cape Cod.
l November	Quarantine reinstated.
2 November	U.S. reconnaissance aircraft confirm the dismantling of missale sites.
3 November	DEFCON 3 BRAVO declared.
6 November	AEW&C aircraft received jamming for a short duration in the vicinity of the Bussian trawlers.
9 November	Air National Guard fighter interceptor squadrons were returned to routine scremble status.
16 November	Both Texas Towers were evacuated due to a severe storm.
17 November	The 26th Air Division received instructions to return dispersed aircraft from Olmstead, Niagara Falls, Atlantic City, and Burlington.
18 November	Texas Towers underwent inspections so that they could be reoscupied:
19 November	All dispersed aircraft were returned to home base except those deployed to Florida.
20 November	Quarantine lifted by Fresident Kennedy as crisis dissipates.





Date	EVENS
27 November	Daily Log of COC and 24 hour duty of Battle Staff manning was discontinued.
28 November	F-102's of the 482d Fighter Interceptor Squad- ron were returned from Homestead AFB, Florida, to Seymour Johnson AFB, North Carolina.
	DEFCON 5 declared.
3 December	The first Soviet Ilyushin-28 jet bombers were sighted leaving Cuba.
6 December	F-106's of the 48th Fighter Interceptor Squad- ron were returned from Patrick AFE, Florida to Langley AFE, Virginia.




FIGHTER INTERCEPTOR STATUS AT HOME BASE*

		17 Oct	17 Oct	1 Nov		g Nov		21 Nov	,	26 Nov	,	26 Dec	
2-101	Bage	Auth	Possid	Poss 1 d	Œ	Poss*d	œ	Possid	<u>OR</u>	Possid	<u>úr.</u>	Poss'd	œ
ZFIS 49PIS 60PIS 75FIS 98PIS	Suffolk Griffies Otis Dow Dover	18 24 18 19 19	16 22 17 17	16 15 17 13	15 12 16 9 4	15 16 16 13	12 7 10 9	16 24 16 16 17	12 18 13 15	16 24 17 16 17	12 20 14 16 14	16 21 17 16 17	14 19 14 16 16
444FIS F-102	Charleston	19	15	13	13	14	12	15	11	15	13	16	15
76FIS 462FIS	Westover Seymour- Johnson	21 27	19 24	12 13	10 10	12 19	9 13	17 19	75 74	17 21	14 14	20 24	18 19
Postice.		,											
2/FIS 48PIS 95FIS 539FIS	Loring Langley Andrews McGuire	23 21 20 21	21 20 17 15	16 7 11 13	4 3 5	16 7 11 21	4 6 12	21 7 17 16	15 2 11	21 8 17 16	12 5 14 12	21 20 16 14	15 13 12 10
P-100													
118ANG	Bradley Fld	22	19	19	14	19	15	19	12	19	12	19	
F-89													
134ANG 132ANG	Burlington Dow	25 24	27 28	27 26	23 24	27 28	23 24	27 28	22 23	27 28	23 20	27 28	

FIGHTER INTERCEPTOR STATUS AT HOME BASE

		17 Oct	17 Oct	1 Nov	<i>†</i>	8 No	T.	21 1	lov	2 6 1	loΨ	26 Dec	
F-102	Basa	Auth	Posn'd	Poga*	<u>CR</u>	Poss	<u>a or</u>	Poss*	d OR	Poss	4 Œ	Possid OR	
146ang	Fitteburg	17	16	16	10	14	8	14	11	14	13	25	
F=104									4				
157ANG	McEntire	24	24	24	16	24	16	24	16	23	7	23	



26TH AIR DIVISION AIRCRAFT DEFLOYED STATUS

(23 October thru 6 December)

					23.0	ct 62	8 Nov 62		19 Nov 62		
	Unit	Dago.	Deployed To	a√g.	Possid & OR	Combst <u>Losded</u>	Poss'd & OR	Combat Londed	Poss'd & OR	Combat Lended	
•	27FIS 48FIS 482FIS	Westover AFB Dover AFB Andrews AFB Griffies AFB Dow AFB McQuire AFB Loring AFB Lengley AFB Seymour-Johnson AFB Charleston AFB	Burlington Atlantic City Atlantic City Siegara Falls Siegare Falls Olmstead Langloy Olmstead Patrick AFB Homestead AFB Langley AFB Andrews AFB	F-102 F-101 F-106 F-101 F-106 F-106 F-106 F-102 F-101 F-101	65584446214 2	6 8 4 4 6	6 4 8 4 6 12 5 2	6 3 4 8 4 4 6	644844 6252	644844 6 2	
	Total				70	33	55	37	55	38	

Source: 26th Air Division Aircraft Deployed Status Chart, 26000

76FIS 98FIS	Westover AFB Dover AFB	Burlington Atlantic City	F-102 F-101			
95FIS	Indrevs AFB	Atlantic City	F-106			
ASPIS		Niegere Falls	F-101			
	Dow APB	Niegera Falls	F-101			
539FIS	McGuire AFB	Cimetesc	F-106		•	
		Langley	F-106			
27713	Loring AFB	Olmstead	F-106			
	Lengley AFB	Patrick AFB	F-106	12	12	Redeployed
482FIS	Seymour Johnson AFB	Homesteed AFB	F+102	5	Redeployed	
	Charleston AFB	Langley AFB	P~101	2	Redeployed	
		Andrews AFB	F-101			

21 Nov 62

Poss'd Combat

A/C & CR Loaded

28 Nov 62

Poss'd Combat

& OR Loaded

Fose'd Combat

& OR Loaded

Sources 26th Air Division Aircraft Deployed Status Chart, 26000

Deployed To

Unit Bese



STATES OF ALERT CONDITIONS

		ALFHA				PRAVO	!			0	HARLI	<u>E</u>		
Heapon Trie	5 <u>Bn</u>	15 15n	30 Min	Min 5		15 151		30 Ma	5 Min		15 <u>Min</u>		30 Min	5 Min
Kamed Interceptor	2	1/3 A/C poss+d per Sq		2	8 per 24 1/C Sq.	6 A/C per 18 A/G Sq	4 A/C per 12 A/C Sq		2	12 A/C per 24 A/C Sq	10 A/C per 18 A/C Sq	6 A/C Per 12 A/C Sq		All combat ready A/C
Surface-to-Ai combat ready fire units in a defense with more than 2 fi units (NIGE- MERCULES)	h	25%	50 %			50%		25%			50\$		50\$	100%
Surface-to-Air combat ready fire units in a defense with more than 2 fi units (EIRE- ERCURES)	1	50 %	50 %								50%		50¢	100\$
Surface-to-Air combat ready i units (NIKE-22	ire	25%	50%					25%			50%		50%	100%
Umanued Inter							- 40							

All combat ready missiles at a two minute state of elert



DEFCON INSTRUCTIONS

Defense Readiness Condition (DEFCON)

A general indication of the type action that may be taken or directed to bring the air defense system to a desired readiness posture to meet any contingency. Defense Readiness Conditions consist of 5 numbered DEFCON's and

DEFCON 5

A normal readiness posture which can be sustained indefinately and which represents an optimum balance between the requirements of readiness and the routine training and equipping of forces for their primary mission.

DEFCON A

A readiness posture requiring increased intelligence watch and a continuing analysis of the political/military situation in the area of tension; review contingency plans for the area concerned, and based on the above analysis, make modifications or formulate new plans, as required; take actions to increase security and anti-sabotage measures, etc., if considered necessary; keep appropriate commanders informed of the developing situation. During this condition no measures will be taken which could be considered provocative or which might disclose operational plans. Every effort should be made to insure that measures taken do not cause public speculation.

DEFCON 3

A readiness posture that requires certain portions of the assigned forces to assume increased readiness posture above that of normal readiness. Generally, in this condition, all forces and resources will come from within the command. Plans of the next higher condition are reviewed and readied. During this condition no measures will be taken which could be considered provocative or which might disclose operational plans. In assuming this condition, and unless otherwise directed, commanders should time-phase actions in a manner to avoid public speculation, if possible.

DEFCON 2

A readiness posture requiring a further increase in military force readiness which is less than maximum readiness; certain military deployments and selected civil actions may be necessary in cononance with the commander's mission; resources may be made available from outside the command; preliminary measures are taken to permit the most rapid transition to maximum readiness, if necessary.





DEPCON 1

A maximum readiness posture requiring the highest state of preparedness to execute war plans.

Air Defense Emergency

The highest state of preparedness by the military forces and civilian agencies whereby all air defense measures are readed for implementation. This is the declaration which is the authorization to implement approved military and civilian plans and agreements for defense of the North American Continent. Subsequent to the declaration of the Air Defense Emergency, imminence of attack will be epecified by Air Defense Warning Red, Air Defense Warning Yellow or Air Defense Warning Warting White.

Air Defense Warning Red

A declaration meaning that attack by hostile aircraft/missiles is imminent or is taking place.

Air Defense Warning Yellow Is probable.

Air Defense Warning White

Is not considered immediately probable or imminent but does not cancel Air Defense Emergency.



966th Airtorne Early Warning and Control Squadron Cumulative Station Manning Data

18 October to & December 1962


	STATION "DOG"	STATION "ECHO"	TOTAL.
Station Required	1152+00	1010+45	23.62+45
Station Provided	1151+40	1010+30	2162+10
Per Cent Provided	99-97%	99.97%	99.97%
Bent Time	12+00	5+35	17+35
Per Cent Bent Time	1.045	0.5528	0.812%
Station Break	+20	+15	+35
Per Cent Station Break	0.038	0.03%	0.03%
APS 45 in	1054+10	920+10	1974+20
Per Cent APS 45 in	92.5%	91.04%	91.29%
Track Tetal	1961	2257	L216


966th Airborne Early Warning and Control Squadron Cumulative Station Manning Data

AEWEC Intercepts	50	14	64
н.А.	48	12	60
K-I-	2	2 .	4



- Station DXG performed low altitude radar between Florida and Cuba in the vicinity of the Florida Reys.
- ** Station ECHO performed low altitude radar coverage between Florida and Cuba in the vicinity of the Great Bahama Bank.





PHOTOGRAPHS

- Dispersed fighter aircraft of the 49th Fighter Interceptor Squadron on alert at Niagara Falls Municipal Airport, Niagara Falls, New York.
- Deployed fighter sircraft of the AAAth Fighter Interceptor Squadron at Langley AFF, Virginia.
- Maintenance being performed on a BOMARC during the Cuban Crisis at the 35th Air Force Missile Squadron, Niagara Falls Municipal Airport, Niagara Falls, New York.